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The Regulation of Mining and Mining Waste
in the European Union
Yvonne Scannell*
Abstract
This article reviews EU law relating to the regulation of mining
and mining waste, liability for environmental damage caused by mining,
remedies for environmental damage caused by mining, mine closure
obligations and the nature of financial guarantees required to ensure the
proper performance of environmental obligations, as well as developments
in EU law which have resulted in the elucidation of human rights available
at a supranational level to those subjected to severe pollution from mining
activities. It notes that much of the world’s mineral resources are located in
developing countries which have less sophisticated environmental
regulations and greater potential to experience environmental and social
disasters from mining activities than the EU, proposes the regulation of
mines of international significance on a more global scale, and speculates
whether the relatively sophisticated EU mining regulatory system can
provide an embryonic model for this.
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I. Introduction

Despite the importance of mining in meeting the need for minerals
and its contributions to economic and social development, concerns about
aspects of its performance prevail. Mining and the use and disposal of
mining wastes have sometimes caused significant environmental and social
damage. Some communities and indigenous groups living near mines have
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alleged human rights abuses.1 In the EU, spectacular mining accidents in
Spain (Aznalcollar) and Romania (Baia Mare) linked to burst tailings dams
illustrated the environmental risks in disposing of mining waste and
highlighted the need for major reforms in mining laws.2 It is not always
clear that mining benefits host countries economically and socially because
the minerals sector often operates in countries where there is poor
governance with which it is sometimes associated.3 The International
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) has recognized that mining faces
governance and operational problems.4 This concern is particularly apposite
because the majority of the world’s potential mineral resources are located
in developing countries.5 ICMM recognizes that corporate responsibility to
shareholders does not exonerate mining companies—whether operating in
their home countries or abroad—from their responsibilities to the
environment and to local communities liable to be adversely affected by
mining operations.6 The EU has also addressed mining issues. In the last
1.
See Taskin and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 46117/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 126, 138
(2005) (finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); see also Jo M. Render, Mining and
Indigenous Peoples Issues Review, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, 18–
20, available at http://www.icmm.com/page/1161/mining-and-indigenous-peoples-issuesreview (then follow “Download PDF” hyperlink) (describing the recognition of human
rights issues with indigenous groups).
2.
See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Big Sludge Spill Poisons Land in Southern Spain, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/world/big-sludge-spill-poisonsland-in-southernspain.html?scp=1&sq=Big%20Sludge%20Spill%20Poisons%20Land%20in%20Southern%2
0Spain&st=cse (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (describing the effects of the Aznacolar mining
accident) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
3.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, MINING,
PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT 19–24 (Alastair Sharp-Paul & Liz Jacobsen eds.,
2011) [hereinafter ICMM], available at http://www.icmm.com/mpdtoolkit (then follow
“Download PDF” hyperlink) (describing the challenges of mining in a country with poor
governance).
4.
See Our Work, ICMM, http://www.icmm.com/our-work (last visited Nov. 3, 2011)
(describing the aims of ICMM’s work) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
5.
See BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 7 (June 2009), available at
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_public
ations/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_r
eview_of_world_energy_full_report_2009.pdf (mapping the proven oil reserves at the end of
2008). North America (70.9) and Europe and Eurasia (142.2) had 213.1 thousand million
barrels of proven oil reserves, while South and Central America (132.2), Asia and the Pacific
(42), Africa (142.2), and the Middle East (754.1) had 1070.5 thousand million barrels of
proven oil reserves. Id.
6.
See
generally
Sustainable
Development
Framework,
ICMM,
http://www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainable-development-framework (last visited Nov. 7,
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twenty years or so, a transformation has taken place in the EU mining
industry largely in response to stringent EU requirements relating to
environmental protection and accident prevention.7 This article presents a
broad overview of the current status of the law in the EU relating to mining
and mining waste, illustrates the many possibilities for enforcing mining
legislation at Member State and supranational levels, argues that there is a
case for the supranational regulation of mining and mining waste, and
speculates whether the EU regulation of mining can serve as an embryonic
model for this on a global scale.
II. How EU Law Works
To appreciate how EU law governs the environmental aspects of
mining, it is important to understand how it applies in the EU.8 The EU
itself is neither a conventional international organization nor a federal state:
it is a supranational organization of twenty-seven Member States with its
own legal order.9 This can be characterized as an integrated legal order,
which means that the Member States10 share responsibility with the EU for
ensuring that EU laws are effectively and properly executed.11 The EU has
the power to enact legislation binding on all Member States and the
authority to enter into international agreements.12 The most frequently used
legislation in the environmental field is the Directive, of which at least 700
2011) (describing the Sustainable Development Framework ICMM members are required to
implement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
7.
See, e.g., JIM WALKER & STEVE HOWARD, FINDING THE WAY FORWARD: HOW
COULD VOLUNTARY ACTION MOVE MINING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT? 10–11
(2002) (describing the forces for change in the mining industry); see also NATALIA
YAKOVLEVA, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MINING INDUSTRIES 80 (2005)
(describing the corporate governance policy with respect to disclosure of social policies).
8.
For a description of how EU law works, see generally JAN H. JANS & HANS H.B.
VEDDER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2012) and KLAUS-DIETER BORCHADT, THE ABC
OF
EUROPEAN
UNION
LAW
(2010),
available
at
http://europa.eu/documentation/legislation/pdf/oa8107147_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
9.
See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 21–24 (describing fundamental principles of the
EU legal order).
10.
The EU Member States are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands (since 1951), Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1980),
Spain, Portugal (1986), Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta (2005), Romania, and
Bulgaria (2007). See Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (listing the EU Member States) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
11.
See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 115 (stating that Member States must implement
law and enforce it in their national courts).
12.
See id. at 80–82 (describing the sources of EU law).
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deal with environmental matters.13 A Directive is a type of legislation that
has to be implemented in the national legal orders of Member States in a
manner as to guarantee that the objectives prescribed in it are attained in
that State.14 Member States have a choice or discretion as to how this is
ensured.15 The authorities responsible for implementing a Directive in
practice are called “competent authorities.”16 When a European Directive
confers rights on individuals, these rights have to be made available by
Member States in clearly binding domestic legislation, and individuals must
be empowered to enforce their rights before national courts.17 This makes
EU law more powerful than international law. The EU Commission or
another Member State can sue a Member State before the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) when it is not complying with its European obligations.18
The ECJ has power to sanction States for not complying with their
obligations.19
Although it is almost heretical to say so, a major advantage that has
improved the quality of EU environmental law is that it is made at a
supranational level by the European Council of Ministers (Council of
Ministers) and the European Parliament.20 The Council of Ministers is a
13.
See generally Summaries of EU Legislation: Environment, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2012)
(summarizing environmental directives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
14.
See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 89.
15.
See id.
16.
A competent authority is a body with legal authority to act on behalf of the
Member State to ensure that EU law is administered and enforced. It can operate at national,
regional, or local levels.
17.
The ECJ has held that the provisions of a Directive must be implemented with
unquestionable binding force and with the necessary specificity, precision, and clarity to
satisfy the principle of legal certainty, which requires that, in the case of a Directive intended
to confer rights on individuals, the persons concerned must be enabled to ascertain the full
extent of their rights. See Case C-197/96, Comm’n v. France, 1997 E.C.R. I-1496, I-1501
(holding that France failed to uphold its obligation to ensure equal employment, vocational
training, promotion, and working conditions for women); Case C-207/96, Comm’n v. Italy,
1997 E.C.R. I-06869, I-06869 (finding that Italy violated Community laws by retaining laws
that prohibit the employment of women); JAN H. JANS, ROEL DE LANGE, SACHA PRECHAL &
ROB WIDDERSHOVEN, EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC LAW 63–96 (2009) (describing the
doctrine of direct effect, which states that Community law confers rights on individuals
independently of the legislation of Member States).
18.
See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 87–112 (describing how obligations are enforced).
19.
See id. at 103–12. The ECJ’s official name was changed from the “Court of Justice
of the European Communities” to the “Court of Justice” after the Treaty of Lisbon came into
force on December 1, 2009 although it is still called the European Court of Justice. The
Court of First Instance was renamed as the “General Court,” and the term “Court of Justice
of the European Union” officially designate the two courts.
20.
See id. at 98–103 (describing the EU’s legislative process).
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body of only twenty-seven people (one Environmental Minister from each
Member State) who are much more isolated from national politics, lobby
groups, and parliamentary scrutiny and control than they would be if
involved in legislating domestically.21 Consequently, they are more
amenable to persuasion on the objective merits of proposals and (because
less politically accountable in their own countries) are less accommodating
to vested interests than they would be if operating at a national level.
Furthermore, although the European Parliament has equal legislative power
with the Council of Ministers under the co-decision procedure, almost all
EU environmental legislation is passed under a consultation procedure,
whereby the European Parliament has limited legislative powers amounting
only to limited powers to delay legislation.22 The result is that the EU
legislature, insulated from the pressures of domestic politics, is often able to
enact higher quality environmental legislation than most individual Member
States.23
III. Mining, Mining Waste, and Human Rights
The EU ensures that mines and mining waste are managed properly
by a combination of environmental, health and safety, and human rights
law. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),24 the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter of Fundamental
Rights),25 and the European Social Charter,26 all of which bind EU Member
21.
See id. at 53–61 (describing the composition and presidency of the Council of
Ministers).
22.
See Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the
EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 533, 535 (Sept.
2006),
available
at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14685965.2006.00650.x/pdf (describing how the consultation procedure contributes to the
democratic deficit).
23.
It is arguable that the allegedly undemocratic EU legislative process is one of the
reasons why the EU was able to adopt the Climate Change Package and assume world
leadership in climate change adaption. See European Commission, What is the EU Doing on
Climate Change?, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2011) (describing that the EU is a leading force in combating climate change)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
24.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 194 (entered into force June 1, 2010) [hereinafter CPHRFF],
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (listing protected
human rights); see also Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, C.E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Nov.
1, 1998), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/155.htm (amending
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
25.
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 51, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1, 21 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. The Charter of Fundamental Rights
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States27 and the institutions of the EU,28 guarantee certain human rights that
can be impaired by mining activities.29 The vindication of these rights
requires EU Member States and/or the EU itself as appropriate to protect
citizens’ health, safety, and environment from serious actual or threatened
environmental harm.30

is only binding on Member States when they are implementing EU law. The United
Kingdom, Poland, and the Czech Republic have opted out of the Charter. There is
considerable debate concerning what effect the Protocol containing this opt-out will actually
have. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM
238–40 (2010) (stating that one reading of the Protocol is that it is merely interpretative and
will have limited legal consequences).
26.
See European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, E.T.S. 35, available at
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/035.htm; Revised European Social
Charter,
May
3,
1996,
E.T.S.
163,
available
at
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm
[hereinafter
Social
Charter]; Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of
Collective Complaints, Nov. 9, 1995, C.E.T.S. No. 158, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/158.htm (establishing a complaints
procedure). All EU Member States are party to the ECHR and to the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. See European Social Charter, supra note 26; Revised European Social Charter, supra
note 26. Although all Member States have signed and ratified the original or revised
European Social Charter, not all have subscribed to all obligations in it or allowed rights to
NGOs to complain of State violations. Id. Many States outside the EU are also party to the
ECHR and to the European Social Charter. Id.; CPHRFF, supra note 24.
27.
Although all are binding on Member States, some States have not accepted all
aspects of the ECHR or the European Social Charter. See European Social Charter, supra
note 26; Revised European Social Charter, supra note 26; CPHRFF, supra note 24.
Meanwhile, the obligations of the UK, Poland, and the Czech Republic with respect to the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU remain unclear. See The European Charter of
Fundamental Rights: the Commission’s Strategy for Implementation, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
AND
DEFENCE
SECTION,
SN/IA/5963
(May
13,
2011),
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05963.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2011) (stating
that the compatibility of UK law and the Charter is a matter of concern) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
28.
See Treaty on European Union art. F(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0001000001
(“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November
1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as
general principles of Community law.”).
29.
See, e.g., Social Charter, supra note 26, art. 22 (declaring a right to take part in the
determination and improvement of working conditions and the working environment).
30.
See, e.g., id. arts. 3, 11 (declaring rights to safe and healthy working conditions
and to the protection of health). See also supra note 28.
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A. The European Convention on Human Rights

Under Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU
considers fundamental rights granted on the basis of the ECHR to be
general principles of Community law.31 This is not the place for extensive
elaboration on the nature and extent of obligations incumbent upon States
under the above instruments: suffice it to say that the obligations imposed
on State parties to the ECHR have been interpreted to provide substantive
rights to individuals affected by serious or imminent environmental damage
as well as the procedural rights needed to realize substantive rights.32 These
procedural rights can be found in Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 13
(right to an effective remedy).33 No less than six of the eighteen
environment-related cases that have come before the ECHR have involved
31.
In practical terms, this means that the EU as an institution is bound by the ECHR,
and, as a consequence, since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg is able to deal with cases relating to the EU. See Martin
Lassen-Vernal & Brendan Sweeney, Lisbon Treaty Boosts Human Rights in Europe, THE
DANISH
INSTITUTE
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS
http://humanrights.inforce.dk/news/
lisbon+treaty+boosts+human+rights+in+europe (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (commenting on
the augmentation of human rights in Europe effected by the Lisbon Treaty) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Note that 47 States
and the EU are now parties to the ECHR.
32.
See, e.g., Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for “Tatar
v. Romania”) (finding a violation of Article 8 because the government did not provide
people living in the neighbourhood with sufficient information about the risks associated
with a company using cyanide to extract gold); Budayeva and Others v. Russia, App. No.
15339/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 195 (2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for “Budayeva and Others v. Russia”)
(holding that the State had violated Articles 8 and 2 by failing to take ex ante regulatory
measures to control risk and to warn of life threatening emergencies and to hold an ex post
judicial enquiry when the risk of a mud slide causing deaths transpired); Taskin and Others
v. Turkey, App. No. 46117/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 138 (2005) (finding a violation of Articles 6
and 8 for allowing continued use of sodium cyanide in mine production and inadequate
enforcement of laws); Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 138 (2005),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case
Title” for “Fadeyeva v. Russia”) (finding a violation of Article 8 when woman suffered from
polluting emissions because the government failed to strike a fair balance between the
interests of the community and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for
her home and her private life); Moreno Gomez v. Spain, App. No. 4143/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶¶ 60–63 (2004), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(search “Case Title” for “Gomez v. Spain”) (finding a violation of Article 8 because
authorities did not address noise from nightclubs); Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99,
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 118 (2004), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for “Oneryildiz v. Turkey”) (finding a
violation of Article 2 because the State had not adequately warned inhabitants of dangers
from landfill).
33.
CPHRFF, supra note 24, arts. 6, 13.
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environmental and health and safety problems caused by mines or mining
waste disposal facilities,34 as too has the most important case decided by the
Committee of Social Rights.35
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (the right to the
peaceful enjoyment of property) has been invoked against a State party that
did not act where an illegally built structure devalued the applicant’s
property and interfered with her right to light and her view.36 Article 2 of
the Convention (the right to life) has been interpreted to require States to
provide an adequate regulatory framework and to take the necessary
practical measures to safeguard the life and health of persons living near an
illegally operated landfill.37 Article 8 (the right to private and family life)
has been interpreted to impose a duty on States to warn the public of
dangers to health and safety from dangerous facilities, including a mine
waste facility,38 a duty to ensure that the health of citizens is not directly
and seriously endangered by the adverse environmental effects of
potentially dangerous facilities, including mines,39 a duty to provide
34. See Environment-Related Cases in the Court’s Case Law, European Court of Human
Rights, at 3–4 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/0C818E19-C40B412E-9856-44126D49BDE6/0/FICHES_Environnement_EN.pdf (summarizing key decisions
involving human rights and the environment).
35.
See Decision on the Merits, Marangopoulos Found. for Human Rights v. Greece,
Complaint No. 30/2005, Eur. Comm. Soc. Rts. ¶ 195 (2006), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/complaints/CC30Merits_en.pdf
(interpreting Article 11 of the Charter as including the right to a healthy environment). The
European Committee of Social Rights rules on State compliance with the European Social
Charter under the 1988 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter and the 1996
European Social Charter (revised). See Revised European Social Charter, supra note 26.
36.
See Antonetto v. Italy, App. No. 15918/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000) (condemning a
Member State for failure to protect a landowner’s property rights by not enforcing laws
against an illegally erected building for seventeen years).
37.
See Oneryildiz, App. No. 48939/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. A landfill is not essentially
different, in legal terms, from a mining waste facility.
38.
See Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (finding that the
State’s failure to provide for an appropriate regulatory system ensuring effective and
proportionate measures to deal with mine pollution and the risks from a gold mine
constituted a breach of Article 8); Guerra v. Italy, App. No.14967/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60
(1998) (finding that the State’s failure to provide a warning system against industrial
accidents from a fertilizer factory constituted a breach of Article 8).
39.
See Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 122–23
(2011) (finding that applicants suffered health problems and damage to their house and
living environment as a result of a nearby coal mine and factory, that the government owed a
duty to take appropriate remedial measures, and that there was a violation of Article 8); see
also Budayeva and Others v. Russia, App. No. 15339/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 201 (2008),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case
Title” for “Budayeva and Others v. Russia”) (holding that actions that violated Article 2
because of failures to provide adequate health and safety measures also constituted a
violation of Article 8); Marangopoulos Foundation, ¶ 122 (explaining that specific
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appropriate regulatory systems and to take appropriate and effective action
to prevent imminent threats from serious pollution to the health and safety
of persons in their territories,40 a duty to enforce environmental and other
laws designed to ensure respect for rights guaranteed by the Convention in
cases of severe pollution,41 and a duty to provide appropriate remedies for

obligations of employees exist under Article 8 to effectively handle occupational accidents,
including a written evaluation of occupational risk); Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No.
48939/99,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
¶ 160
(2004),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for
“Oneryildiz v. Turkey”) (finding a violation of Article 8 based on the same facts that
warranted a violation of Article 2). See generally Office of the High Commission for Human
Rights, Consultation on Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation
(May 11, 2007), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/docs/
consultationReportmay07.pdf (summarizing the relationship between clean water and
enjoyment of the right to life and health); KEVIN WATKINS, UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (Bruce Ross-Larson et al. eds., 2006), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf (discussing the relation between human
development and access to clean drinking water).
40.
See Budayeva, App. No. 15339/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 199–201 (finding a duty to
warn local resident of nearby dangers); Oneryildiz, App. No. 48939/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 75
(same).
41.
See Moreno Gomez v. Spain, App. No. 4143/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 61–63 (2005),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case
Title” for “Gomez v. Spain”) (finding Spain condemned for a breach of Article 8 for not
enforcing noise control laws against night clubs); Dees v. Hungary, App. No. 2345/06, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 24 (2011) (finding Hungary in violation of Article 8 for not properly regulating
heavy traffic which caused noise nuisance and other ill effects); Mileva and Others v.
Bulgaria, App. Nos. 43449/02, 21475/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 97, 101–02 (2010) (finding
Bulgaria in breach of Article 8 for failing to respond properly to the applicants’ complaints
about noise nuisances and for not enforcing noise abatement orders); Dubetska and Others v.
Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 120 (2011) (stating that the State should have
been aware of environmental dangers from state-owned factories); Lopez Ostra v. Spain,
App. No. 16798/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (1994) (finding Spain’s failure to provide a remedy
for serious pollution caused by a wastewater treatment plant constituted a violation of
Article 8); Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 89 (2005), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for
“Fadeyeva v. Russia”) (finding that the state is required to take positive actions to secure
rights for its residents); Giacomelli v. Italy, App. No. 59909/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 98 (2007)
(finding that the failure of administrative authorities to comply with municipal
environmental laws on environmental impact assessment and to enforce court orders
suspending the operation of a hazardous waste plant constituted a violation of Article 8);
Guerra v. Italy, App. No.14967/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 53 (1998) (finding a State duty to collect
and disseminate information about environmental dangers); Taskin and Others v. Turkey,
App. No. 46117/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 126 (2005) (finding a violation of Article 8 where State
authorities deliberately defied final judicial decisions); Tatar v. Romania, App. No.
67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (finding that the state has a duty to regulate activities
dangerous to the environment and human health).
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individuals whose rights have been infringed by serious pollution.42 The
European Court of Human Rights has enforced these duties against partyStates when the individuals bringing suit had not obtained a remedy from
their national courts and/or regulatory authorities; individuals have also
enforced Convention rights in domestic courts in those Member States that
have incorporated the guarantees in the ECHR into their domestic law.43
B. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union came
into effect following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on
December 1, 2009.44 Enshrining a broad range of political, social, and
economic rights for EU citizens and residents into EU law, it has the same
legal value as the European Union Treaties.45 The EU is required to act and
legislate consistently with the Charter, as must Member States when
implementing EU law.46 The Charter applies to Member States only when
they are implementing EU law; it does not extend the competences of the
EU beyond those given to it elsewhere in the EU Treaties.47 Much of the
Charter is based on the ECHR, the human rights case-law of the ECJ, and
42.
See Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 123
(2011) (stating that the state should have been aware of environmental dangers from stateowned factories); Hatton v. UK, App. No. 36022/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 96 (2003) (“There is no
explicit right in the Convention to a clean and quiet environment, but where an individual is
directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article
8.”).
43.
The United Kingdom and Ireland, for example, have incorporated the Convention
into their domestic legal systems; rights must therefore be respected by public authorities
and the courts in these jurisdictions. See Human Rights Act 1998, 1998-42,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42; European Convention on Human Rights Act
2003, IRISH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www.ihrc.ie/enquiriesandlegal/
europeanconvent.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
44.
See Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (stating that the
Treaty of Lisbon came into force on Dec. 1, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
45.
See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 6, § 1, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 13
(“The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in Charter of
Fundamental Rights of 7 December, 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007,
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”).
46.
See Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, art. 51, § 1 (requiring the EU
and Member States to “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application
[of the Charter’s provisions] in accordance with their respective powers”).
47.
See id. art. 51, § 2 (“This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the
Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.”).
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existing provisions of EU law.48 Several of the rights contained therein, like
the same or similar rights in the ECHR, can be relied upon to secure
environmental rights or to protect the environment impacting on human
rights: for example, Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the right to
physical and mental integrity), Article 7 (the right to respect for private and
family life), and Article 17 (the right to the peaceful enjoyment of lawfully
acquired possessions).49
Outside the human rights context in the strict sense, the ECJ is
competent to adjudicate on compliance by Member States with Community
law obligations in areas regulated by the EU such as environmental
protection, health and safety of workers and the public, and conditions of
work.50
C. The European Social Charter
The European Social Charter is a Council of Europe Treaty
guaranteeing social and economic rights: it is the counterpart of the
European Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees civil and
political rights. The European Committee of Social Rights hears cases
involving alleged violations of the European Social Charter. Individuals
cannot yet bring an action against a Member State for infringing their social
rights but non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a right to complain
against States that have accepted the Collective Complaints Protocol for
infringing guaranteed social rights.51 All EU Member States have signed
and ratified the original or revised Social Charter, but not all have accepted
every provision of the Charter, the revised Charter, or the rights of NGOs to
complain against them.52 Nonetheless, for those that have accepted the
48.
See CRAIG, supra note 25, at 199–206 (describing the relationship between the
ECHR, EU law, and the Lisbon Treaty).
49.
See CPHRFF, supra note 24, arts. 2, 3, 7, 17.
50.
See generally European Court of Justice, Annual Report 2010, at 81–93 (June 1,
2011),
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201105/ra2010_version_integrale_en.pdf (summarizing the subject matter of new and completed
cases).
51.
See Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, supra note 26 (allowing
NGOs to submit claims); Robin Churchill & Urfan Khaliq, The Collective Complaints
System of the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance
with Economic and Social Rights?, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 417, 426–28 (2004) (describing the
requirements for NGOs to be a complainant organization).
52.
See The 9 Most Frequently Asked Questions About the European Social Charter,
COUNCIL
OF
EUROPE,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/
Presentation/FAQ_en.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (stating the positions of the member
states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment). Amongst EU States, only Poland, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom
have not signed the Collective Complaints Protocol as of February 2011. See Acceptance of
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entire Charter and the standing of NGOs to complain, the Charter is an
additional weapon in the armory for environmental protection in the EU.
In Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece,53 a
Greek environmental NGO54 complained to the Committee of Social Rights
that a Greek lignite mining company, of which the State was the majority
shareholder, had violated, inter alia, the right to protection of health in
Article 11 of the Charter.55 Noting the complementary relationship between
the right to health in Article 11 of the Charter and the right to life in Article
2 of the ECHR, the Committee ruled that the right to health included the
right to a healthy environment56 and that the measures required under
Article 11 should be designed to remove causes of ill-health resulting from
environmental threats.57 The Committee held that Greece had violated
Article 11 by not enforcing national and international environmental
protection legislation effectively, by not monitoring pollution from the
mine, and by not ensuring that its environmental inspectorate was properly
equipped to fulfill its tasks.58 Greece was condemned for failing to take
sufficient account of the environmental effects of mining and for failing to
develop and enforce an appropriate regulatory regime to prevent and
Provisions of the Revised European Social Charter, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7 (1996),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/presentation/ProvisionTableRev_en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (listing which provisions nations have accepted) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
53.
See Complaint, Marangopoulos Found. for Human Rights v. Greece, Complaint
No. 30/2005, Eur. Comm. Soc. Rts. ¶ 11 (2005), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
monitoring/socialcharter/complaints/CC30CaseDoc1_en.pdf (alleging that Greece has not
complied or has unsatisfactorily complied with Articles 2(4), 3(1), 3(2), and 11 of the
European Social Charter of 1961); see also Mirja Trilsch, European Committee of Social
Rights: The Right to a Healthy Environment, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 529, 534–38 (2009)
(discussing Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece).
54.
The Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights is a Greek non-governmental
organization for the research, study, defence, promotion, and protection of human rights. See
MARANGOPOULOS FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.mfhr.gr/?ln=1 (last visited
Nov. 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
55.
See Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece, Decision on the
Merits, ¶¶ 12–13 (alleging a violation of Article 11); see also Social Charter, supra note 26,
art. 11 (applying Articles 1–10 to Part II of the Additional Protocol). Article 11 of the
revised Charter is identical to Article 11 of the unrevised Charter except for the addition of
the words “as well as accidents” at the end of the third paragraph.
56.
See id. ¶ 195 (finding that the right to health includes the right to a healthy
working environment).
57.
See id. ¶ 202 (stating that “measures required under Article 11 should be designed,
in the light of current knowledge, to remove the causes of ill-health resulting from
environmental threats such as pollution.”).
58.
See id. ¶¶ 208–16 (stating obligations on Member States with respect to mining
activities permitted).
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combat public health risks from lignite mining.59 The Committee also found
that Greece had failed to provide for the enforcement of worker health and
safety regulations by supervisory measures because of a lack of inspectors
and available data.60 Mirja Trilsch has commented that the Marangopoulos
ruling “essentially removes the right to a healthy environment from the
constrained realm of so-called third-generation rights and introduces it into
the mainstream of human rights.”61
IV. Liability for Damage by Mining and Mining Waste under the
Environmental Liability Directive
A. The Scope of Liability
Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the
prevention and remedying of environmental damage (the ELD) came into
force in 2007.62 It is aimed at implementing the “polluter pays” principle
whereby the party responsible for pollution is liable to pay damages to
remedy the environmental damage caused.63 At the time of its enactment,
the ELD was heralded as “a comprehensive liability regime for damage to
the environment.”64 It was enacted to deal with “pure ecological damage”
as distinct from “traditional damage,” i.e., personal injury, damage to
property, and economic loss.65 The objective is to ensure that operators pay
for ecological damage caused by their activities either by remedying it

59.
See id. ¶¶ 194–221.
60.
See id. ¶¶ 222–31 (finding a violation of Article 3(2) of the European Social
Charter).
61.
Trilsch, supra note 53, at 536.
62.
See generally Directive 2004/35, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 (CE) [hereinafter ELD],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075:en:PDF.
63.
See id. art. 1 (stating that the purpose of the Directive is to establish a framework
of environmental liability based on the polluter pays principle.)
64.
Questions and Answers Environmental Liability Directive, EUROPA, (Apr. 27,
2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/157&format=
HTML (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
65.
See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl. ¶ 14 (“This Directive does not apply to cases of
personal injury, to damage to private property or to any economic loss and does not affect
any right regarding these types of damages.” Private rights to damages are available under
the municipal laws of Member States. See id. art. 3.3 (“[T]his Directive shall not give private
parties a right to compensation as a consequence of environmental damage or an imminent
threat of such damage.”).
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themselves or paying public authorities for doing so.66 The ELD does not
confer a right to compensation (an expression which includes damages) for
environmental damage or an imminent threat of such damage on private
parties.67 Nor does it affect rights to compensation for traditional damage
under any relevant international agreement governing civil liability for the
same damage.68 It was extended to cover extractive waste from mines and
quarries by Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from
extractive industries (the MWD).69
Although the ELD specifically targeted the “many contaminated
sites in the Community,”70 its drafters were particularly anxious to avoid
the problems the USA experienced with respect to their contaminated sites
where transaction costs devoured much of the funding for environmental
remediation.71 Operators of the dangerous, or potentially dangerous,
occupational activities listed in Annex III to the ELD are strictly liable for
any environmental damage (or the imminent threat of such damage) caused
by those activities;72 operators carrying out activities not listed in Annex III
are only liable for any fault-based damage to nature that they cause, and are
66.
See id. art. 1 (stating that the purpose of this Directive is to establish a framework
of environmental liability based on the polluter-pays principle to prevent and remedy
environmental damage).
67.
See id. art. 3.3 (stating that compensation for environmental damage is not
available to private parties); id. pmbl. ¶ 14 (“This Directive does not apply to cases of
personal injury, to damage to private property or to any economic loss and does not affect
any right regarding these types of damages.”).
68.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 11 (stating that the Directive is aimed at preventing and remedying
environmental damage and does not affect compensation for traditional damage granted
under any relevant international agreement regulating civil liability); id. art. 4.2–4.4
(limiting the Directive’s application).
69.
See id. art. 15 (“The management of extractive waste pursuant to Directive
2006/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
management of waste from extractive industries” shall be added to Annex III of Directive
2004/35/EC), thereby making mining waste one of the activities for which operators are
strictly liable under the ELD.
70.
Id. pmbl. ¶ 1.
71.
See White Paper on Environmental Liability, at 29, COM (2000) 66 final 1 (Feb.
9, 2000) (referring to the high transaction costs of cleaning up superfund sites in the United
States). Transaction costs have ranged from 80% of total costs in 1992 to 33% in 1997. See
JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE
EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 24–28 (1992), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4132.html (finding the overall transaction costs for
CERCLA clean-up activities as consistently high for all actors); see also SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, Summary of the March 12, 1997 Hearing by the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/policy/congress/summ0312.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (stating a need to
reduce transaction costs incurred in the Superfund programme) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
72.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.1 (defining “environmental damage”).
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not liable at all for damage to water or soil unless Member States use their
discretion to extend the strict liability regime to them.73 An “operator” is
defined as any natural or legal, public or private, person who operates or
controls the occupational activity or to whom national legislation delegates
decisive economic power over the technical functioning of such an activity,
including the holder of a permit, authorization for such an activity, or the
person registering or notifying such an activity.74 A large number of
activities connected with mining are listed in Annex III. 75 A holder of an
IPPC or waste licence for mining and related waste activities in the EU is
subject to the ELD because activities listed in Annex III to the ELD include
any installation subject to a permit in pursuance of Directive 96/61/EC,
concerning integrated pollution prevention and control.76 So also is the
operator of certain waste management operations77 and the person who
discharges or injects dangerous substances into inland surface water or
groundwater if these activities require prior authorizations under EC
Directives.78 Water abstraction and impoundment subject to prior
73.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 2 (stating that that the “polluter pays” principle should help
determine who bears the costs of cleaning up environmental damage); id. pmbl. ¶ 8 (stating
that the directive applies to environmental damage caused by occupational activities which
present a risk for human health or the environment); id. art 3.1 (finding a strict liability
principle will apply to all activities referred to in Annex III without prejudice to Community
legislation or national legislation). Note that several Member States have extended strict
liability regime to activities which are not listed in Annex 111. See Report from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3 (Nov. 12, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the
transposition and implementation of the Directive in practice and finding that nine Member
States had extended the strict liability regime to other activities by 2010).
74.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.6 (stating the directive’s definition of operator).
75.
See id. Annex III.
76.
See id. Annex III, § 1 (listing all activities listed in Annex I of Directive 96/61/EC
with the exception of installations or parts of installations used for research, development,
and testing of new products and processes to strict liability under ELD). Although Directive
96/61/EC, which is mentioned in Section 1 of Annex III, and some amendments thereto have
been codified by Directive 2008/1/EC and will soon be replaced by Directive 2010/75/EU
on industrial emissions, the extraction and processing of minerals and the storage of mineral
waste are subject to IPPC and to the new IED. See generally Directive 2010/75, 2010 O.J. (L
334) 17 (EU).
77.
See ELD, supra note 62, Annex III, § 2 (stating that waste management operations
include the collection, transport, recovery, and disposal of waste and hazardous waste,
including the supervision of such operations and after-care of disposal sites, subject to
permit or registration in pursuance of Directive 75/442/EEC on waste and Directive
91/689/EEC on hazardous waste). It is important to note that Directive 2008/98/EC
specifically repeals Directive 91/689/EEC. See Directive 2008/98, pmbl. ¶ 43, 2008 O.J. (L
312), 3, 7 (EC) [hereinafter Waste Framework Directive] (repealing Directive 91/698/EEC).
78.
See ELD, supra note 62, Annex III, §§ 3–5 (indicating this directive covers both
inland and groundwater discharges but omitting marine discharges).
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authorization under Directive 2000/60/EC (the Water Framework Directive,
or WFD) establishing a framework for water policy,79 and the use, storage,
processing, release into the environment, transport of dangerous substances,
and the transport of dangerous or polluting goods regulated by specified EC
Directives, also fall within the activities listed in Annex III. 80 These
activities are often associated, to a greater or lesser extent, with almost all
mining. Furthermore, activities dealing with mining waste were
unambiguously added to Annex III by Article 15 of the MWD.81
Consequently, it is hard to think of any aspect of mining or mining waste,
and its listed associated activities, for which the operator of a mine is not
strictly liable under the ELD.
“Environmental damage” is somewhat narrowly defined in Article
2.1 of the Directive as follows: direct or indirect damage to the aquatic
environment covered by the WFD, direct or indirect damage to species and
natural habitats protected at Community level by Directive 79/409/EEC on
the conservation of wild birds (the Birds Directive), by Directive
92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and
flora (the Habitats Directive),82 and direct or indirect contamination of land
which creates a significant risk to human health.83 The ELD does not cover
environmental damage to all marine waters as defined in the Marine
Strategy Framework Directive 2008/56/EC; however, this omission is being
re-examined.84 Member States have discretion to augment ELD liability to
79.
See generally Directive 2000/60, art. 11, 2000 O.J. (L 327), 1 (EC) [hereinafter
WFD].
80.
See ELD, supra note 62, Annex III, §§ 6–8 (regulating, inter alia, the discharge of
pollutants into water, water abstraction, water impoundment, procedures that release
substances into the environment, and transportation practices).
81.
See Directive 2006/21, art. 15, 2006 O.J. (L 102), 15, 27 (EC) [hereinafter MWD]
(adding to ELD, Article 15 “[t]he management of extractive waste pursuant to Directive
2006/21/EC”).
82.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.1 (stating the directive’s working definition of
environmental damage as damage to the aquatic environment, species, and natural habitats,
and land and plant damage with the exception of adverse effects where Article 4, Section 7
of the WFD applies).
83.
See Gerd Winter, et al., Weighing up the EC Environmental Liability Directive, 20
J.
ENVTL.
L.
1,
11
(2008),
available
at
http://www-user.unibremen.de/~gwinter/envirliability.pdf (observing that “land contamination is only
considered as damage if creating significant risk to human health”).
84.
For regulatory frameworks and practices currently governing environmental
damage at sea, see European Commission, Public Consultation on Oil and Gas Offshore
Safety, EUROPA (May 11, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/oil/consultations/2011_05_11_
oil_gas_offshore_safety_en.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). See European Commission, Public
Consultation: Improving Offshore Safety in Europe, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/oil/consultations/doc/20110511_public_consultation_offshore_safety.pdf (last visited
Nov. 26, 2011) (suggesting that the extension of the ELD to Marine Waters will be
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cover damage to species and natural habitats protected under their national
nature conservation laws.85 Furthermore, under general EU environmental
law, Member States have the power to maintain or adopt national
provisions over mining activities; this allows each state to allocate a higher
level of protection to the environment than the Directive requires—
assuming retrospectivity problems are addressed.86
B. Exemptions from Liability under the ELD
The ELD provides for a number of exemptions from liability
relevant to mining.87 There is no liability for previously identified adverse
effects resulting from the act of an operator which was expressly authorized
by regulatory authorities in accordance with provisions implementing
Articles 6(3), 6(4), and 16 of the Habitats Directive, or Article 9 of the
Birds Directive, or, in the case of habitats and species not covered by
Community law, in accordance with equivalent provisions of national
nature conservation laws.88 Note, however, that the adverse effects
excluded must have directly resulted from an authorized act and that they
must have been previously identified.89 When the ELD Directive came into
force, many operators of existing mining and mining-related activities
examined) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
85.
See ELD, supra note 62, arts. 2.3(c), 16(1) (allowing Member States to include
provisions beyond the scope of the Directive’s coverage). See Report from the Commission
to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3 (Nov. 12, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the
transposition and implementation of the Directive in practice and finding that fourteen
Member States had done this by 2010). Since then Ireland and the UK have also extended
their national definitions of “protected species and natural habitats” to include species and
habitats unprotected by EU law. Id.
86.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Mar. 30, 2010, 83 C.E.T.S. 49, art. 193 (“The protective measures adopted pursuant to
Article 192 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more
stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. They
shall be notified to the Commission.”). But see DONNA GOMIEN, SHORT GUIDE TO THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 69–71 (2005), available at
http://www.humanrights.coe.int/aware/GB/publi/materials/1062.pdf
(stating
that
retrospective criminal legislation, however, is liable to violate Article 7 of the ECHR).
Consequently, EU Member States, who are all parties to the Convention, must respect this
principle. The Constitutions of Member States may also constrain the enactment of
retroactive legislation. See e.g., IR. CONST., Art. 15.5.1° (giving an example of a Constitution
that constrains retroactive legislation).
87.
See, e.g., ELD, supra note 62, art. 4 (stating some exceptions to liability).
88.
See id. art. 2.1(a).
89.
See id.
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governed by IPPC legislation did baseline studies identifying the effects of
their existing projects on protected habitats and species to ensure that they
would not be liable under the Directive for damage caused before then.
Article 4 provides that the ELD does not cover environmental
damage, or an imminent threat of damage, resulting from what can broadly
be termed acts of war or civil insurrection, acts of God, damage covered by
International Conventions listed in Annex IV and Annex V, or in Article
4.3, activities regulated under the Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community, and damage caused by activities the main purpose of
which is serving national defence, international security, or for the sole
purpose of protecting from natural disasters.90 Under Article 4.5, ELD
liability for pollution of a diffuse character will only apply where it is
possible to establish a causal link between the damage and the activities of
individual operators.91 Predictably, this exception has been restrictively
interpreted by the ECJ. In Raffinerie Mediterranee (ERG) SpA v. Ministero
dello Sviluppo economico (Raffinerie Mediterranee 1), the ECJ ruled that
only a weak causal link between an operator’s activities and diffuse
pollution needs to be established for a competent authority to require the
operator to clean up the pollution.92 The court also held that the burden of
proof relating to the alleged causation of diffuse pollution lies with the
operator, not the enforcing authority.93
Moreover, although the ELD only came into force on April 30,
2007, and although it appears to exclude pre-April 2007 damage,94 the ECJ
in Raffinerie Mediterranee 1 held that the ELD can apply to environmental
damage caused by an emission, event, or incident that occurs after that date
90.
See id. art. 4.
91.
See id. art. 4.5.
92.
See Case C-378/08, Raffinerie Mediterranee (ERG) SpA v. Ministero dello
Sviluppo economico, 2010 E.C.R. I-01919, ¶ 138 [hereinafter ECR, Raffinerie Decision 1]
(applying the “polluter pays” principle to diffuse pollution caused before but continuing after
the Directive comes into force); Joined Cases C-379 & 380/08, Raffinerie Mediterranee
(ERG) SpA v. Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, 2010 E.C.R. I˗02007 [hereinafter ECR,
Raffinerie Decision 2] (finding for broad liability under ELD).
93.
See ECR, Raffinerie Decision 1, ¶ 49 (finding that “the burden of proof . . . lies
with the operator”). Valerie Fogleman points out that a Member State cannot place that
burden of proof on the enforcing authority because the ELD bars transposition of the
Directive by less stringent domestic legislation. See Valerie Fogleman, First Environmental
Liability Directive Cases from European Court of Justice, COMMERCIALRISKEUROPE.COM
(June 4, 2010), http://www.commercialriskeurope.com/cre/190/57/First-EnvironmentalLiability-Directive-cases-from-European-Court-of-Justice/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). If the
burden of proof was on the enforcing authority, it would be more difficult for it to enforce
the ELD; therefore, enforcement would be less stringent. Id.
94.
See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl., ¶ 30 (“Damage caused before the expiry of the
deadline for the implementation of this Directive should not be covered by its provisions.”).
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if it results from activities commenced before, but continued after, that
date.95 This conclusion is especially relevant for those Member States
(including the UK and Ireland) that had not transposed the Directive by the
April 30, 2007 deadline because, due to the supremacy of EU law over
domestic law when provisions conflict,96 operators whose activities cause
environmental damage, or an imminent threat of such damage, between
April 30, 2007 and the date their national transposing legislation eventually
came into force are liable for remediating environmental damage under the
Directive although not under their domestic law.97
Article 8.3 provides that an operator is not liable if he or she can
prove that (a) the damage or imminent threat was caused by a third party
and occurred despite the fact that appropriate safety measures were in place
or (b) that the damage resulted from compliance with a compulsory order or
instruction given by a public authority unless the order or instruction was
consequent upon an emission or incident caused by the operator’s own
activities.98 Indeed, in these cases, because the operator will be blameless,
Article 8.3 of the ELD requires Member States to enable an operator to
recover its costs in dealing with the environmental damage or imminent
threat of same.99 Presumably, the objective is to encourage innocent
operators to take action to prevent environmental damage without worrying
about the costs. The exemption from liability in Article 8.3(b) is a welcome
provision because some common law systems provide that public
authorities are not liable for damages arising from the manner in which they

95.
See ECR, Raffinerie Decision 1, ¶ 54 (“Under Article 17 and Article 19(1) of the
Environmental Liability Directive, the directive does not apply to damage caused by an
emission, event or incident that took place before 30 April 2007.”). “Nor does it apply to
damage caused by an emission, event or incident which takes place subsequent to that date
when it derives from a specific activity that took place and finished before that date.” Id.
96.
See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 599 (stating that
“subsequent unilateral measure cannot take precedence over Community law”); see also
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, Grounds ¶ 3 (finding that Constitutions of
Member States cannot prejudice the primacy of European law), and Case 167/73,
Commission v. France 1974 ECR 359 (stating that Member States must rescind national
legislation contrary to Community law).
97.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 20 (stating that “[t]his Directive shall enter into force
on the day of the publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,” and, since this
Directive was published on April 30, 2004, the Directive entered into force April 30, 2004,
but Member States had a maximum of three years to transpose it into their national laws, a
deadline some missed). See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl., ¶ 30 (“Damage caused before the
expiry of the deadline for the implementation of this Directive should not be covered by its
provisions.”).
98.
See id. art. 8.3.
99.
See id.
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carry out their environmental powers or duties, provided they act bona
fide.100
Article 8.4 provides that Member States have discretion to provide
for defences for an operator which can demonstrate that it was not at fault
or negligent and that the damage was caused by (a) an emission or event
expressly authorized by an authorization envisaged in Annex III to the
ELD101 or (b) an emission, activity, or any manner of using a product in the
course of an activity which the operator demonstrates was not considered
likely to cause environmental damage according to the state of scientific
and technical knowledge at the time when the emission was released or the
activity took place.102 The latter defence is the conventional “state of the
art” defence.103 The ELD states that Member States “may allow the operator
not to bear the cost of remedial actions taken pursuant to [the ELD].”104
Fogleman considers that “[t]he use of the past tense of verb supports an
interpretation of the ELD that the operator must remedy environmental
damage before asserting that it is not liable for such costs.”105
C. Liability for Taking Preventive and Remedial Measures
An operator of a mining or associated activity that is listed in
Annex III who causes environmental damage, or produces an imminent
threat of environmental damage, is required to take preventive106 and

100.
See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 (Act No. 7/1992) § 15 (Ir.),
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992/en/act/pub/0007/index.html (providing for
extensive agency immunity against damages for the manner in which it carries out its powers
and duties under the Act); see also Waste Management Act 1996 (Act No. 10/1996) § 67
(Ir.),
available
at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1996/en/act/pub/0010/index.html
(providing immunity to the agency and local authorities against actions for damages in
relation to the manner in which they carry out their powers and functions under the Act).
101.
See supra notes 76–80. Note that mining waste activities are listed in Annex III.
102.
See ELD, supra note 62.
103.
See Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3
(Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/
com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the transposition and implementation of the Directive in
practice and finding that fewer than half of the Member States had provided for both
defenses).
104.
ELD, supra note 62, pmbl. ¶ 20, art. 8.
105.
Valerie Fogleman, The Environmental Liability Directive and its Impacts on
English Environmental Law, 2006 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 1443, 1454 [hereinafter Fogleman,
Environmental Liability Directive].
106.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.10 (defining “preventative” as action to prevent or
minimize an imminent threat of damage).
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remedial107 actions under Articles 5 and 6 of the ELD respectively and to
pay the costs of such actions.108 A decision issued by a competent authority
requiring preventive or remedial measures must state the exact grounds on
which it is based, be notified to the operator, and must inform it of any legal
remedies available under municipal laws and of the time limits for availing
of these.109 Member States are obliged by Article 15 to cooperate with each
other, including, when appropriate, exchanging information where
environmental damage affects or is liable to affect more than one Member
State with a view to ensuring that preventive and, if necessary, remedial
action is taken.110 The Member State where the damage originated is
obliged to provide “sufficient” information to any other States potentially
affected.111 When environmental damage occurs that was not caused in a
Member State, this Member State may report this to the EU Commission
and to any other Member State concerned, make recommendations for the
adoption of preventive and remedial measures, and seek to recover costs
incurred in relation to the adoption of preventive and remedial measures.112
These costs are recoverable from the operator of the Annex III activity.113
107.
See id. art. 2.11 (defining “remedial measures” as any action to restore,
rehabilitate, or replace damaged natural resources or impaired services or to provide an
equivalent alternative to them as envisaged in Annex II).
108.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 18 (stating that the “polluter pays” principle requires the “operator
causing the environmental damage . . . to bear the cost of necessary preventative or remedial
measures”); id. pmbl. ¶ 21 (“Operators should bear the costs relating to preventative
measures . . . .”); id. art. 5.4 (“The competent authority shall require that the preventative
measures are taken by the operator . . . .”); id. art. 6.3 (“The competent authority shall
require that the remedial measures are taken by the operator . . . .”);
109.
See id. art. 11.4 (stating the measures Member States must take when decisions
requiring preventative or remedial measures are taken).
110.
See id. art. 15.
111.
See id. art. 15.2.
112.
See id. art. 15.3. Obligations on Member States to not only cooperate with each
other but to also take one another’s observations into account also exists under the EIA,
IPPC, and IED Directives and in general international environmental law, such as under the
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 1979, the
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 1992, and the Convention
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991. See, e.g., Case C418/04, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. I-10951, 10994. See also Robin Churchill &
Joanne Scott, The Mox Plant Litigation: the First Half-Life, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 643, 646
(July 2004) (noting specifically the obligations of a State to provide information to another
State on proposed activities liable to damage the marine environment under article 9 of the
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic 1992).
113.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 5.4 (stating “the competent authority shall require
that the preventative measures are taken by the operator” and if the operator cannot be
identified “the competent authority may take these measures itself . . .”); id. art. 6.3 (“[T]he
competent authority shall require that the remedial measures are taken by the operator” or if
the operator fails to the take these costs “the competent authority may take these measures
itself, as a means of last resort . . . .”).
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Articles 5.4 and 6 impose a mandatory obligation on competent
authorities to require operators to take preventive measures and remedial
measures respectively.114 This is a very strict obligation to enforce these
articles which is binding on Member States.115 When the operators
responsible for environmental damage cannot be identified, or when
operators fail to take preventative or remedial measures, or are not required
to pay ELD costs, States are empowered to take preventive or remedial
measures themselves; however, they are not obliged to do so.116 The
Council of Ministers deleted this obligation from a draft ELD.117 Such an
obligation may, as discussed elsewhere in this article, exist elsewhere under
municipal laws, other EU laws, the ECHR, the European Social Charter, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and even under various international
conventions.118 The value of imposing mandatory obligations is that
Member States are subject to direct enforcement action in the ECJ if they
do not comply with them.119
D. Preventive Measures
The obligation to take “necessary preventive measures” arises when
environmental damage has not yet occurred but there is an imminent threat
of such damage.120 For damage to be “imminent” there must be a
“sufficient” likelihood that it will occur in the “near” future.121 The
competent authority must require that preventive measures are taken by the
operator.122 The operator must take those measures “without delay,” and
Member States must transpose the Directive requiring the operator to
inform the competent authorities of all relevant aspects of the situation as
soon as possible, where appropriate, and certainly whenever the imminent
threat has not been dispelled by the operator’s preventive measures.123
114.
See id. art. 5.4 (finding “the competent authority shall require” that operators take
action); id. art. 6 (stating “the competent authority shall require that the remedial measures
are taken by the operator”).
115.
See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 603 (holding that
Member States are bound to enforce Community laws).
116.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 5.4 (“[T]he competent authority may take these
measures itself.”).
117.
See Common Position 58/2003, 2003 O.J. (C 277 E) 10 (EC).
118.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the options a Member State
has to report environmental damage that was not caused in that Member State).
119.
See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa, 1964 E.C.R., at 603–04 (holding that Member
States are bound to comply with obligations in Directives).
120.
ELD, supra note 62, art. 5.1.
121.
Id. art. 2.9.
122.
See id. arts. 5.3(b), 5.4 (empowering Member States to require preventive action).
123.
Id. art. 5.2.
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There appears to be some flexibility for Member States not to require
operators to inform competent authorities immediately upon suspicion or
discovery of an imminent threat of damage or before preventive (though not
remedial) action is taken.124 A competent authority may also, “at any time,”
order the operator to take the necessary preventive measures without delay,
require it to provide information on any imminent or suspected threat of
damage, give instructions on the necessary preventive measures, and itself
take the necessary preventive measures and require the operator to pay the
costs of such measures.125 If the operator fails to comply with the
obligations to take preventive measures or cannot be identified or is not
required to bear the costs under the ELD, the competent authority may (not
must) take these measures itself.126
E. Remedial Measures
Article 6.1 of the ELD requires operators to notify the competent
authority “immediately” of all relevant aspects of the situation when
environmental damage occurs. Moreover, the operator must take all
practicable steps to immediately control, contain, and remove or otherwise
manage the relevant contaminants and/or other damage factors in order to
limit or prevent further environmental damage and adverse effects on
human health or further impairment of services.127 The operator must take
the necessary remedial measures in accordance with Article 7.128
Article 7 envisages that the operator takes primary responsibility
for determining proposed remedial measures to competent authorities in
accordance with Annex II unless the competent authority has already taken
remedial action itself,129 and Article 11.2 provides that it is the duty of the
124.
See id. (stating that when there is an imminent threat operators should inform
“when appropriate”). But see art. 6.1 (requiring that when actual damage occurs, the
competent authority is to be notified “without delay”).
125.
See id. art. 5.3.
126.
See id. art. 5.4.
127.
See id. art. 6.1 (“Where environmental damage has occurred the operator
shall . . . take: all practicable steps to immediately control, contain, remove or otherwise
manage the relevant contaminants and/or any other damage factors . . . to limit or to prevent
further environmental damage and adverse effects on human health or further impairment of
services . . . .”).
128.
See id. art. 7 (providing that the necessary remedial measures must be identified by
operators in accordance with Annex II, must be approved by the competent authority, which
may also decide priorities for sequential actions where there are multiple instances of
damage, and must involve stakeholders mentioned in Art. 12, paragraph 1).
129.
See id. arts. 6.2(e)–6.3 (“The competent authority may . . . (c) require the operator
to take the necessary remedial measures . . . . If the operator fails to comply . . . the
competent authority may take these measures itself, as a means of last resort.”).
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competent authority to determine remedial measures to be taken with
reference to Annex II.130 It is therefore envisaged that operators have a
role—but not the final say—in proposing remedial action. Annex II
establishes the framework for determining the most appropriate measures
for remedying environmental damage.131 In all cases, Article 6.2 empowers
the competent authority to require operators to provide supplementary
information on any damage, to itself take, or to require operators to take, all
practicable steps immediately to control, contain, remove, or otherwise
manage the relevant contaminants and/or other damage factors, and to give
instructions on the necessary remedial measures.132
Competent authorities are obliged to invite observations from
stakeholders referred to in Article 12(1) (affected persons and certain
NGOs) to submit their observations and to take them into account when
remedial (but not preventive) measures are being determined.133 Member
States are free to augment this obligation by expanding public participation
rights.134 One issue which has arisen in practice concerning the obligation
to empower affected persons to make observations on proposed remedial
measures is defining who is an “affected” person. In one case in the
author’s experience, a competent authority refused to allow a defendant in a
trespass action, who was alleged to have illegally dumped materials on an
operator’s lands, to participate in the decision-making on proposed
remediation measures although the alleged trespasser was potentially liable
in private law to the operator for causing the damage.

130.
See id. art. 11.2 (requiring the competent authority to establish which operator
caused the damage and determine which remedial measures shall be taken in reference to
Annex II).
131.
See id. Annex II (detailing remedies for environmental damage).
132.
See id. art. 6.2.
133.
See id. art. 7.4 (requiring invitation and consideration of opinions from persons
potentially affected by the damage or remedial action). The potential for unsubstantiated
allegations of damage is much greater when preventive measures are concerned and, in any
case, it appears to be the policy to leave more control over the situation to the operator when
the damage is imminent, and more control to the competent authorities, and more
opportunities for NGO and stakeholder participation, when damage has actually occurred.
See id. arts. 6–8 (delegating primary responsibility for remedial action to competent
authorities, providing for NGO and stakeholder input in remedial action, and placing
primary responsibility for preventative measures on the operator).
134.
See id. art. 16.1 (permitting member nations to adopt more stringent provisions for
the prevention and remediation of environmental damage).
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F. Rights of NGOs and the Public to Request Action to Remediate
Environmental Damage

Article 12.1 of the ELD provides that natural or legal persons
(including NGOs) (a) adversely affected or likely to be adversely affected
by environmental damage or (b) having a sufficient interest in
environmental decision-making relating to the damage or, alternatively, (c)
alleging the impairment of a right, if the administrative law of a Member
State makes this a pre-condition, are entitled to submit observations relating
to instances of environmental damage or imminent threats of such damage
of which they are aware and may ask the competent authorities to take
action under the Directive.135 Member States may determine the
requirements for (a) and (b) above for natural and legal persons, but
environmental NGOs meeting any standing requirements under national
law must be deemed to have a sufficient interest and rights capable of being
impaired for the purposes of (c) above.136
Article 12.2 provides that requests for action must be accompanied
by relevant information and data supporting observations submitted relating
to the alleged environmental damage.137 It is not sufficient merely to allege
that there is damage or threatened damage—some evidence of the reality of
such damage must be provided.138 Where the request for action and
accompanying observations show, “in a plausible manner,” that
environmental damage exists, the competent authority is obliged to consider
them and to give the relevant operator an opportunity to make his views
known with respect to the observations and request for action submitted. 139
It is clear that there is scope for competent authorities not to consider
requests for action which are frivolous, vexatious, or without substance or

135.
See id. art. 12.1 (specifying parties permitted to submit observations of
environmental damage, imminent environmental damage, or proposed remedies).
136.
See Case C-263/08, Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening v. Stockholms
kommun genom dess marknämnd, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967, ¶ 75 (concluding that national
legislation that guarantees access to justice only to environmental non-governmental
organizations with at least 2000 members is unacceptable). Member States may not make the
qualifications for recognition as an NGO too restrictive. Id. ¶ 74 (“Any restriction whose
effect is to hinder rather than to facilitate access to administrative and judicial procedures for
environmental organisations must, even more evidently, be rejected.”).
137.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 12.2 (“The request for action shall be accompanied
by the relevant information and data supporting the observations submitted in relation to the
environmental damage in question.”).
138.
Id.
139.
See id. art. 12.3 (requiring competent authorities to consider observations and
requests for action where a plausible case is made that environmental damage exists and to
give operators an opportunity of commenting on such observations and requests for action).

THE REGULATION OF MINING AND MINING WASTE IN THE EU 203
foundation.140 On the other hand, Article 12.3 does not oblige the
competent authority to consider the request for action if a plausible case is
made that there is an imminent threat of damage as distinct from actual
damage.141 In fact, Article 12.5 provides that Member States are free to
stipulate that no such obligation exists where the threat of damage is merely
imminent.142 Member States are obliged under Article 12.4 to ensure that
decisions taken with respect to observations, and the reasons for them, are
communicated to the observers.143 Article 12.5 permits Member States not
to extend any of the rights in Article 12 to cases of imminent threats of
damage.144
Article 13.1 provides that the persons referred to in Article 12.1
must have access to a court or other impartial tribunal to challenge the
substantive and procedural legality of the competent authority’s decisions,
acts, or failure to act.145 This obligation to provide access to justice is
already an obligation on the EU and on Member States under the UNECE
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus
Convention).146 The right of individuals and NGOs to intervene in
administrative decision-making concerning remediation of environmental
damage is somewhat limited and does not include a right to take direct
action against the operator to compel remediation. The domestic laws of
some EU Member States may, however, provide for such a right.147
140.
See id. (allowing the competent authority to dismiss cases lacking plausible
evidence of environmental damage).
141.
See id. art. 12.3 (empowering competent authorities to take observations into
account and to consider requests for action where environmental damage “exists,” not when
it is imminent).
142.
See id. art. 12.5 (“Member States may decide not to apply paragraphs 1 to 4 . . . to
cases of imminent threat of damage.”).
143.
See id. art. 12.4 (“The competent authority shall . . . inform the persons referred to
in paragraph 1, which submitted observations to the authority, of its decision to accede to or
refuse the request for action and shall provide the reasons for it.”).
144.
See id. art. 12.5 (“Member States may decide not to apply . . . to cases of imminent
threat of damage.”).
145.
See id. art. 13.1. The persons referred to in Article 12(1) are natural and legal
persons affected or likely to be affected by environmental damage, or having a sufficient
interest in decisions on environmental damage or, alternatively, alleging the impairment of a
right where the law of the Member State requires this for standing.
146.
See Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE,
http://live.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (“The Aarhus
Convention grants the public rights and imposes on Parties and public authorities obligations
regarding access to information and public participation and access to justice.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
147.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 13.2 (“This Directive shall be without prejudice to
any provisions of national law which regulate access to justice . . . .”); Irish Local
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V. Liability on Member States to Remediate Environmental Damage by
Mining
As indicated above, the ELD imposes no direct obligation on
Member States or competent authorities themselves to take preventive or
remedial action for environmental damage, including damage from mining
waste.148 The primary obligation to take such action and to pay the costs, as
defined in the ELD, lies with “operators.”149 Individuals and NGOs with
standing under Article 12 of the ELD may judicially review a Member
State’s decision not to act against an operator, but they have no rights under
the ELD to compel competent authorities to prevent or remediate the
environmental damage when the operator fails to do so.150 A question then
arises as to what happens when there is no operator as defined in Article 2.6
of the ELD,151 or when an operator is unable, for financial or other reasons,
to prevent or remediate the environmental damage, or when the
environmental damage is not the kind of damage covered by the
Directive.152
Article 3.2 of the ELD provides that the ELD shall operate without
prejudice to more stringent Community legislation regulating any of the

Government (Water Pollution) (Amendment) Act, (Act No. 21/1990) §§ 8, 9 (Ir.) (permitting
under sections 11 and 12 any person, whether or not he has a personal or proprietary interest
in the matter, to apply to court for an order compelling a polluter to remediate environmental
damage causing or liable to cause water pollution). Similar rights exist under section 28 of
Air Pollution Act 1987 and sections 57 and 58, as amended, of the Waste Management Act
1996.
148.
See ELD, supra note 62, arts. 6.1–6.3 (placing the primary responsibility for
remedial action with the operator rather than Member States or competent authorities).
149.
See id. (stating that the operator has the primary responsibility to take remedial
action). Note that all Member States surveyed by 2010 had extended the definition of
operator. See Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3
(Nov.
12,
2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/
pdf/com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the transposition and implementation of the directive
in practice and finding that all but one of the EU Member States which had transposed the
directive had expanded the definition of operator in their domestic laws by 2010).
150.
See id. art. 13 (providing judicial review for parties with standing under Article
12.1, but not providing for power to coerce action on the part of competent authorities).
151.
See id. art. 2.6 (defining operator as any natural or legal, private or public person
who operates or controls the occupational activity or to whom decisive economic power over
the technical functioning of such an activity has been delegated, including the holder of a
permit or authorization).
152.
This could be the case if the damage was caused and completed before April 30,
2007, or if, for some reason, a mining activity was not regulated under Annex III of the
ELD. See id. art. 19.1 (providing a remedy for Member States after April 30, 2007).
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activities falling within its scope.153 Compliance with obligations under
international law, under the ECHR, the European Social Charter, and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights discussed above could also require Member
States to remediate environmental damage or deal with imminent threats of
such damage caused by mining.154 In addition, there are a number of
requirements under various Directives which could be relied upon
(depending on the circumstances) to compel Member States themselves to
prevent or remediate damage caused by mining or mining waste activities,
including damage caused by closed or abandoned mines, for which no
operator, or no operator with the capacity or financial resources to prevent
or remediate, can be found. The next part of this article will deal with some
of the more important Directives.
A. Directive 98/83/EC on the Quality of Water Intended for Human
Consumption
Directive 98/83/EC on the quality of water intended for human
consumption provides that if there is a non-compliance with the standards
for the quality of drinking water imposed under the Directive, the Member
State concerned must investigate the cause and ensure that the necessary
remedial action is taken as soon as possible to restore the quality of the
water. 155 Where water constitutes a potential human health hazard,156
Member States are required to take appropriate action.157 The Commission
enforces the quality standards in this Directive against Member States.158

153.
See id. art. 3.2 (“This Directive shall apply without prejudice to more stringent
Community legislation regulating the operation of any of the activities falling within the
scope of this Directive and without prejudice to Community legislation containing rules on
conflicts of jurisdiction.”).
154.
See supra notes 24–30.
155.
See Directive 98/83, pmbl. ¶ 25, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 330) 32, 34, 36 (EC)
(imposing mandatory standards for microbiological and chemical parameters in water
intended for human consumption).
156.
Id. art. 8 (obliging Member States to ensure that substances used in water for
human consumption do not directly or indirectly constitute a public health hazard).
157.
See id. art. 7.1 (requiring States to ensure that drinking water at least meets the
requirements in Annex 1); id. art. 19 (requiring Member States to take the necessary
measures to ensure that the water meets the standards in the Directive).
158.
See Comm’n v. United Kingdom, Case C 337/89, 1992 E.C.R. 1-6103 (ruling that
the obligation to comply with the standards in Directive 80/778/EEC (which Directive
98/83/EC replaced) is strict and can only be excused in the circumstances provided for in the
Directive, thus effectively ruling that failure in practice to meet required standards is
inexcusable). See Comm’n v. Belgium, Case C 42/89, 1990 E.C.R. I-2821 (holding that
Belgian authorities were not entitled to plead financial considerations for failure to ensure that
lead in drinking water met standards prescribed in Directive 80/778/EEC). It also held that
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If mining and waste activities cause a contravention of drinking
water quality standards prescribed in the Directive, and if there is no other
source of drinking water readily available, a Member State itself might be
obliged to take the necessary preventive and remedial action with respect to
the polluting activity in order to ensure compliance with obligations in the
Directive and indeed to ensure respect for the human rights to water and
sanitation, the rights of bodily integrity, and the rights to respect for family
and private life.159 In practice, Irish and English authorities have done this
when drinking water sources have been contaminated.
B. Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of
Wild Fauna and Flora
Obligations relating to habitats protected under the Habitats and
Birds Directives may require a State itself to take proactive measures,
including remediation of a protected habitat damaged by mining, to ensure
that the habitat is conserved and/or restored.160 Article 6.2 of the Habitats
Directive obliges Member States to take “appropriate steps” to avoid
deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species and the
significant disturbance of species in designated areas.161 This requires
derogations with respect to poison or microbiological requirements are not permissible because
of the risk to human health involved. Id.
159.
See G.A. Res. 64/48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/48, 3 (July 26, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/L.63/Rev.1 (“The right to safe and
clean drinking water and sanitation is a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of
life and all human rights.”). See generally M. A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEYLANKFORD, THE WORLD BANK, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY
DIMENSIONS (2004); HENRI SMETS, ACADEMIE DE L’EAU, LE DROIT À L’EAU POTABLE ET À
L’ASSAINISSEMENT EN EUROPE—THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO SAFE DRINKING
WATER AND SANITATION IN EUROPE (2011); Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit
of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4
NW. U. J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS 331 (2005).
160.
See Council Directive 92/43, art. 6.2, Annex III, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7, 49 (EEC)
[hereinafter Habitats Directive] (obliging Member States to establish necessary conservation
measures in special conservation areas and to take appropriate steps to avoid the
deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species and to avoid the significant
disturbance of species in those areas). Note that over 14% of the EU is protected under the
Habitats Directive and that many special conservation areas are often areas where mining
activities are liable to take place. See also Directive 79/449/EEC, O.J. (L 103), which is now
codified as Directive 2009/147/EC (O.J. (20/7)). Article 7 of the Habitats Directive extends
the protections in Articles 6(2), (3), and (4) of the Habitats Directive to areas classified
under Article 4 of the Directive 79/447/EEC from the date they are classified so that the
protections described above apply equally to designated bird habitats and other habitats.
161.
See id. The Habitats Directive protects birds and a wide range of rare, threatened,
or endemic species of flora and fauna, including over 450 animals, 500 plants, and over 200
rare and characteristic habitats. The Birds Directive and Habitats Directive protect the most
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Member States to take a proactive and creative approach to habitat and
species protection. In a number of cases including Commission v. Spain162
and Commission v. Ireland,163 the ECJ held that the Article 6.2 obligation
arises even before any reduction or risk to a protected species materializes,
for example, in cases of imminent threats to protected species or habitats.164
The Commission may examine how Article 6.2 is implemented for
particular habitats and species and, if the measures taken are inadequate, it
may enforce this obligation against the Member State in the ECJ.165 In
Commission v. France,166 the ECJ held that French measures adopted to
comply with similar obligations under Article 4 of the Birds Directive were
inadequate.167 Likewise, in Commission v. Ireland,168 the ECJ ruled that
Ireland had contravened Article 3 of the Birds Directive and Article 6.2 of
the Habitats Directive by not taking adequate proactive measures to protect
and to prevent the deterioration of the habitats of red grouse in the
Owenduff-Nephin Beg Complex Special Protection Area and by not taking
the necessary measures to prevent damage to a blanket bog protected under
the Habitats Directive.169 The Article 6.2 obligation is imposed on the State;
absent anybody the State can compel to take the appropriate steps, it must
take them itself.170

important habitats of migratory species and of over 194 particularly threatened species and
designated wetlands habitats.
162.
See Case C-355/90, Comm’n v. Kingdom of Spain, 1993 E.C.R. I-4286, I-4271
(finding that Spain had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC treaty by not taking
adequate measures to prevent deterioration and pollution of marsh habitats used by wild
birds by permitting wastewater discharges, roads, and industrial projects in the Santona
marshes).
163.
See Case C-117/00, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2002 E.C.R. 1, I-5355 (finding that
Ireland had failed to take adequate measures to avoid the deterioration of the bog habitats
populated by the red grouse protected species in special protection areas).
164.
See Comm’n v. Ireland, at I-5352 (finding Ireland responsible for failure to
prevent situations causing the deterioration of habitats by overgrazing); Comm’n v. Spain, at
I-4271 (holding that Spain failed to fulfill its obligations by not taking appropriate steps to
avoid pollution or deterioration of important bird habitats by permitting projects which cause
the deterioration of marsh habitats).
165.
Id.
166.
See Case C-374/98, Comm’n v. France, 2000 E.C.R. I-1512, 10836.
167.
See id. (finding that France failed to adopt special conservation measures sufficient
for geographical protection of wild birds).
168.
See Case C-117/00, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2002 E.C.R. at I-5355 (finding that
Ireland had failed to take adequate measures to prevent deterioration of habitats in special
protection areas).
169.
Id.
170.
See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6 (“Member States shall take
appropriate steps to avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the deterioration of natural
habitats . . . .”).
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VI. The Regulation of Mining

It is generally recognized that liability regimes are not the only or
even the best way of preventing or dealing with environmental damage
from mining or mining waste activities or major accidents connected with
such waste.171 The insurance industry’s experience is that a greater focus on
risk management is the best means of reducing risks of environmental
damage.172 The EU has enacted a number of Directives which operate to
ensure that mining and mining wastes do not pose a risk to the environment
or human health or safety.173 Individuals who have standing may enforce
the requirements of these Directives in national courts174 and national courts
must take them into consideration and enforce them.175

171.
See COMM. OF EUROPEAN ASSURANCES, CEA RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN
COMMISSION’S PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON IMPROVING OFFSHORE SAFETY IN EUROPE 2 (2011),
available at http://www.cea.eu/uploads/Modules/Publications/european_commissions_
consultation_on_improving_eu_offshore_safety.pdf (“[T]hese risks are covered by
specialised policies offered by the marine and energy lines of the insurance market. . . .
[T]hese types of insurers have effectively offered related liability cover under the primary
international conventions dealing with sea pollution.”).
172.
See id. at 3 (“The insurance industry’s experience has revealed that a better focus
on such risk management is the best means of reducing environmental damage risks.”). The
CEA is the European insurance and reinsurance federation, representing undertakings that
account for around 95% of total European premium income. Id at 5.
173.
See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text (describing Directives designed to
ensure that mining and mining waste do not pose a risk to the environment or human health
or safety).
174.
See Case 118/94, Comm’n v. Italy, 1996 E.C.R 1-01223 (holding that whenever
the provisions of a Directive are sufficiently clear and precise, those provisions can be relied
upon by an individual against any Member State where the State has failed to implement the
Directive in national law correctly or by the end of the period prescribed); see also
Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403,
5431, ¶ 56 (stating the obligation on a national court called upon to implement Community
Law to do all within the limits of its power to do so.)
175.
See Directive 2003/35, art. 3(7)(b), 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17, 20 (EC) (requiring
Member States to provide access to justice—meaning access to the courts when
appropriate—in all cases involving EIA and IPPC projects). Moreover, the ECJ has held, in
Case C-435/97, World Wildlife Fund and Others v. Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others,
1999 E.C.R. I-5637, ¶ 69, that:
[I]t would be incompatible with the binding effect conferred on directives . . .
for the possibility for those concerned to rely on the obligation which
directives impose to be excluded in principle. Particularly where the
Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States the
obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the effectiveness of such
an act would be diminished if individuals were prevented from relying on it in
legal proceedings and if national courts were prevented from taking it into
consideration as a matter of Community law in determining whether the
national legislature, in exercising its choice as to the form and methods for
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A. Strategic Control of Mining
At a strategic level, Directive 2001/42/EC on Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA)176 encourages a more integrated
approach to territorial planning where environmental considerations are
taken into account at an early stage in the planning process. Article 3 of the
SEA Directive requires SEA for plans and programmes, as well as certain
modifications to them, prepared and/or adopted by an authority177 pursuant
to legislative, regulatory, or administrative provisions which set the
framework for future development consent in respect of projects under,
inter alia, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive,178 or which
require an assessment under the Habitats Directive.179 SEA may result in
the identification of locations or development constraints where operators

implementing the directive, had kept within the limits of its discretion set in
the Directive.
Id.; see also Case C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the
Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I-723, ¶ 57 (holding that an individual can invoke directly effective
provisions of a directive against a Member State in national courts); Case C-287/98,
Luxembourg v. Berthe Linster, 2000 E.C.R. I-6917, ¶ 32 (noting that the effectiveness of
Directives would be reduced if individuals could not make directive-based claims in national
courts); Case C-72/95, Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. Zuid-Holland,
1996 E.C.R. I-5403, 5431, ¶ 56 (noting the right of an individual to invoke provisions in a
directive and the obligation of the national courts to enforce Directives).
176.
See Directive 2001/42, pmbl. ¶ 7, 2001 O.J. (L 197) 30 (EC). This Directive
implements the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the United
Nations/Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context.
177.
See Implementation of Directive 2001/42 on the Assessment of the Effects of
Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment, ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL
OF
THE
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
¶¶ 3.12,
3.13,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/030923_sea_guidance.pdf (noting that the concept
of “authority” has been given a large scope in the case law of the ECJ).
178.
See generally Council Directive 85/337, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40 (EEC) [hereinafter
EIA Directive] (strengthening previous directives concerning transboundary environmental
impact). Most substantial mining projects commenced since July 5, 1987, the date the EIA
Directive came into force, fall within its scope. Id. Additionally, since the decision in Case
C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I723, older mining projects subject to an environmental re-authorization must also be subject
to an environmental impact assessment (EIA).
179.
See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, at 7 (requiring measures for the
conservation of natural habitats and of wild flora and fauna). In practice, many mining
projects located in remote or rural areas are liable to affect protected habitats. See HAKAN
TARRAS-WAHLBERG, MINING AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ACP COUNTRIES 1–2, available at
http://www.acpsec.org/mines/Mining%20and%20Sustainability.pdf (explaining that “[w]hen
mines are established in previously undisturbed areas, the environmental impacts are
considerable”).
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of proposed mining projects may, or will, encounter difficulties in obtaining
the required environmental authorizations.180
Mining and waste plans and programmes are among those for
which SEA is required under Article 3 either because they are often
components of the various plans (notably land use and natural resources
plans) listed in Article 2.2 for which SEA is mandatory, or because they are
other listed types of plans or programmes for which Member States are
obliged to require SEA,181 and/or because mining and mining waste projects
are almost invariably subject to EIA or are often liable to have effects in
environmentally sensitive areas protected under the Birds, Habitats, Urban
Wastewater Treatment, and the Water Framework Directives.182 Where
properly implemented, SEA enables alternatives to be considered at a
macro level, allowing EIA of individual projects to focus more on locationspecific or operational alternatives.183 The SEA of a mining, waste, land
180.
See id. art. 5 (requiring the filing of an environmental report in which the likely
significant effects on the environment of implementing the plan or programme, and
reasonable alternatives taking into account the objectives and the geographical scope of the
plan or programme, are identified, described, and evaluated). Note that Annex 1 requires the
report to deal, inter alia, with
(c) the environmental characteristics of areas likely to be significantly
affected; (d) any existing environmental problems which are relevant to the
plan or programme including, in particular, those relating to any areas of a
particular environmental importance, such as areas designated pursuant to
Directives 79/409/EEC and 92/43/EEC; and (e) the environmental protection
objectives, established at international, Community or Member State level,
which are relevant to the plan or programme and the way those objectives and
any environmental considerations have been taken into account during its
preparation.
Id. Annex I. The evaluation should show environmental and other constraints on plans and
projects in particular areas.
181.
See Directive 2001/42, supra note 176, art. 2.2(a) (listing sectors for which SEA is
mandatory and including plans and programmes for energy, industry, waste management,
water management, town and country planning, and land use). Official mining plans and
programmes feature in many of these, and in any case would normally come under Article
2.4 as other plans “likely to have significant environmental effects.” See id. art. 1 (requiring
environmental assessment for plans with significant environmental effects). When
PROTOCOL ON STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT TO THE UNECE CONVENTION ON
EIA IN TRANSBOUNDARY CONTEXT (Kiev, 2003), approved by Council Decision 2008/871,
2008 O.J. (L 308) 33 (EC), is fully implemented, SEA will be required for policies and
legislation.
182.
See Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1 (EEC) (requiring stricter
standards for waters discharged directly or indirectly into identified sensitive areas), and Water
Framework Directive, arts. 6 and 8 (requiring registration and protective measures for protected
areas listed in Annex IV); Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6 (same); Council Directive
91/271, art. 3, O.J. (L 135) 41 (EEC) (same).
183.
See William Sheate et al., The Relationship between the EIA and SEA Directives
(2005), 17–18, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/final_report_0508.pdf
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use, or industry plan or programme may result in the identification of areas
where mining is prima facie to be encouraged, areas where mining must be
restricted, and areas where it will be discouraged or disallowed completely.
(This is the typical result of SEA of major land use and industry plans in the
EU so that, for example, land use plans adopted after the SEA process often
prohibit mining in national parks.)
The recognition of suitable or unsuitable areas for mining may also
occur when competent authorities in Member States are implementing the
Water Framework Directive (WFD), under which protection/conservation
areas for economically significant shellfish and freshwater fish species,
bathing waters, water dependent conservation areas, and drinking water
protection areas are established pursuant to various EU Water Directives.184
Particularly relevant to mining are obligations in Article 4.1 of the WFD
requiring Member States to achieve a good ecological and chemical status
of all bodies of surface water and groundwater by 2015 and in Article 4.4
requiring them to draw up river basin management plans to achieve this.185
If a mining-related activity was likely to compromise the objectives in these

(discussing which assessment procedures are most appropriate in an EIA and SEA context).
If an area is considered suitable for mining or mining waste under a SEA, the task of
justifying that location in an EIA is much reduced. Id. (discussing the overlap in EIA and
SEA assessment and approval procedures).
184.
See WFD, supra note 79, at 12 (requiring Member States to establish a register, or
registers, of protected areas). The register, or registers, must comprise areas lying within
each river basin district designated as requiring special protection under specific Community
legislation for the protection of their surface water and groundwater or for the conservation
of habitats and species directly depending on water. Id. Annex IV lists the types of areas that
must be included in the register:
(i) Areas designated for the abstraction of water for human consumption; (ii)
Areas designated for the protection of economically significant aquatic
species; (iii) Bodies of water designated as recreational waters, including areas
designated as bathing waters; (iv) Nutrient-sensitive areas, including areas
identified as Polluted Waters under the Nitrates Directive and areas designated
as sensitive under Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive; (v) Areas
designated for the protection of habitats or species where the maintenance or
improvement of the status of water is an important factor in their protection
including relevant Natura 2000 sites designated under Directive 92/43/EEC(1)
and Directive 79/409/EEC(2).
Id. Annex IV. See generally UK Technical Advisory Group on the Water
Framework Directive, Guidance on Objectives and Standards for Protected Areas,
http://www.wfduk.org/tag_guidance/Article_06-07/guidance_protected_areas (last
visited Nov. 19, 2011) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
185.
See WFD, supra note 79, arts. 4.1–4.4 (requiring the study and assessment of
measures to protect groundwater).
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plans, a SEA of any plan or programme dealing with mining would likely
recommend that it should be prohibited or very rigidly controlled.186
The WFD even addresses the quantitative status of groundwaters.187
Member States must ensure that all bodies of groundwater are protected,
enhanced, and restored; that there is a balance between abstraction and
recharge of groundwater; that the groundwater resource does not decrease;
and that it is managed sustainably.188 Such obligations are particularly
relevant in the context of authorising many mines. Similarly, although
probably less relevant in practice, where Member States find that a
particular zone exceeds or is at risk of exceeding the limit values and any
relevant margin of tolerance for the various pollutants prescribed under
Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe,189
and when they draw up air quality plans to achieve required air quality
standards by relevant target dates, mining projects making it difficult to
achieve these standards are liable to be refused operating permits.190
Article 28 of Directive 2008/98/EC on waste191 (the Waste
Framework Directive) requires Member States to draw up waste
management plans for their territories, but this Directive does not apply to
extractive waste as defined in the Mining Waste Directive (MWD).192 Plans
for such waste must be made under the MWD discussed below. Both
Directives require the management of general wastes and extractive wastes
to be regulated in accordance with waste management plans drawn up as
required by them.193
Obligations might exist under Directive 96/82/EC on the control of
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (the Seveso II

186.
See id. art. 8 (providing for decision-making based on the environmental report);
see also supra note 180.
187.
See WFD, supra note 79, pmbl. ¶ 19 (stating that although the control of water
quantity is an ancillary element in securing good water quality, measures on quantity,
serving the objective of ensuring good quality, should also be established); id. ¶ 41 (stating
that for water quantity, overall principles should be laid down for control on abstraction and
impoundment in order to ensure the environmental sustainability of the affected water
systems).
188.
Id. arts. 4.1(ii), 11.1(e),
189.
See generally Directive 2008/50, 2008 O.J. (L 152) 1 (EC) (defining and
establishing objectives for ambient air quality).
190.
See id. art. 17.1 (requiring Member States to take necessary measures to meet
targets for achieving prescribed ambient air quality standards).
191.
See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, at 17–18 (requiring states to
create waste management plans).
192.
See id. art. 2.2(d) (excluding extractive waste from the scope of the directive).
193.
See id. art. 28 (requiring the establishment and enforcement of waste management
plans); MWD, supra note 81, at 21–22 (stating requirements for waste management plans
under the Directives).
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Directive) requiring Member States to identify hazardous wastes,194 assess
the risks which they pose, and state measures to be taken to address any
risks. Directive 2003/105/EC amended Seveso II to cover the processing
and storage of minerals containing dangerous substances extracted in
mining, quarrying, and tailings disposal and other mining waste facilities.195
Implementation of the Seveso II Directive, which had to be transposed by
July 1, 2005, may also mandate either the prohibition of tailings disposal
facilities, tailings ponds or dams containing dangerous substances, and
storage of certain dangerous substances in certain areas or, if they are
permitted, separating them appropriately from other areas. Article 12(a),
inserted by Article 1 of Directive 2003/105/EC, requires Member States to
ensure that:
[T]heir land-use and/or other relevant policies and the
procedures for implementing those policies take account of
the need, in the long term, to maintain appropriate
distances between establishments covered by [Seveso II]
and residential areas, buildings and areas of public use,
major transport routes as far as possible, recreational areas
and areas of particular natural sensitivity or interest and, in
the case of existing establishments, of the need for
additional technical measures in accordance with Article 5
so as not to increase the risks to people.196
B. Permit Systems for Mining and Mining Waste Activities
At a non-strategic level, mining and mining waste is primarily
controlled by permit systems designed to impose operational and risk
management controls in order to ensure that mining and waste and ancillary
activities do not endanger the environment or human health or safety.
Almost all mines and many associated waste activities of any
environmental significance are subject to environmental impact assessment
(EIA) when they apply for authorizations to develop and operate because
they are projects for which EIA is prima facie required or because, although
they might not be listed as projects for which EIA is required, they are an
194.
See id. art. 19 (defining hazardous waste in Art. 3.2 of Directive 2008/98/EC as
“waste which displays one or more of the hazardous properties listed in Annex III” thereto).
195.
See Directive 2003/105, art. 1(a), 2003 O.J. (L 345) 97, 98 (EC) (amending Article
4 of Seveso II by Article 1 of Directive 2003/106/EC to cover: operational tailings disposal
facilities, including those containing dangerous substances used in connection with chemical
and thermal processing, operations, and storage of minerals and chemicals related to
operations involving dangerous substances, listed in Annex I).
196.
Id.
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integral part of a project for which EIA is obligatory.197 Many kinds of
mining and many projects which facilitate mining are listed as Annex 1 or
Annex II projects under the EIA Directive and Member States have the
discretion to set thresholds below which mining projects listed in Annex 11
197.
See EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 1 (requiring an EIA for certain projects
likely to have significant effects on the environment). The following projects, which could
conceivably be associated with mining, are listed in Annex I of the Consolidated Directive
as being mandatorily subject to an EIA: waste disposal installations for hazardous waste,
waste disposal installations for non-hazardous waste (with a capacity of more than 100
tonnes per day), groundwater abstraction or artificial groundwater recharge schemes where
the annual volume of water abstracted or recharged is equivalent to or exceeds 10 million
cubic meters, construction of overhead electrical power lines with a voltage of 220 kV or
more and a length of more than 15 km, quarries and open-cast mining where the surface of
the site exceeds 25 hectares, or peat extraction where the surface of the site exceeds 150
hectares, extraction of natural gas where the amount abstracted exceeds 500,000m3 per day.
Id. Annex I. Article 4(2) gives Member States, within certain limits, power to define the
types of projects within Annex II which will require an EIA. Id. art. 4.2. Annex II provides,
in material part, that EIA is required for the following:
2. Extractive industry (a) Quarries, open-cast mining and peat extraction
(projects not included in Annex I); (b) Underground mining; (c) Extraction of
minerals by marine or fluvial dredging; (d) Surface industrial installations for
the extraction of coal, petroleum, natural gas and ores, as well as bituminous
shale; 3. Energy industry (b) Transmission of electrical energy by overhead
cables (projects not included in Annex I); (c) Surface storage of natural gas;
(d) Underground storage of combustible gases; (e) Surface storage of fossil
fuels; (f) Industrial briquetting of coal and lignite; 10. Infrastructure projects
(c) Construction of railways and intermodal transshipment facilities, and of
intermodal terminals (projects not included in Annex I); (d) Construction of
airfields (projects not included in Annex I); (e) Construction of roads, harbors
and port installations, including fishing harbors (projects not included in
Annex I); (f) Inland-waterway construction (projects not included in Annex I);
(g) Dams and other installations designed to hold water or store it on a longterm basis (projects not included in Annex I); (i) Oil and gas pipeline
installations and pipelines for the transport of CO2 streams for the purposes of
geological storage (projects not included in Annex I); (j) Installations of longdistance aqueducts; (l) Groundwater abstraction and artificial groundwater
recharge schemes not included in Annex I; II. Other projects (b) Installations
for the disposal of waste (projects not included in Annex I). The ECJ has held
that even if one of the above projects is merely ancillary to a project for which
EIA is not required under Annex I or I1, an EIA may still be required for the
entire project.
Id. See also Case C-215/06, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2008 E.C.R. I-4911, where EIA was not (then)
required for a wind farm under Directive 85/337/EEC but might have been required for ancillary
development (minor roads to the site and the displacement of peat) necessary to build the wind
farm. The ECJ held that EIA was required for the entire project. Id.; see also Interpretation Line
Suggested by the Commission as Regards the Application of Directive 85/337/EEC to
Ancillary/Associated
Works
(2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
eia/pdf/Note%20-%20Interpretation%20of%20Directive%2085-337-EEC.pdf (providing guidance
on when EIA for ancillary works triggers an obligation to do an EIA for the entire project). The
main test is whether the ancillary works are an integral part of the main works.
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need not be subjected to EIA if they are unlikely to have significant
environmental effects.198 However, this freedom has been largely
undermined by successive ECJ decisions giving a very expansive
interpretation to the concept of “projects” in the Directive199 and a very
restrictive scope to Member States’ exclusionary discretion.200
Consequently, it is difficult to conceive of any operator of a new mine or of
a significant expansion to an existing mine neglecting to submit to EIA in
an EU Member State without running a substantial risk of a judicial review
of the mining permission in the Member State itself or of enforcement
action by the EU Commission.201 ECJ decisions have also ensured that,
even when the continued operation of existing mines and of their waste
facilities was permitted before the EIA Directive came into force in 1987,

198.
See Joint Ministerial Order H.P. 11014/703/F104, Official Journal B 332 (March
20, 2003) (setting the French threshold so as to exclude mining operations covering
< 500,000 square meters, or about 125 acres). Some Member States (e.g., Ireland, Spain,
Sweden) have not set any exclusion thresholds so that all mining is subject to EIA. See
generally European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council on the Application and Effectiveness of the EIA Directive, EUROPA,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/report_en.pdf.
199.
See, e.g., Case C-2/07, Abraham v. Region Wallonne, 2008 E.C.R. I-1197, ¶ 86
(stating the purposive definition of “construction . . . of airports with a basic runway length
of 2,100m or more” in paragraph 7 of Annex I to the EIA Directive as including the
restructuring and widening—but not the lengthening—of an existing runway at an airport
which already exceeded 2,100m). As a result, EIA was required for an intensification of use
because it was likely to have similar effects to the lengthening of a runway. Case C-72/95,
Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403, I5425 (stating projects below exclusion thresholds require EIA if they are likely to have
significant effects on the environment); Case C-205/08, Umweltanwalt von Kärnten v.
Kärntner Landesregierung, 2010 All ER (D) 31, ¶ 83 (requiring EIA for a transboundary
overhead powerline project which was below the threshold in Austria but above it when the
part in Italy was taken into account); Case C-215/06, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2008 E.C.R.
¶¶ 110–12 (requiring EIA for a wind farm, although it was not a listed project in Annex I or
II, because ancillary aspects of the project, including roads to facilitate transport of the wind
turbine, involved projects which were listed in Annex II); Case C-142/07, Ecologistas en
Acción-CODA v. Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2008 E.C.R. I-6097, ¶¶ 30, 66 (stating express
road could mean express road; and holding subsequently that small forest roads were
projects for which EIA was required).
200.
See Case C-392/96, Comm’n v. Ireland, 1999 E.C.R. I-5901, ¶ 66 (“Even a smallscale project can have significant effects on the environment if it is in a location where the
environmental factors set out in Article 3 of the EIA Directive, such as fauna and flora, soil,
water, climate or cultural heritage, are sensitive to the slightest alteration.”).
201.
See Commission Interpretation of Definitions of Certain Project Categories of
Annex I and Annex II of the EIA Directive 4 (2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/interpretation_eia.pdf (“Experience gathered in the
application of the EIA Directive shows that, in practice, it can prove problematic to decide if
individual projects fall within its scope.”).

216

3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 177 (2012)

these projects must be subjected to EIA if they require a fresh
environmental consent after then to continue operating.202
Any project submitting an environmental impact statement for a
mine must identify, inter alia, its likely significant effects on the
environment, including its direct effects and any indirect, secondary, short-,
medium- and long-term, permanent and temporary, positive and negative
effects, its cumulative effects, and a strategy to prevent or minimize those
effects.203 Environmental risk management and accident prevention
proposals are regarded as essential components of any environmental
impact statement,204 and the requirements of Seveso 11 on the prevention of
major accidents must be ensured (when applicable) by all permits for mine
waste and storage facilities.205 Comprehensive EU guidelines,206 often
amplified by guidelines issued by Member States themselves, elaborate on
the nature and extent of these obligations.207 In Landelijke Vereniging tot

202.
See Case C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the
Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I-723, I-747 (requiring an EIA for a project commenced before July 3,
1988 before a new consent to continue operating after that date is given); Case C-81/96,
Burgemeester en wethouders van Haarlemmerliede en Spaarnwoude and Others v.
Gedeputeerde Staten van Noord-Holland, 1998 E.C.R. I-3923, ¶¶ 25–28 (holding that
projects commenced before but requiring fresh environmental consents after July 3, 1988
also required an EIA).
203.
See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex IV.4 (specifying information to be
contained in an environmental impact statement); id. art. 5.3(c) (requiring an EIS to include
a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce, and, if possible, remedy
significant environmental effects); Commission Guidance On EIA: EIS Review (June 2001),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-guidelines/g-review-full-text.pdf.
204.
See EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 4.3 (referring to Annex III which specifies
the characteristics of projects including the risk of accidents having regard in particular to
substances and technologies to be used to be considered in an environmental impact
statement). Note, in particular, the attitude of the Irish Planning Appeals Board (An Bord
Pleanála) to the Corrib Gas Project when it refused permission for an onshore terminal
because measures to deal with risks associated with displaced peat bog had not been
properly described in the environmental impact statement. See An Bord Pleanála, Corrib
Gas Pipeline, Case Ref. No. 16.GA.004, 340–41 (2009), available at
http://www.pleanala.ie/news/ga0004/rga0004d.pdf.
205.
See generally Land Use Planning Guidelines in the Context of Article 12 of the
Seveso II Directive 96/82/EC as Amended by Directive 105/2003/EC (Sept. 2006), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/landuseplanning_guidance_en.pdf.
206.
See supra note 203.
207.
See, e.g., Guidelines on the Information to be Contained in Environmental Impact
Statements 2002 (Ir.), available at http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/ea/guidelines/
EPA_Guidelines_EIS_2002.pdf (setting out guidance from Ireland’s Environmental
Protection Agency); Environmental Impact Assessment: A Guide to Procedures 2001 (U.K.),
available
at
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/
157989.pdf (providing the U.K.’s Department for Communities and Local Government’s
procedures for preparing environmental impact statements).
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Behoud van de Waddenzee v. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw,208 the ECJ
ruled that the meaning of the phrase “likely to have significant effects” in
the Habitats Directive was, as required by the precautionary principle, to be
understood in the sense that such a likelihood existed if the possibility of
harm could not be excluded on the basis of objective information.209 In EU
law, therefore, “likely” is nearer to the spectrum of possible risk than
probable risk though it is not a hypothetical risk.210 In practice, if every
possible effect, whether or not it is “likely” or “significant,” is not
described, and if proposals to identify and manage risks to the environment
and to prevent major accident hazards are not adequately described, a mine
promoter will very likely be exposed to regulatory interrogation, requests
for further information and questioning by the public, NGOs, and bodies
with specialist expertise in any Member State properly implementing EIA
requirements.
Permits granted must be conditional on compliance with conditions
(often envisaged in the EIS and advanced in proposals to satisfy
requirements in Directive 96/82/EC on the prevention of major accident
hazards) designed to ensure, inter alia, that mine operators take all
necessary measures to prevent, or reduce as far as possible, adverse effects
on the environment and human health from mining and extractive waste
when in operation and after the mine closes, and that appropriate measures
are taken for the prevention or limitation of major accidents involving the
mine and mining and tailings facilities.211 Otherwise, however, the EIA
Directive itself does not guarantee (although in practice it is often

208.
See Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee v.
Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, 2005 E.C.R I-07405, I-7446–47.
209.
Id.
210.
Id. See Boggis v. Natural England, [2009] EWCA Civ. 1061 (holding that a
“claimant who alleges that there was a risk which should have been considered by the
authorizing authority so that it could decide whether that risk could be ‘excluded on the basis
of objective information,’ must produce credible evidence that there was a real, rather than a
hypothetical, risk which should have been considered”).
211.
This is required for projects subject to IPPC licensing and is one of the indirect
requirements of the EIA Directive. See Directive 2008/1, art. 3.1(e), 2008 O.J. (L 24) 8 (EC)
[hereinafter IPPC Directive], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:024:0008:0029:en:PDF (requiring the operator to
demonstrate that “the necessary measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their
consequences”), EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 3 (requiring an assessment of the likely
effects of projects on the environment including human beings). See MWD, supra note 81,
art. 4.2 (obliging Member States to ensure that operators take all necessary steps to prevent
or reduce effects on the environment and human health from extractive waste, including
from waste facilities following closure, and the prevention of major accidents involving that
facility and the limiting of their consequences for the environment and human health).
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implemented so as to ensure)212 that appropriate conditions to deal with the
environmental risks of mining and mining waste will be attached to
permits.213 It merely provides procedural mechanisms structuring the
assessment of relevant interventions in the natural or human
environment.214
C. Appropriate Assessments for Mining Plan and Projects
The Habitats Directive, unlike the EIA and SEA Directives,
imposes substantive requirements on operators seeking permits for mining
and waste projects likely to have significant effects on protected habitats
and protected flora and fauna. Article 6.3 of the Habitats Directive
mandates an “appropriate assessment” of any plan or project that, in itself
or in combination with other plans and projects, is likely to significantly
affect a habitat protected under the Directive.215 This includes a mining or
mining waste plan or project.216 A requirement for an appropriate
assessment for projects is usually imposed in the context of a permit system
and is additional to any requirement for EIA. Appropriate assessments of
plans and programmes is usually carried out in the context of land-use
legislation and/or under other legislation implementing Directive
2001/41/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and
programmes on the environment. Almost 14% of EU land territory is
designated for over 15,500 individual Natura sites,217 many of which are in
rural and wilderness areas where mining projects are commonly initiated.
Moreover, the appropriate assessment will be required not only for plans
and projects in protected habitats, but for projects outside habitats that

212.
See, e.g., Case C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the
Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I-723, I-747 (stating that EIA requirement applied to applications for
the renewal of old mining permits).
213.
See EIA Directive, supra note 178.
214.
See Case C-418/04, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2007 E.C.R. 1-10947 (distinguishing
between the objectives of assessments made under the EIA and Habitats Directives).
215.
See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.3.
216.
Id.
217.
See Questions and Answers Environmental Liability Directive, EUROPA (Apr. 1,
2004), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/78 (last visited
Nov. 6, 2011) (“These protected species and areas represent biodiversity that has been found
to be particularly rich and socially valuable in the EU.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Designation of offshore areas as
Natura sites is not common but can also be required under the Directive. See R v. Sec’y of
State for Trade & Indus. ex parte Greenpeace Ltd., [2000] Env. L. R. 221 (concluding that
requirements of the Habitats Directive extended to a site beyond the territorial waters of the
UK but within the UK Continental Shelf). This article is concerned with onshore mining
only. Id.
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could impact them.218 Mining is also banned or heavily regulated in many
national parks and other areas for ecological or heritage reasons under
Member State municipal laws, and there are many instances where mining
permits have been refused because the location was deemed unsuitable.219
Consent may only be given for a mining (or any) project which has
significant adverse effects on the integrity of a protected habitat for reasons
of overriding public interest,220 and then only if there is no alternative
solution and provided compensatory measures are taken.221 The EU
Commission has published guidance on the implementation of the Habitats
Directive.222
Consideration of alternatives is a mandatory and is a major part of
the process of assessing the impacts of plans and programmes on habitats
and of tailoring applications for permits for projects affecting protected
habitats and species. If the protected habitat or species is not a priority site
or the habitat of a priority species, the reasons of “overriding public
interest” which may justify permitting it notwithstanding its adverse
impacts include social and economic reasons, such as providing
employment or contributing towards the achievement of important EU or
national programmes for providing infrastructure or other important policy
218.
It is entirely possible that a mining project outside a protected habitat could affect
it. For example, dewatering, a fairly common impact of mining, could affect the
hydrogeology of a wetland far from the mining site, reduce water levels in a protected river
or lake downstream, or affect spawning grounds of protected fish species. See European
Commission, Managing Natura 2000 Sites: The Provisions of Article 6 of the ‘Habitats’
Directive
92/43/EEC
34,
EUROPA
36
(2000),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/provision_of_art6
_en.pdf (providing an example of a drainage project located outside a site which affects a
wetland). Dust blow offs from tailings ponds and could affect protected species of flora and
fauna growing in areas far from the mine. Id.
219.
For example, in Ireland, in 1991, planning permission was refused for a talc mine
near Westport, Co. Mayo. See Mayo Talc Mine is Rejected, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 15, 1991, at 14
(reporting on the refusal of planning permission for a talc mine because of its location near a
heritage town) (on file with the author). Similarly, authorities rejected a gold mine in
Cregganbaun, Co. Mayo. See Glencar Cautious After Mayo Planning Decision, IRISH TIMES,
Sep. 1, 1993, at 12 (commenting on the refusal of permission for a gold mine near a holy
mountain) (on file with the author). In Scotland, planning permission to re-open a gold mine
in a national park was refused in 2010. See Cononish Gold Mine Application Turned Down,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central11019781 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
220.
Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4.
221.
Id.
222.
See generally Commission Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the ‘Habitats
Directive’ 92/43/EEC (2007) [hereinafter Habitats Directive Comm’n Guidance], available
at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/guidance_art6_
4_en.pdf.
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objectives.223 However, if the site is a priority natural habitat or hosts a
priority species, the only considerations that may be taken into account in
deciding whether to permit a plan or project which could significantly
adversely affect the integrity of the site in view of its conservation
objectives are reasons of public health and safety, or of “beneficial
consequences of primary importance for the environment or, further to an
opinion from the Commission, other imperative reasons of overriding
public interest.”224 Ultimately, therefore, the Commission has a role in
deciding if a plan or project can be permitted if it is likely to adversely
affect priority sites.225
It is difficult to envisage the authorization of any mine that
significantly adversely affects the integrity of a priority site, save in the
most exceptional circumstances.226 This is because it is unlikely that the
Commission would approve a private sector mining project in or adversely
affecting a priority site.227 Article 6.4 of the Directive requires a Member
State contemplating the authorization of mining in such circumstances to
obtain the prior opinion of the EU Commission.228 By 2009, the
Commission had given favorable opinions on 10 of 11 proposed projects in
223.
See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4, Comm’n Opinion 96/15, art. 4.2,
1996 O.J. (L 6) 14 (EC) (concluding that extension of the A-20 motorway through
Germany’s Peene Valley was justified by “exceptionally high unemployment” and the lack
of any alternative solution); Draft Comm’n Opinion, 95/C 178/03, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1995:178:0003:0006:EN:PDF
(discussing a similar justification for the A-20 motorway’s intersection through the Trebel
and Recknitz Valley).
224.
Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4; see also Ludwig Kramer, The
European Commission’s Opinions under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, 21 J. ENVTL.
L. 59 (2009) (examining the Commission’s assessment of Member States’ justifications for
applying Article 6.4 of the Habitats Directive to projects likely to significantly affect the
integrity of priority habitats).
225.
See id.
226.
This is because article 6.4 of the Habitats Directive provides that competent
authorities may only permit projects which could significantly adversely affect the integrity
of a priority habitat where there is a lack of alternatives and for reasons of “overriding public
interest” which is narrowly defined to mean human health or public safety or other reasons
condoned by the EU Commission.
227.
See Habitats Directive Comm’n Guidance, supra note 222, at 7 (stating that
“[p]rojects or plans that ensure only the interests of companies or individuals are not covered
by imperative reasons of overriding public interest”). Cf. Opinion of the Commission of
24/04/2003, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/
docs/art6/prosper_haniel_en.pdf (issuing a favorable opinion on the extension of a coal mine
likely to affect a priority site because it employed a significant number of people at Haniel,
Germany, and because the Commission was satisfied with the compensatory measures
proposed).
228.
See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4 (stating that a project that may
negatively impact a priority site may be permitted for reasons of overriding public interest
“further to an opinion of the Commission”).
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priority sites.229 This was probably because most of them were for public
infrastructure projects (ports, airports, roads, and railways) and because
Member States seeking its opinion went to great lengths to prove that
considered alternatives were impracticable and to ensure that very good
migratory and compensatory measures would reduce and compensate for
damage to the habitat.230
D. Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Permits
At the time of planning a mine opening, plans for its closure must
also be drafted.231 Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution
prevention and control (the IPPC Directive)232 requires Member States to
regulate certain industrial installations where one or more activities listed in
Annex I, as well as any other directly associated activities having a
technical connection therewith, are carried out.233 Although the list of
229.
See Kramer, supra note 224, at 81 (reporting that a negative opinion was issued in
only one of the 11 cases referred to the Commission by 2009).
230.
The Commission envisages that compensatory measures for habitat damage should
be taken before the project is commenced. See Habitats Directive Comm’n Guidance, supra
note 222, at 11.
231.
See EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 5 (requiring a promoter of a project to
describe the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce, and, where possible, offset any
significant adverse effects on the environment and Mining Waste Directive); id. art. 4.2
(requiring Member States to ensure that mine operators take all measures necessary to
prevent or reduce as far as possible any adverse effects on the environment and human
health due to the management of extractive waste, including “the management of a waste
facility also after its closure”); see also id. art. 5.2(c) (requiring waste management plans to
provide for the safe disposal of mining waste after closure “at the design stage”).
232.
See generally IPPC Directive, supra note 211. In December 2010, Directive
2010/75/EU on industrial emissions replaced the IPPC Directive, but it does not have to be
transposed by Member States until January 7, 2013. In general, the measures in Directive
2010/75 will apply from January 7, 2013 for new sites which will require a licence, and from
January 7, 2014 for sites which already have a licence under existing legislation or which
have applied for one by 7 January 2013. See Directive 2010/75, supra note 76.
233.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.3 (defining “installation” for purposes
of the directive). Activities listed in Annex I subject to IPPC include installations:
[2.5] (a) for the production of non-ferrous crude metals from ore, concentrates
or secondary raw materials by metallurgical, chemical or electrolytic
processes; (b) for the smelting, including the alloyage, of non-ferrous metals,
including recovered products, (refining, foundry casting, etc.) with a melting
capacity exceeding 4 tonnes per day for lead and cadmium or 20 tonnes per
day for all other metals. 2.6. Installations for surface treatment of metals using
an electrolytic or chemical process where the volume of the treatment vats
exceeds 30 m3. . . . 5. Waste management . . . Without prejudice to Article 11
of Directive 2006/12/EC or Article 3 of Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12
December 1991 on hazardous waste . . .: 5.1. Installations for the disposal or
recovery of hazardous waste as defined in the list referred to in Article 1(4) of
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Annex I activities does not cover all or even most mines, many mines
become subject to IPPC because of their directly associated activities
(notably waste management activities) or because Member States
implementing the IPPC Directive in their domestic laws have voluntarily
extended its provisions to mining activities.234 Even when mines are not
subjected to IPPC, analogous controls are often required under other less
sophisticated authorization systems designed to ensure compliance with
applicable EU environmental requirements, such as requirements to meet
emission or environmental quality standards.235 Operating permits for IPPC
activities must require operators to comply with best available techniques
(BAT) when carrying out their operations.236 An operator seeking a permit
must demonstrate to the competent authorities that BAT are, or will be,
applied to the operation of a mine and all directly associated activities in
order to reduce environmental impacts to air, water, and land, minimize
impacts on local receptors, reduce waste, conserve energy, water, and
materials, and prevent or limit the consequences of accidents.237 The EU

Directive 91/689/EEC, as defined in Annexes II.A and II.B (operations R1,
R5, R6, R8 and R9) to Directive 2006/12/EC and in Council Directive
75/439/EEC of 16 June 1975 on the disposal of waste oils . . ., with a capacity
exceeding 10 tonnes per day. . . . 5.3. Installations for the disposal of nonhazardous waste as defined in Annex II.A to Directive 2006/12/EC under
headings D8 and D9, with a capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day. 5.4.
Landfills receiving more than 10 tonnes per day or with a total capacity
exceeding 25,000 tonnes, excluding landfills of inert waste.
Id. Annex I.
234.
A member State which has done this will most likely have included mining in the
list of activities strictly liable for environmental damage under the ELD when transposing
the ELD into its domestic legislation.
235.
For example, the programme of measures that Member States are obliged to adopt
under article 11.3 of the Water Framework Directive for maintaining and improving water
quality requires them to establish “as a minimum” a system of prior authorization of artificial
recharges or augmentation of groundwaters and the prohibition, prior authorization, or
registration of point source discharges liable to cause pollution of any waters. See WFD,
supra note 79, art. 11.3. Article 11. 3 states that these measures must ensure compliance with
all relevant EU measures for the protection of waters. See id.; see also MWD, supra note 81,
art. 23 (stating that its requirements may be integrated into other domestic or EU permit
procedures).
236.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(a), 9.4. BAT is basically the best way
of operating from an environmental point of view, as recommended by the EU and Member
States, including the use of the best available technologies and the best practices and
procedures identified for the sector. See id. art. 2.12 (defining “best available techniques”).
237.
See id. art. 6 (requiring applicants for permits to demonstrate the proposed
technology and other techniques for preventing or, where this not possible, reducing
emissions from the installation); id. art. 3.1(e) (requiring the operator to demonstrate that
“the necessary measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their consequences”); id.
arts. 9.4, 10 (requiring emission limit values and the equivalent parameters and technical
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has published guidance on BAT in the form of reference documents
(BREFs) for a number of activities associated with mining; these include
Emissions from Storage (BREF 07.2006), Energy Efficiency (BREF 02.09),
Waste (BREF 08.2006), and Management of Tailings and Waste-rock in
Mining Activities (BREF 01.09).238
In order to assist Member State authorities in determining BAT,
Article 17(2) of the IPPC Directive requires the EU Commission to
organize “an exchange of information” between Member States and the
various stakeholders and interests concerning BAT, associated monitoring,
and developments.239 Every three years the Commission must publish the
results of these exchanges.240 Information published pursuant to Article
17(2) must be taken into account when determining BAT in specific
cases.241 The information obtained is coordinated by the European
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau (EIPPCB) in Seville,
Spain.242 For this purpose, the EIPPCB has set up Technical Working
Groups (TWGs) for thirty different industrial sectors covered by the
Directive, including mining.243 TWGs consist of nominated experts from
EU Member States, EFTA countries, Accession countries, industry,
environmental NGOs, the services of the Commission, and the European
Environmental Bureau, an NGO.244
Bettina Lange has noted that the drafting of BREFs often generates
coalitions of interests which transcend conventional distinctions between
the economic interests of industry and the regulatory interests of Member

measures to be based on BAT unless this is insufficient to meet environmental quality
standards in which case additional and stricter measures are required).
238.
See Reference Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU [hereinafter Reference
Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU], http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/ (last visited Nov. 7,
2011) (cataloguing all adopted reference documents by industry) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
239.
IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 17.2.
240.
See id.
241.
See id. Annex IV, ¶ 12 (listing considerations relevant to the determination of best
available techniques including Commission reports).
242.
See Bettina Lange, Searching for the Best Available Techniques—Open and
Closed Norms in the Implementation of the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention
and Control, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 67, 83 (2006) (describing the process by which BAT is
determined).
243.
See Reference Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU, supra note 238 (listing
BREFs adopted for each industry).
244.
See Who’s Who in the EID (ex IPPC Directive), EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU,
http://eippcb.jrc.es/about/who_is_who.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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States.245 She describes the process of writing the BREFs as one of
“iterative expert judgment.”246 It “welds together the political and technical
dimensions” of BAT determinations, such as the subjective evaluation of
techniques through ongoing negotiation between all interested parties—
“iterative judgment”—and “the reasoned application of structured and
documented scientific and engineering knowledge”—“expertise.”247
Member States must ensure that the competent authority
implementing the IPPC Directive follows or is informed of developments in
BAT.248 The techniques to be taken into account may also include those
used in other Member States, as long as they are reasonably accessible to
the operator at a reasonable cost.249 The EU maintains a website for
competent authorities to share experiences.250 In this manner, less
developed Member States become aware of best practice in mining and
waste regulation throughout the EU.251 BAT is defined at sectoral-level for
the sector as a whole and not for individual installations.252 Sectoral-level
BAT takes into account costs, economic viability, multi-media aspects, and
technical issues, whereas local-level BAT applied by regulators in Member
States to individual installations on a case-by-case basis takes account of
the “technical characteristics of the installation concerned, its geographical
location and the local environmental conditions.”253 This latter element of
BAT has been criticized on the grounds that it leads to varying levels of
environmental protection across the EU but, although it allows for tailoring
245.
See Lange, supra note 242, at 84 (“Industry, Member States and environmental
NGOs were not three unified and opposed power blocs in BAT determinations, but there
were a number of different interests linkages between them.”).
246.
Id. at 82.
247.
Id.
248.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 11.
249.
See id. art. 2.12(b) (defining “available techniques” as “those developed on a scale
which allows implementation in the relevant industrial sector . . . whether or not the
techniques are used or produced inside the Member State in question”). In practice, in the
UK and Ireland, competent authorities tend to consider that, whatever the cost, operators of
mining projects can afford to implement BAT.
250.
See Welcome to the European IPPC Bureau (EIPPCB), EUROPEAN COMMISSION
JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE INSTITUTE FOR PROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGICAL STUDIES,
http://eippcb.jrc.es/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (providing access to adopted BREFs, as well
as current drafts and meeting reports, and allowing registered members to exchange views
on TWG draft texts before they become publicly available) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
251.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 27 (noting that the exchange of information at Community level on
BAT “will help to redress the technological imbalances in the Community” and help
Member States “in the efficient implementation of the Directive”).
252.
See id. art. 2 (defining BAT and referring to the fact that available techniques
means those developed on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant industrial
sector).
253.
IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 9.4.
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a permit to individual circumstances, it does not permit deviation from
mandatory EU environmental emission and quality standards.254 The
finalized reference documents (BREFs) are intended to give guidance to
national authorities and set parameters for BAT requirements to be imposed
at State level.255 Member States may publish their own BAT documents for
the different regulated sectors, having regard to the appropriate BREF
documents.256 BREFs, although authoritative, do not legally bind local
permitting authorities.257
The IPPC Directive itself provides only limited guidance on how
BAT is to be determined at Member State level; it establishes only two
“baselines” for determining BAT.258 First, where environmental quality
standards require stricter conditions than those achievable by using BAT,
additional measures must be included in the permit.259 Second, the permit
must, in all circumstances, “ensure a high level of protection for the
environment as a whole.”260 Member States still have wide discretion, as
the Directive fails to specify what constitutes “a high level of protection.”
Nonetheless, Annex IV (which lists the considerations to be taken into
account when determining BAT requirements) cites “the principles of
precaution and prevention,” thereby encouraging a conservative approach
in determining BAT.261

254.
Id., arts. 9.4, 10; see also Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access,
Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade
Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 308 (1997) (“In response to this criticism, EC
Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard has made it clear that the Commission would
not allow national permitting authorities to abuse the flexibility built into this provision by
setting low requirements designed to give local companies a competitive advantage.”).
255.
See Don Litten, BAT Reference Documents: What Are They and What Are They
Not, in EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON “THE SEVILLA-PROCESS: A DRIVER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE
IN
INDUSTRY”
92
(Apr.
6–7,
2001),
available
at
http://www.umweltdaten.de/publikationen/fpdf-l/1823.pdf (stating that BREFs “represent a
collection of information for the guidance of decision makers involved in implementation of
the IPPC Directive”).
256.
See, e.g., Best Available Techniques (BAT) (Ir.), available at
http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/bat (setting out the Irish Environmental Protection
Agency’s BAT Guidance Notes).
257.
See Litten, supra note 255, at 92 (“BREFs are not prescriptive. They do not set nor
propose emission limit values either at sector, national, regional, local or site specific level.
They do not provide any legal interpretation of the Directive itself.”).
258.
See Martina Doppelhammer, More Difficult than Finding the Way Round
Chinatown? The IPPC Directive and its Implementation, 9 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 204
(2000) (noting the two provisions of the IPPC Directive which guard against any potential
“race to the bottom” among Member States).
259.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 10.
260.
Id. art. 9.4.
261.
Id. Annex IV.
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In any case, the obligation to ensure a “high level” of
environmental protection, including “the minimisation of long-distance or
transboundary pollution,” implies that the most appropriate techniques
cannot be set solely on the basis of local considerations.262 Transboundary
consultation is obligatory where applications for new installations or
substantial changes to existing installations are likely to have significant
negative transboundary effects.263 Such applications must be made available
to the public in the Member State likely to be affected and the result of the
trans-boundary consultations must be taken into account in the decisionmaking process.264
The various BREFs relevant to mineral extraction and related
activities form the agenda between regulators and regulated for permit
applications. In practice, the application process usually involves an
element of negotiation, especially when permits are reviewed and
updated—as they must be—at specified intervals or for specified reasons.265
A specific BREF for tailings and waste-rock was published in 2009.266 The
permit application must demonstrate that the operator of the
installation/facility will take all appropriate preventative and mitigation
measures against pollution, save energy, manage waste appropriately, 267
and prevent accidents through the application of BAT.268 If necessary, the
262.
Id. art. 9.4; see also id. pmbl. ¶¶ 10, 17, 18 (noting the Directive’s goal of
achieving “a high level of protection for the environment as a whole”); id. art. 18 (stating
Member States’ obligations with regard to transboundary effects); Directive 2003/35, supra
note 175, at 19–20 (amending certain provisions of the IPPC Directive and requiring
consultation in transboundary IPPC cases).
263.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, pmbl. ¶ 29, arts. 4.5, 17.
264.
Id.; see also Directive 2003/35, supra note 175, art. 4.5 (empowering Member
States “likely to be significantly affected” to request consultation in transboundary IPPC
cases).
265.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 13 (requiring periodic updating of permit
conditions and setting forth specific instances which trigger such reconsideration); see also
MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 16 (noting the “special nature of the management of waste
from the extractive industries,” and requiring “necessary measures to ensure that the
competent authorities periodically reconsider and, where necessary, update permit
conditions”).
266.
See Reference Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU, supra note 238.
267.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.12, Annex IV (stating that the need to
use low waste technology and to further the recycling and recovery of substances generated
and used in the process when determining BAT at sectoral and local levels); see also Waste
Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 4 (mandating States to implement the waste
hierarchy requiring waste prevention and minimization before recovery or disposal when
authorizing waste activities unless a departure from the hierarchy can be justified for specific
waste streams for reasons of technical feasibility, economic viability and environmental
protection.)
268.
See id. arts. 3.1(e), 6(h) (requiring competent authorities to ensure that “necessary
measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their consequences”).
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permit must “include appropriate requirements ensuring protection of the
soil and ground water and measures concerning the management of waste
generated by the installation.”269 Member States assessing applications for
permits ensure compliance with EC Regulation 1272/2008 and apply the
UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of
Chemicals.270 Guidelines on Metals Environmental Risk Assessment, which
embody EU and UN requirements, were issued by the International
Commission on Mining and Metals in 2008 for “assessing risks posed by
metals and inorganic metal compounds in the environment.”271 In many
Member States, applicants will be required to justify all but the most
stringent emission limit values in the range for their installations and
facilities. Regulators in the UK, Sweden, and Ireland typically raise the
targets for improved environmental performance, waste management,
conservation of resources, accident prevention, and energy saving with each
permit review or permit for substantial changes, a practice which somewhat
deters operators from seeking licence reviews.272
In EU law, Member States and competent authorities (including
IPPC permitting authorities) are obliged to do “all within their powers” to
ensure compliance with relevant EU legislation, including legislation on,
for example, emissions, environmental quality standards, accepted
standards/guidelines for protected areas (e.g., drinking waters, waterdependent conservation sites, nutrient-sensitive areas, shellfish waters, and
bathing areas), resource use, biodiversity protection, waste management, 273
dangerous substances, and accident prevention when issuing an IPPC or
indeed any environmental permit required under EU law for any activity
associated with mining.274 They must also ensure controls over the injection
of waters containing substances resulting from mining into geological
formations from which substances have been mined and pumped and of
groundwater injections and re-injections when authorized as required by
269.
Id. art. 9.3.
270.
See Regulation 1272/2008, pmbl. ¶ 6, 2008 O.J. (L 353) 1, 1 (EC) (integrating
internationally agreed GHS criteria into Community law).
271.
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, METALS ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE, available at http://www.icmm.com/page/45830/.
272.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 12, 13 (requiring Member States to
ensure that no substantial change planned by the operator is made without a permit issued in
accordance with the IPPC Directive and to ensure that competent authorities reconsider and,
where necessary, update permit conditions).
273.
See MWD, supra note 81, at 61 (stating that special rules apply to extractive waste
as defined in this Directive, which are described in the next section).
274.
See Case C-72/95, Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v.
Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403, I-5420 (holding that
compliance with EU environmental standards is a general obligation on competent
authorities in Member States under EU law).
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Article 11(3)(j) of the WFD.275 Appropriate conditions in permits must
require compliance with applicable environmental protection and accident
prevention provisions in numerous Directives.276 Article 9.3 of the IPPC
Directive obliges competent authorities to include conditions on emission
limit values based on BAT for polluting substances (particularly those listed
in Annex III) likely to be emitted in significant quantities from the
installation or directly associated facilities, having regard to their nature and
to their potential to transfer pollution from one medium to another.277
Where appropriate, competent authorities may supplement or replace limit
values by equivalent parameters or technical measures.278 If necessary,
Article 9.3 provides that “the permit must include appropriate requirements
ensuring protection of the soil and ground water and measures concerning
the management of waste generated by the installation.”279
Permits must contain measures relating to abnormal conditions
such as start-ups, leaks, malfunctions, momentary stoppages, and definitive
cessation of operations, and provisions for temporary derogations (up to six
months) to enable operators to implement approved pollution abatement
programmes.280 They must also contain monitoring and measurement
provisions for checking compliance; these are determined on a case-by-case
basis, taking account of each installation’s unique operating requirements
and environment.281 Self-reporting, external independent audits, and
regulatory inspections are often required to monitor and ensure compliance
with BAT and permit conditions.282

275.
See WFD, supra note 79, art. 11.3(j) (requiring specific provisions for the
prohibition of discharging pollutants directly into the groundwater).
276.
See, e.g., IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3(e), Annex IV; WFD, supra note
79, art. 11(l); MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶¶ 14, 28, arts. 4.2, 5.3(a), 6, 16, Annex I.
277.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 9.3 (stating mandatory conditions for
permits authorizing the operation of an installation).
278.
See id. (stating that emission limits cannot currently be set for emissions of
greenhouse gas from an installation specified in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC,
establishing a scheme for the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading relating to activity
in a mine, scheme unless it is necessary to ensure no significant local pollution is caused,
and providing for derogation for energy saving requirements for some combustion plants
listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC).
279.
Id. Appropriate measures will include measures to ensure compliance with all
applicable environmental Directives.
280.
See id. art. 9.6.
281.
See id. art. 9.5.
282.
See id. art. 14(b), (c) (stating that the operator must regularly inform the competent
authority about the results of monitoring releases as well as provide the authority with all
necessary assistance to enable the carrying out of inspections).
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There is an ongoing obligation to ensure that operators meet BAT
standards.283 Given that these standards do not remain static—they may or,
in specified cases, must be revised to incorporate new scientific knowledge
and experience—operators have to achieve corresponding improvements.284
Regulators have the power to force shut-downs as well as to renew and
revoke permits.285
There must be public participation and access to specified relevant
information in the IPPC permitting and review process.286 Any person who
has a sufficient interest or who maintains the impairment of a right is
entitled to access to a procedure before a court or independent and impartial
tribunal to challenge the substantive and/or procedural merits of decisions,
acts, or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of the
Directive.287 If there are likely trans-boundary negative effects or another
Member State so requests, the public and competent authorities in other
Member States have rights to information and to participate.288
The above requirements relate to mining and mining waste
activities not specifically governed by the MWD which are discussed in the
next paragraph.289
VII. Special Rules for Extractive Waste
A. Definition of MWD Wastes
The MWD was passed in 2006 to deal with characteristic waste
from the extractive industries290 resulting from “the prospecting, extraction,

283.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 12, 13.2 (“Member States shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that competent authorities periodically reconsider and, where
necessary, update permit conditions . . . .”).
284.
See id. arts. 9.6, 12, 13.2 (outlining when reconsideration and updating of the
permit should be required).
285.
See id. arts. 9.6, 13.
286.
See id. art. 15, Annex V (prescribing requirements for the access to information
and public participation during the permit procedure and emphasising the need for Member
States to ensure that the public is given an early and effective opportunity to participate in
the decision-making procedure). See also Directive 2003/35, supra note 175, art. 4
(extending public participation requirements to decision-making on IPPC permits and
reviews).
287.
See id. art. 16.1.
288.
See id. art. 18 (discussing the steps to be taken when there could be negative
transboundary effects).
289.
See MWD, supra note 81, at 15 (outlining the methods of managing waste from
extractive industries).
290.
See id. art. 3.6 (stating that “‘extractive industries’ means all establishments and
undertakings engaged in surface or underground extraction of mineral resources for
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treatment and storage of mineral resources and the working of quarries,”
which it terms “extractive waste.”291 Broadly speaking, this means topsoil,
tailings, waste rock, and overburden moved to access the ore or mineral
body, including pre-production and topsoil. Certain wastes are excluded
from the application of the MWD altogether.292 Member States are
permitted to impose less stringent requirements relating to inert waste, nonhazardous prospecting waste, unpolluted soil, waste resulting from the
extraction, treatment, and storage of peat, and non-hazardous, non-inert
waste, unless deposited in Category A facilities.293 This is due to their lower
environmental risks. Likewise, lighter regulation is permitted for the
deposit of non-hazardous waste generated from the prospecting of mineral
resources, except oil and evaporites other than gypsum and anhydrite, as
well as for the deposit of unpolluted soil and of waste resulting from the
extraction, treatment, and storage of peat as long as the requirements of
Article 4 of the MWD are met.294
The MWD does not apply at all to specifically mentioned wastes
regulated by other means, such as offshore extractive waste, pumped
groundwater injections and re-injections authorized by Article 11(3)(j) of
the Water Framework Directive, or to those aspects of radioactive wastes
that are specific to radioactivity and are regulated under EURATOM.295
Wastes not covered by Article 2 of the MWD may be regulated pursuant to
different EU legislation, including the Waste Framework Directive,
Directive 99/31/EC on the landfill of waste, Directive 200/60/EC on
Community action in the field of water policy and the IPPC Directive.296
Article 3(1) of the MWD provides that, for the purposes of that Directive,
“waste” is as defined in Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442/EEC, now Article
commercial purposes, including extraction by drilling boreholes, or treatment of the
extracted material”).
291.
Id. art. 2.1.
292.
See id. art. 2.2 (excluding the following from the scope of the Directive: (a) waste
which is generated by the prospecting, extraction, and treatment of mineral resources; (b)
waste resulting from the offshore prospecting, extraction, and treatment of mineral
resources; (c) the injection of water and re-injection of pumped groundwater).
293.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 9 (stating that “[f]or non-hazardous prospecting waste, Member
states may reduce or waive certain requirements.”); see also art. 2.3 (explaining that lighter
regulation means exemption from Articles 7, 8, 11.1 and .3, 12, 12.6, 14, and 16). Of course,
these wastes must be regulated to comply with any other applicable waste laws, including
Directive 2008/98/EC on waste. Id.
294.
See id. art. 2.3 (explaining that lighter regulation means exemption from Articles
11.3, 12.5 and .6, 13.6, 14, and 16). These wastes must be regulated to comply with any
other applicable waste laws including Directive 2008/98/EC on waste. Id.
295.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 10 (mentioning this exception, but it is not referred to in the main
text of the MWD).
296.
See id. art. 2.4 (providing that waste which falls within the scope of MWD shall
not be subject to Directive 1999/31/EC on landfill).
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1(1)(a) of the Waste Framework Directive.297 The case law of the ECJ
indicates that “waste” placed in voids may not actually be waste at all if the
objective is to reuse it and save on other natural resources, and the MWD
excludes excavation voids into which waste is replaced, after extraction of
the mineral, for rehabilitation and construction purposes from the definition
of a waste facility.298 However, some of this waste (if it is regarded as waste
by competent authorities) may be subject to other waste controls, including
Directive 1999/31/EC on landfill (the Landfill Directive),299 in order to
protect surface water and/or groundwater, secure the stability of such waste,
and ensure appropriate monitoring upon cessation of mining. 300 The MWD
had to be implemented in all Member States by May 1, 2008 at the latest.301
The provisions in the Waste Framework Directive on waste do not apply to
mining waste covered by the MWD.302

297.
See id. art. 3.1 (providing that, for the purposes of that Directive, “waste” is as
defined in Article 1(a) of the Waste Framework Directive). There is now a substantial body
of case law by the ECJ on the interpretation of the definition of waste and the meaning of
“discard.” See Case C-9/00, Palin Granit Oy and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön
kuntayhtymän hallitus, 2002 E.C.R. I-3533, 3562 (implying that if definite plans had been
made for the use of the stored waste rocks in the short or medium term, they might not have
been classified as wastes).
298.
See id. art. 3.15. On one reading of ECJ jurisprudence, such waste would not
qualify as waste at all. For example, in the AvestaPolarit case, 2003 E.C.R. I-8725, I-8773,
the ECJ held that “if a mining operator can identify physically the residues which will
actually be used in the galleries and provides the competent authority with sufficient
guarantees of that use, those residues may not be regarded as waste.” Scottish authorities do
not regard mining waste used to fill galleries/voids as wastes if the operator physically
identifies them, provides a sufficient guarantee that they will be so used, if they are not
stored for too long in the opinion of the competent authority, if their use is necessary and
lawful, and if they can be used without prior processing. See DIRECTORATE FOR THE BUILT
ENVIRONMENT, MINING WASTE DIRECTIVE CONSULTATION PAPER 13, 2008 (Scot.), available
at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/219188/0058826.pdf; see also Council
Directive 1999/31, art. 3.2, 1999 O.J. (L 182) 1, 8 (EC) [hereinafter Landfill Directive]
(excluding “the deposit of unpolluted soil or of non-hazardous inert waste resulting from
prospecting and extraction, treatment, and storage of mineral resources as well as from the
operation of quarries” from its scope).
299.
See Council Directive 1999/31, 1999 O.J. (L 182) 1 (EC); MWD, supra note 81,
art. 2.4 (providing that waste which falls within the scope of MWD shall not be subject to
Directive 1999/31/EC on landfill).
300.
See, e.g., MWD, supra note 81, arts. 5.2(a)(iii), 10, 11, 13.5, pmbl. ¶ 20.
301.
See id. art. 25.1.
302.
See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 2.2(d) (excluding “waste
resulting from prospecting, extraction, treatment and storage of mineral resources and the
working of quarries covered by Directive 2006/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2006 on the management of waste from extractive industries”).
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B. Obligations on Member States

Member States have a general obligation to ensure that extractive
waste is managed without endangering human health, without using
processes or methods which could harm the environment, and without
adversely affecting the landscape or places of special interest.303 Failure to
comply with this obligation can lead to enforcement action in the ECJ.304
Member States must prohibit the abandonment, dumping, or uncontrolled
depositing of extractive waste.305 Furthermore, they must have application
and permit procedures for waste facilities306 used for receiving specified
extractive wastes.307 The MWD approves of the integration of the procedure
for obtaining MWD permits with other environmental authorizations,
provided all the requirements of Articles 5 and 7 are complied with.308 Its
requirements are often incorporated in the IPPC or waste or some other
environmental permitting system capable of meeting the requirements of
MWD. If the extractive waste is not subject to an environmental
authorization implementing EU requirements in these areas, an equivalent
system implementing MWD requirements must be established to deal with
MWD waste facilities.
Member States are required to indicate clearly the requirements for
incumbent waste facilities servicing the extractive industry as regards
location, management, control, closure, and preventive and protective
measures to be taken against environmental threats in the long and short
term and especially against groundwater pollution by leachate infiltration
into the soil.309 They must also clearly define Category A (the more
environmentally dangerous) waste facilities.310 Moreover, they must ensure
that waste facilities are designed, located, and managed by technically

303.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.1.
304.
See Case C-494/01, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2005 E.C.R. I-3331, 3381 (condemning
Ireland for its failure to comply with a similarly worded obligation in Directive 75/446/EEC
on waste).
305.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.1.
306.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 15.
307.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 16, art. 7.
308.
See id. art. 5.5 (specifying that plans pursuant to other legislation may be used
provided that certain conditions are met under this Directive); id. art. 7.1 at 23 (stating that
permits produced pursuant to other legislation can be combined to form a single one,
provided that it complies with all the requirements under that Article).
309.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 18, arts. 13, 19.
310.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 19 (expressing the necessity in clearly defining Category A waste
facilities); id. art. 9 (stating that authorities should classify a waste facility as Category A
according to criteria in Annex III); id. Annex III (stating the criteria for determining the
classification of waste facilities).
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competent persons and that operators and staff are appropriately skilled.311
Competent authorities must draw up external emergency plans which
involve the public specifying measures to be taken off-site in case of an
accident and operators must have major accident policies, safety
management systems implementing them, and internal emergency plans.312
MWD permits must be reviewed every five years (or earlier when the
conditions in Article 7.4 of the MWD apply) and if there are substantial
changes to the operation of the waste facility or to the waste deposited.313
Member States must provide for effective public participation (including,
when appropriate, participation by the public in other Member States) in the
mining facility permitting process.314 Where there are likely to be
significant adverse effects for the environment or human health in the other
Member State and/or if the State likely to be so affected requests, it must be
given the specified information and its views must be taken into account.315
C. The Extractive Waste Permit
Many of the requirements of the MWD relating to permits can be
imposed under existing EU legislation, especially under legislation
implementing the IPPC, Waste Framework, and Water Framework
Directives.316 The procedure for obtaining an extractive waste permit is
similar to the procedure for obtaining an IPPC permit described above,
except that much more specific detail is required relating to extractive
waste, and greater emphasis is placed on accident prevention and the long
term effects of the mining activities.317 Conditions to secure the MWD
objectives and to implement the Directive (and indeed all the appropriate
311.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 21, art. 11.1.
312.
See id. art. 6.3 (stating that each operator must have a major accident prevention
policy prior to the start of operations for managing extractive wastes, draw up a majoraccident prevention policy for the management of extractive waste, and put into effect a
safety management system implementing it in accordance with Section 1 of Annex I, and
shall also put into effect an internal emergency plan specifying the measures to be taken on
site in the event of an accident).
313.
See id. art. 5.4.
314.
See id. pmbl. ¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 29, art. 15; Doppelhammer, supra note 258, at 201.
315.
See MWD, supra note 81, arts. 8, 16.
316.
See id. art. 7.1 (stating that permits issued pursuant to other legislation can be
combined to form a single one, provided that it complies with all the MWD requirements).
Note that art. 2.5 provides that waste covered by the MWD cannot be subject to Directive
1999/31/EC on landfill and that the Landfill Directive, in Article 3.2, excludes “the deposit
of unpolluted soil or of non-hazardous inert waste resulting from prospecting and extraction,
treatment, and storage of mineral resources as well as from the operation of quarries” from
its scope.
317.
See id. art. 7.2 (stating the elements necessary to complete an application for a
permit).
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requirements of EU environmental law relevant to the installation/s) must
be attached to permits.318 Effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties
must be provided for breach of any laws implementing the MWD and
indeed all EU Directives.319
Operators seeking a MWD permit under MWD (which they may do
contemporaneously with or by integrating the application for a MWD
permit with an application for an IPPC or waste or other environmental
permit, if a Member State’s regulatory system allows this) are required to
draw up a very detailed waste management plan fulfilling the objectives in
Article 5.2.320 The plan must take account of the principle of sustainable
development for extractive waste, deal with its prevention or minimisation,
treatment, recovery, and disposal, and ensure that waste generation and
harmfulness is minimized and that waste is recovered.321 The plan must,
inter alia,
[E]nsure the short and long term safe disposal of the waste,
in particular by considering waste management during the
design, management, operation, and after-closure of the
facility and by choosing a design which (a) requires
minimal and, if possible, ultimately no monitoring, control
and management of the closed facility, (b) prevents or at
least minimizes any long term negative effects and (c)
ensures the long term geotechnical stability of any dams or
heaps rising above the pre-existing ground surface.322
Mines are categorized into Category A mines and other mines.323
Category A mines are defined in Annex III as mines with waste which if the
mines failed or were incorrectly operated would (a) give rise to a major
accident or (b) are mines containing wastes classified as hazardous under
Directive 91/6898/EEC or dangerous substances or preparations as defined
in Directives 67/548/EEC or 1999/45/EC, above certain thresholds.324
318.
See id. arts. 7.1, 7.3; see also C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and
Others v. Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403 (stating that competent authorities in Member
States must do all within their powers to implement environmental Directives).
319.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 19; Case C-387/97 Comm’n v Greece, 2000 E.C.R.
I-5047, I-5090–91 (finding that Greece failed to enforce the Waste Directive and requiring
the payment of a daily penalty for delay in implementing the necessary measures).
320.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.5.
321.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 13, art. 5.
322.
Id. art. 5.2(c).
323.
See id. pmbl. ¶¶ 14, 19, arts. 6, 7, 9.
324.
See id. Annex III (stating the criteria for classification of waste under category A);
id. pmbl. ¶ 19 (“It is necessary to define clearly Category A waste facilities used to service
waste from the extractive industries, taking into account the likely effects of any pollution
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Operators must justify why their facilities do not fall within Category A,
but must nonetheless identify possible accident hazards.325 (Only Category
A facilities are governed by MWD insofar as accident risks are concerned;
IPPC or waste or other permits may govern other aspects of risks of
accidents from mines).326
Article 5.3 provides that waste management plans for Category A
facilities shall at least:
(i) demonstrate that a major-accident prevention policy, a
safety management system for implementing it, and an
internal emergency plan will be put in place in accordance
with Article 6(3); (ii) characterize the waste in accordance
with Annex II and estimate the total quantity to be
generated in the operational phase; (iii) describe the
operation generating the waste and its treatment; (iv)
describe how the environment and human health may be
adversely affected by the waste and the preventive
measures to be taken during operation and after-closure,
including the construction aspects (location of the facility,
its management, operation and aftercare, rehabilitation and
closure, and arrangements for after-closure phase); (v)
describe proposed control, and monitoring and corrective
measures if there are indications of instability, soil or water
contamination; (vi) supply the closure and rehabilitation
plan and how provision will be made for after-closure
procedures and monitoring as required for after-closure in
Article 12; (vii) describe the measures to be taken to
prevent water status deterioration in accordance with
Directive 2000/60/EC (the Water Framework Directive)
and for preventing or minimizing air and soil pollution in

resulting from the operation of such a facility or from an accident in which waste escapes
from such a facility.”).
325.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.3(a). Accidents from non-Category A facilities
may be subject to ordinary IPPC and EIA Directive requirements or to Directive 96/82/EC
on the control of major-accident hazards or indeed to ordinary planning requirements,
depending on the nature and extent of the facility. See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex
IV (listing the characteristics of projects to be described including accident prevention
measures); IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 3.1(e), 6(h) (requiring competent authorities
to ensure that “necessary measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their
consequences”); WFD, supra note 79, art. 11(l) (requiring programmes of measures to
prevent or reduce the impact of accidental pollution incidents to waters).
326.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.3 (listing the operator’s obligations with respect to
a waste management plan).
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accordance with Article 13; (viii) provide a base line study
of the land to be affected by the waste facility.327

In particular, the waste management plan must justify how the
design for waste management and the choice of method for extracting and
treating minerals will meet the objectives of the waste management plans
prepared to comply with Article 5.2.328 Competent authorities must ensure
that operators take all necessary measures based, inter alia, on BAT to
prevent or reduce as far as possible any adverse effects on the environment
or human health resulting from the management of extractive waste,
including the management of the facility post-closure and the prevention
and limitation of major accidents and limiting their consequences.329 They
usually do this by conditions in various permits required for mining
activities including IPPC permits issued in relation to the mine or the
mining waste facility.330 BREF Notes have been published for Tailings and
Waste.331 BAT Notes in Member States are based on these.332 Waste
management plans must be reviewed every five years and/or amended as
appropriate if there are substantial changes to the operation of the waste
facility or to the waste deposited.333

327.
See id. arts. 5.3(a)–(h) (prescribing the minimum requirements of the waste
management plan).
328.
Id.
329.
See id. arts. 4.2–4.3 (explaining requirements for Member States to ensure that
BAT are used to “prevent or reduce as far as possible any adverse effects on the environment
and human health brought about as a result of the management of extractive waste”).
330.
See id. art. 7.1 (discussing permit requirements).
331.
See Management of Tailings and Waste-rock in Mining Activities, EUROPEAN IPPC
BUREAU, http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/mmr.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (listing
published BREF Notes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate,
and the Environment). The BREF Notes for Tailings and Waste Rock cover the following
metals irrespective of the amounts produced or the mineral processing method used (e.g.,
whether mechanical methods are used, such as flotation, or whether they are produced by
chemical or hydrometallurgical methods, such as leaching: aluminum, cadmium, chromium,
copper, gold, iron, lead, manganese, mercury, nickel, silver, tin, tungsten, and zinc. Id. The
following industrial minerals are also included: barites, borates, feldspar (if recovered by
flotation), fluorspar, kaolin (if recovered by flotation), limestone (if processed), phosphate,
potash, strontium, and talc (if recovered by flotation). Id. Coal is only included when it is
processed and there are tailings produced. Id. Generally, this means that hard coal (or rock
coal or black coal) is covered, whereas lignite (or brown coal), which is usually not
processed, is not covered, and oil shale. Id.
332.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.3 (“The measures referred to in paragraph 2 shall
be based, inter alia, on the best available techniques, without prescribing the use of any
technique or specific technology, but taking into account the technical characteristics of the
waste facility, its geographical location and the local environmental conditions.”).
333.
See id. art. 5.4.
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VIII. The Prevention of Major Accidents
A number of Directives deal with the risk of mining accidents. The
most important is Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances which was amended by Directive
2003/105/EC specifically to cover the processing and storage of minerals
containing dangerous substances extracted in mining and quarrying and the
tailings disposal facilities used in these activities.334 Directive 96/82/EC had
to be transposed in Member States by February 3, 1999.335 It imposes
stringent obligations on establishments holding dangerous substances,
including requiring information to be notified to the public authorities and
the preparation of a major-accident prevention policy, a safety report, and
internal and external emergency plans.336 It also sets requirements relating
to land-use, planning, and public information, as well as requirements for
dealing with an accident if one occurs.337 Some mines are subject to this
Directive, but accidents from Category A mining waste facilities are
specifically regulated under the MWD and not under Directive 96/82/EC as
amended by Directive 203/105/EC.338
All applicants for IPPC permits have a general duty to take all the
necessary measures to prevent all major accidents involving dangerous
substances, to limit their consequences, to identify risks of accidents, to
submit plans to prevent them, to minimize their effects on humans and the
environment, and to notify competent authorities without delay of any
incident or accident significantly affecting the environment.339 Persons who
have compiled an environmental impact statement for any mining or mining
related project in order to comply with Directive 85/337/EEC on EIA must
also identify the risks of accidents and propose measures to prevent and
mitigate environmental damage and risks to health and safety from the
proposed project.340
The need to prevent accidents and to minimize their environmental
consequences is one of the considerations to be taken into account when
334.
See generally Council Directive 96/82, 1997 O.J. (L 10) 13 (EC), amended by
Council Directive 2003/105, 1997 O.J. (L 345) (concerning the control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances).
335.
See id. art. 24 (setting a two-year time limit from February 3, 1995 for
transposition of the Directive by Member States).
336.
See id. arts. 6–7, 9, 11–14.
337.
Id.
338.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 2 (describing the scope of the Directive).
339.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 3.1(e), 14(b).
340.
See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex III ¶ 1 (requiring the EIS to identify the
risk of accidents, having regard in particular to substances or technologies used); id. Annex
I, II (listing projects subject to art. 4); id. art. 5, Annex IV (requiring a description of
measures to prevent, reduce, or offset any significant adverse effects on the environment.).
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BAT is being determined in specific cases.341 Requirements to prevent or
reduce the risks of accidents in Directive 96/82/EC are usually integrated
into the procedures for obtaining permits for mines such as IPPC or waste
licences or water pollution licensees and/or planning or other environmental
permissions for developments and/or consents for projects covered by the
EIA Directive.342 Guidelines on metals environmental risk assessment
issued by the ICMM in 2008 are often used in risk assessments, and EU
Regulation 1272/2008 applying the UN Globally Harmonised System of
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals in the EU must be complied
with.343
The MWD, as described above, contains specific procedures
governing accidents from Category A extractive waste facilities.344 Member
States are obliged to “ensure that major-accident hazards are identified and
that the necessary features are incorporated into all aspects of the extractive
waste facility (design, construction, operation, closure and aftercare) to
prevent such accidents and to limit their consequences for human health
and/or the environment, including transboundary impacts.”345 They must
draw up an external major-accidents plan, and operators are obliged to
supply the competent authority with the information necessary to do this.346
Member States must also ensure that operators immediately inform
competent authorities if there is a risk of a major accident in order to help
minimize its consequences for human health and to assess and minimize the
341.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.12 (defining the meaning of “best
available techniques” for the purposes of the directive); id. Annex IV (detailing the
“considerations to be taken into account generally or in specific cases when determining best
available techniques, as defined in Article 2(12)”; these include “11. the need to prevent
accidents and to minimize the consequences for the environment”).
342.
See supra notes 339–41 and accompanying text (discussing the duties and
responsibilities of IPPC permit applicants and those who have compiled environmental
impact statements).
343.
See generally U.N. ECON. COMM’N EUR., GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF
CLASSIFICATION AND LABELLING OF CHEMICALS, U.N. DOC. ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.2, U.N.
Sales No. E.07.II.E.5 (2008), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/
danger/publi/ghs/ghs_rev02/English/03e_part3.pdf. The system is an internationally agreedupon system of hazard classification created by the United Nations designed to harmonize
classification and labeling standards worldwide by using consistent criteria for classification
and labeling on a global level. Id. It superseded the relevant European Union standards since
it was adopted into EU law by Regulation 1272/2008. Id.
344.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 6.1 (describing major-accident prevention and
information requirements for those Category A waste facilities not falling within the scope
of Directive 96/82/EC). Note that wastes deposited in voids falls within the scope of
Directive 96/82/EC on major accident hazards as does other waste which does not come
within the definition of extractive waste in the MWD, Article 2. Id.
345.
Id. art. 6.2.
346.
See id. art. 6.3.
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extent of the environmental damage.347 This is normally done by requiring
the attachment of appropriate conditions to various permits for extractive
waste facilities.348 Operators are required to draw up major-accident
prevention policies for extractive waste, to put safety systems (as set out in
Section 1 of Annex II to the MWD) and an internal emergency plan (in
accordance with the objectives listed in Article 6.4) into place specifying
measures to be taken on site if there is an accident.349 The public must be
given an opportunity to participate effectively in formulating the external
emergency plans and must be given specified information, including
information listed in Section 2 of Annex II, free of charge. 350 The
information must be reviewed every three years and updated if necessary.351
IX. Mine Closures and Mining Waste Issues
A. Legislation Regulating Mine Closures
Mine closures involve the closure of the mine itself and usually
(although not necessarily contemporaneously) the closure of directly
associated activities. One of these directly associated activities is
sometimes a mine waste facility such as a tailings pond. The closure of
the mine and directly associated activities is often carried out as required
in permits such as those implementing the IPPC, Water and Waste
Framework Directives, and the Landfill Directive, which also, when
appropriate, may be designed or applied to ensure compliance with the
MWD.352 If mining is not regulated under an IPPC or some other
appropriate environmental permit, a specific authorization must regulate
those aspects of mine closure subject to the MWD.353 Alternatively or
additionally, if the mine or any directly associated activity was subject to
EIA or to an appropriate assessment under the Habitats or the Water
Framework Directives, the closure must be carried out in accordance
with the permit or other environmental authorization354 implementing
these, which (particularly in the case of appropriate assessments) may
347.
See id. art. 6.4.
348.
See id. art. 7.
349.
See id. art. 6.4.
350.
See id. arts. 6.5, 6.6 (detailing requirements for public involvement).
351.
See id. art. 6.6.
352.
See generally WFD, supra note 79; Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77;
IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 5; MWD, supra note 81, art. 7.1.
353.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 7.1 (stating that no waste facility shall be allowed to
operate without a permit granted by the competent authority).
354.
In the UK and Ireland, this is often as required in the planning permission for the
project.
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also ensure compliance with various EU environmental and accident
prevention requirements.355 The entire permitting system for a mine (and
certainly for a large mine) normally requires the coordination of
requirements under various Directives.356 This is not always efficiently
ensured in practice, and there can be contradictory requirements where
there are multiple permits granted at different times and when older
permits, such as those authorizing the initial project, cannot be (or are
not) updated.
The IPPC Directive does not deal in detail with the cessation of
activities at permitted installations.357 However, references in Article 3 to
the obligation on Member States to ensure that necessary measures are
taken “to prevent accidents and limit their consequences” and, “upon
definitive cessation of activities, to avoid any pollution risk and return
the site of operation to a satisfactory state,” as well as the requirement in
Article 6.6 that permits make appropriate provision for definitive
cessation of operations, empower Member States to prescribe (and
competent authorities to implement), via transposing legislation,

355.
The EIA Directive, Annex I requires EIA for open-cast mining and quarries where
the surface of the site exceeds 25 hectares. See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex I ¶ 19
(listing projects that are subject to Article 4(1) requiring assessments under the Directive,
some of which are often associated with mining). Waste resulting from prospecting,
extraction, treatment, and storage of mineral resources and the working of quarries is
covered by the MWD. See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, pmbl. (excluding
waste covered by the MWD Directive but not other waste generated by mining from its
scope). The deposit of waste from the processing of minerals (tailings) in a pond may be
covered by Directive 99/31/EC on the landfill of waste unless covered by the MWD. See
MWD, supra note 81, art. 2.4 (“Without prejudice to other Community legislation, waste
which falls within the scope of this Directive shall not be subject to Directive 1999/31/EC.”).
Minerals processing is sometimes covered by the IPPC Directive. See IPPC Directive, supra
note 211, Annex I (referring to industries governed). Specified mining wastes are governed
by the MWD. See generally MWD, supra note 81. The operations of the extractive industry
are also covered by the Water Framework Directive. See WFD, supra note 79, art. 11.3
(stating that Member States must authorize and set conditions for certain extraction-related
activities).
356.
See generally WFD, supra note 79; Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77;
IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 5; MWD, supra note 81, art. 7.
357.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3 (requiring operators to ensure that the
necessary measures are taken upon definitive cessation of activities to avoid any pollution
risk and return the site of operation to a satisfactory state). Directive 2010/75/EU on
industrial emissions, Article 22, has more specific requirements as to closure and, although
not yet obliged to do so, many competent authorities are implementing its requirements
under their general discretion in Article 9.7 of the IPPC Directive. See Directive 2010/75,
supra note 76, art. 14.1(f) (requiring permit conditions to deal with permanent closure); id.
art. 22.3 (prescribing closure requirements, base line reports, and an obligation to return site
to baseline condition on permanent closure).
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requirements governing all aspects of mine closures if these are subject
to an IPPC licence.358
Article 4.1 of the MWD requires Member states to take all
measures necessary to regulate the management of extractive waste in
order to prevent harm to the environment and to human health. This
general obligation is supported by a number of specific measures in the
MWD that may or may not be required, depending on the nature of the
waste and whether there is a “waste facility” (hereafter called a MWD
waste facility) at the site. The classification of waste facilities under the
MWD will also determine what measures are necessary because the
Directive permits Member States to apply less stringent measures to nonCategory A facilities and non-hazardous and inert materials if they so
choose.359 However, the operator of every extractive waste facility must
draw up and obtain approval for a waste management plan that includes
proposals360 for “closure, including rehabilitation, after-closure
procedures and monitoring” as provided for in Article 12.361 A number of
other directives also mandate Member States to require procedures and
secure objectives designed to prevent or minimize the risk of accidents
and environmental pollution arising from the closure and aftercare of
mines and directly associated activities not specifically regulated under
the MWD.362
The important questions relating to the closure of mining waste
facilities are as follows: (i) who is responsible for complying with
358.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 9.7 (“The permit may contain such other
specific conditions for the purposes of this Directive as the Member State or competent
authority may think fit.”).
359.
See id. art. 2.3 (exempting from Category A requirements facilities “[i]nert waste
and unpolluted soil resulting from the prospecting, extraction, treatment and storage of
mineral resources” and stating that they “shall not be subject to Articles 7, 8, 11(1) and (3),
12, 13(6), 14 and 16, unless deposited in a Category A waste facility”).
360.
See id. art. 5.1 (“Member States shall ensure that the operator draws up a waste
management plan for the minimisation, treatment, recovery and disposal of extractive waste,
taking account of the principle of sustainable development.”). “Operator” in Article 5.1 is
defined as any “person responsible for the management of extractive waste,” including its
temporary storage, as well as the operational and after-closure phases. Id. art. 3.24.
361.
Id. 5.3(f).
362.
See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex IV (listing the characteristics of projects
to be described including accident prevention measures); IPPC Directive, supra note 211,
arts. 3.1(e), 6(h) (requiring competent authorities to ensure that “necessary measures are
taken to prevent accidents and limit their consequences”); WFD, supra note 79, art. 11(l)
(requiring programmes of measures to prevent or reduce the impact of accidental pollution
incidents to waters); Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 28 (requiring waste
management procedures after closure); Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13 (providing
closure and after-care procedures). Note that the Landfill Directive does not apply to wastes
covered by the MWD. See id.
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closure requirements? (ii) what are the closure procedures? (iii) who will
implement and be responsible for the aftercare of mine facilities? (iv)
what is the duration of aftercare? (v) what standards of remediation are
expected? (vi) what, if any, financial provision must be made for
environmental liabilities? These issues are addressed in the next
paragraphs.
B. Who is Responsible for Closing a Mine and Associated Activities?
The IPPC Directive does not state who is responsible for closing
a regulated installation but, as its obligations apply to “operators,” it can
be assumed that the operator/s of a mine or waste facility or facilities
licenced under legislation transposing the IPPC Directive is/are
responsible for its/their closure and aftercare.363 An operator of an IPPC
facility is “any natural or legal person who operates or controls the
installation or, where this is provided for in national legislation, to whom
decisive economic power over the technical functioning of the
installation has been delegated.”364
Article 7 of the Landfill Directive, which may regulate aspects of
mining waste management not subject to the MWD,365 states that the
application for a landfill permit must contain certain minimum
particulars, including “the proposed plan for the closure and after-care
procedures.”366 Although the Directive recognizes in Article 7 that
applicants for landfill permits and operators may be “different entities,”
Article 8 refers to the obligations of the operator under the permit and
Article 13(a)(ii) refers to the closure of sites “at the request of the
operator,” so it must be assumed that operators are responsible for
complying with closure requirements. Article 3.9 of the Waste
Framework Directive defines waste management as including “the aftercare of disposal sites,”367 and Article 23.1(f) states that waste permits
must contain “such closure and after-care provisions as may be
363.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3 (prescribing the obligations of
“operators”). IPPC permits often implement waste management requirements in Directive
2008/98/EC on waste. See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 23.5 (stating that
as long as the requirements of the Directive are complied with, they may be imposed by
permits issued under other domestic or EU legislation).
364.
Id. art. 2.13.
365.
See, e.g., MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 8 (stating that the MWD does not apply to
those waste streams which, albeit generated in the course of mineral extraction or treatment
operations, are not directly linked to the extraction or treatment process); id. art. 10.2
(providing that the Landfill Directive shall continue to apply to waste other than extractive
waste used for filling in excavation voids as appropriate).
366.
Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7.
367.
Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 3.9.
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necessary.” Article 23.5 refers to saving operators from dealing with
multiple environmental applications. Article 5 of the MWD specifically
obliges the operator to include, inter alia, a waste facility closure plan in
the facility’s waste management plan, and Article 12(3) refers to closure
reports submitted by the operator.368 From the above, it is clear that
responsibility for the closure of installations regulated under the IPPC,
Landfill, Waste, and Mining Waste Directives rests with operators.369
C. Procedures for Closing Mines and Mining Waste Facilities
The BREF Notes for the Management of Tailings and Wasterock in Mining Activities370 refer to the common practice of competent
authorities in the EU regulating the closure of waste facilities:
Usually, at least for the past few decades, plans for closure
and site clean-up will have been part of the permitting of the
site, right from the planning stage onwards, and should
therefore have undergone regular updating with every
substantial change in the operation and in negotiations with
environmental authorities and other stakeholders. The
concept of ‘design for closure’ implies that the closure of the
site is taken into account in the feasibility study of a new
mine site and is then continuously monitored and updated
during the life cycle of the mine.371
An IPPC permit must prescribe the conditions for closing any
regulated or directly associated installation.372 These must comply with
368.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5 (discussing closure procedures in conjunction
with the waste management plan); id. art. 12.3 (“A waste facility may be considered as
finally closed only after the competent authority has, without undue delay, carried out a final
on-site inspection, . . . certified that the land affected by a waste facility has been
rehabilitated and communicated to the operator its approval of the closure.”).
369.
See id. art. 3.24 (defining “operator” as “the natural or legal person responsible for
the management of extractive waste, in accordance with the national law of the Member
State in which the waste management takes place, including in respect of temporary storage
of extractive waste [and] the operational and after-closure phase”).
370.
See Commission Reference Document on BAT for Management of Tailings and
Waste-Rock in Mining Activities (January 2009) [hereinafter BREF Notes], available at
ftp://ftp.jrc.es/pub/eippcb/doc/mmr_adopted_0109.pdf.
371.
Id. at iv. Note this statement certainly reflects the practice in the UK and Ireland.
372.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.6(a) (defining BAT as including “the
way an installation is . . . decommissioned”). Article 5.3(f) of the MWD applicable to waste
management plans also has requirements relating to closures. See MWD, supra note 81, art.
5.3(f) (requiring waste management plans to contain “the proposed plan for closure,
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BAT, which requires the implementation of approved environmental
management systems.373 The criteria for BAT established under the IPPC
Directive relate, inter alia, to the way an installation is “designed, built,
maintained, operated and decommissioned.”374 Other environmental
permits, such as those ensuring compliance with the EIA Directive, the
Water Directives, and the Habitats Directives may (but are not explicitly
required to), depending on transposing legislation, prescribe conditions
for dealing with the closure of facilities. However, legislation transposing
the IPPC, MWD, Waste, and Landfill Directives must deal specifically
with closure procedures.375
The various EU BREF notes on waste and mining wastes and
Member State BAT notes provide guidance on closure and after-care
requirements.376 Depending on transposing legislation in Member States,
most IPPC permits and other environmental authorizations for mining
installations and waste management facilities require operators to submit
residual management plans, updated regularly, in pursuance of their
obligations to ensure that “the necessary measures are taken upon
definitive cessation of activities to avoid any pollution risk and return the
site of operation to a satisfactory state.”377 Such plans will usually be
including rehabilitation, after-closure procedures and monitoring as provided for in Article
12”).
373.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3. (specifying the basic obligations of
operators). Likewise, Article 5.3(a) of the MWD requires management systems in waste
management plans. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.3(a) (“[W]here a Category A waste
facility is required, a document demonstrating that a major-accident prevention policy, a
safety management system for implementing it and an internal emergency plan will be put
into effect in accordance with Article 6(3).”).
374.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.12(a).
375.
See generally Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77; IPPC Directive, supra
note 211, art. 5; MWD, supra note 81, art. 7.1.
376.
See supra notes 331, 370; Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 9(c) (providing
that a landfill permit must include contingency plans and provisional requirements for the
closure and after-care operations); see also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
GUIDANCE FOR THE LANDFILL SECTOR 51 (U.K. 2007), available at
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/GEHO0407BMHO-E-E.pdf (advising
on “the closure requirements for landfills[] and the requirements leading up to surrender of
the permit”); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BAT GUIDANCE NOTES FOR THE WASTE
SECTOR: LANDFILL ACTIVITIES 41 (Ir. 2003) [hereinafter Irish BAT Notes], available at
http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/bat/bat%20landfill%20final%20april%202003.pdf
(discussing the cessation of waste disposal, restoration and aftercare, and maintenance of
environmental pollution and control systems).
377.
IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(f); see also BREF Notes, supra note 370,
at iv (commenting on general practices for the last two decades). A Residuals Management
Plan is a fully costed and detailed plan for decommissioning or closure of a facility or part
thereof. See EPA, Guidance on Environmental Liability Risk Assessment, Residuals
Management Plans and Financial Provisions [hereinafter EPA, Guidance on Environmental
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modeled on the plans required for the closure of landfills or mining waste
facilities described in the next paragraphs.
Specific procedures apply to the closure of those extractive waste
facilities governed by the MWD that are closed after transposition of the
MWD by Member States, i.e., after May 1, 2008, at the latest.378
Exemptions from the MWD’s stringent requirements apply to specified
extractive waste facilities listed in Article 2 of the MWD, but they may
be subjected to other waste management controls, notably under the
Waste Framework and Landfill Directives.379 Article 5 of the MWD
requires regulated waste facility operators to draft waste management
plans containing proposals for closure, including rehabilitation, afterclosure procedures, and monitoring. Even operators of facilities listed in
Article 2.3 which may be exempted from other MWD requirements must
do this.380
The procedures for closing landfills and mining waste facilities
are similar.381 The operator of a landfill or part of a landfill (which could
be ancillary to a mining activity) or of a mining waste facility specified
in Article 2.1 of the MWD (and other waste facilities specified in Article
2 if Member States so choose) must begin the closure procedure in
accordance with the permit for the facility382 and can only start the
procedure if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (a) the relevant
conditions in the permit are met; (b) the competent authority has
authorized the closure at the request of the operator; or (c) the competent
authority issues a reasoned decision to that effect.383
Permits for mine waste facilities and landfills (and indeed many
other permits covering installations with the potential to cause damage to
human health or the environment after closure) require operators to
supply monitoring results,384 to undertake audits, to commission
Liability], available at http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/licensee/elra%20guidance%20
document.pdf (outlining the requirements of a Residuals Management Plan).
378.
See id. art. 25.1 (“Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 1 May 2008.”).
379.
See supra notes 359, 360, 362.
380.
See supra note 359 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 2.3 of the
MWD permits Member States to apply less stringent measures to certain kinds of facilities
and materials—mostly inert waste facilities).
381.
Compare Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13 (prescribing closure and afterclosure procedures for landfill waste facilities), with MWD, supra note 81, art. 12
(prescribing closure and after-closure procedures for mine waste facilities).
382.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7 (discussion application for a permit
for a landfill); MWD, supra note 81, art. 5 (discussing waste management plans).
383.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(a), MWD, supra note 81, art. 12(a).
384.
See MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 9(22) (stating that it is necessary to establish a
monitoring procedure during the operation and after‐closure of waste facilities and requiring
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independent verification of results,385 to notify of accidents, incidents,
and events likely to affect waste stability or harm the environment
revealed by monitoring, to implement internal emergency plans for
extractive waste facilities when appropriate,386 to maintain records,387 to
prepare and to update environmental and risk assessments at regular
intervals, and to ensure that the facility will meet required standards for
closure.388 Furthermore, operators of authorized landfills and MWD
facilities must appoint competent management with the requisite skills
and technical training.389
A competent authority cannot consider a landfill or mining waste
facility definitively closed until it has carried out a final on-site
inspection assessing all the reports submitted by the operator and
certified that the waste facility has been rehabilitated.390 In practice,
competent authorities, in addition to their own investigations, require
operators to commission independent reports by reputable consultants
(usually respected multinational consultancies) reviewing the
environmental status of the facilities; they will not agree to closure unless

an after‐closure period for monitoring and control of Category A waste facilities
proportionate to the risk they pose, “in a way similar to that required by Directive
1999/31/EC”); id. arts. 5(3)(e), 11(2)(c); Landfill Directive, supra note 298, pmbl. ¶ 23
(stating that it is necessary to establish common monitoring procedures during the operation
and after-care phases of a landfill in order to identify any possible adverse environmental
effect of the landfill and take the appropriate corrective measures); id. arts. 7(f), 9(c)–(d).
385.
Independent verification is also required by the London Stock Exchange Rules and
is recommended in many BREF and BAT Notes. See, e.g., Reference Document on Best
Available Techniques for Management of Tailings and Waste Rock (January 2009),
available at http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/BREF/mmr_adopted_0109.pdf.
386.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(c); MWD, supra note 81, art. 11.3.
387.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, arts. 9(d), 10, 11.2, 13(b); MWD, supra
note 81, art. 17.2.
388.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(b) (stating that a landfill or part of it
may only be considered as definitely closed after the competent authority has carried out a
final on-site inspection, has assessed all the reports submitted by the operator, and has
communicated to the operator its approval for the closure); MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.4,
(requiring operators to review the waste management plan every five years); id. art. 12.6
(requiring operators to report after closure).
389.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 8(a)(ii) (requiring that landfill permits
not be issued without ensuring that landfill sites will be managed by competent persons);
MWD, supra note 81, art. 11.1 (requiring States to take appropriate measures to ensure that
the management of a waste facility is in the hands of a competent person and that technical
development and training of all staff are provided”). This is also BAT. Member States may
modify this obligation for facilities specified in art. 2.3, paragraph 1 of the MWD (i.e., “Inert
waste and unpolluted soil from . . . prospecting, extracting, treatment and storage of peat and
mineral resources and quarry waste”). Id. art 2.3.
390.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(b) (requiring a final on-site
inspection and approval for closure); MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.3 (same).
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satisfied with rehabilitation. IPPC permits and other authorizations
regulating mining and mining waste normally require mine rehabilitation
on a progressive basis wherever possible so that the rate of restoration is
similar to the rate of exploration or exploitation.
D. After-Care Requirements
Both landfill facilities and extractive waste facilities governed by
the MWD (except those listed in Article 2.3) must be subjected to aftercare procedures.391 Operators of both are responsible for maintenance,
monitoring, control, and corrective measures in the after-closure phase
“for as long as may be required by the competent authority,”392 taking
into account the nature and duration of the hazard.393 The MWD
envisages that competent authorities may take over after-care of the
facilities, but this has been resisted in Ireland.394 Landfill operators must,
without prejudice to any Community or national legislation as regards
the liability of the waste holder, for as long as the competent authority
considers the landfill a hazard to the environment, monitor and analyze
landfill gas and leachate from the site, as well as the groundwater regime
in the vicinity of the site in accordance with Annex III to the Landfill
Directive.395 Where considered necessary by the competent authority to
comply with Community legislation, especially relating to water quality,
MWD waste facility operators must, inter alia, control the physical and
chemical stability of the facility and minimize negative environmental
effects on waters by ensuring that the facility structures are monitored
and conserved, with control and measuring apparatus always ready for
use, and, where applicable, that overflow channels and spillways are kept
clean and free.396

391.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13 (listing procedures for closure and
after-care); MWD, supra note 81, art. 12 (same).
392.
Landfill Directive, supra note 298, arts. 13(c)–(d) (requiring that the operator of a
site shall be responsible for monitoring for as long as the competent authority considers that
a landfill is likely to cause a hazard); MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.4 (stating that the
operator “shall be responsible for the maintenance, monitoring, control and corrective
measures in the after-closure phase for as long as may be required . . . .”).
393.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(d).
394.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.4 (“The operator shall be responsible . . . in the
after-closure phase . . . save where the competent authority decides to take over such tasks
from the operator . . . .”). Insofar as can be determined, only the Netherlands does this for
landfills.
395.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(d).
396.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.5.
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E. Duration of After-Care

The Landfill Directive states that “it is necessary to indicate
clearly the requirements with which landfill sites must comply as regards
. . . closure and preventive and protective measures to be taken against
any threat to the environment in the short as well as in the long-term
perspective, and more especially against the pollution of groundwater by
leachate infiltration into the soil,”397 but it does not stipulate a definite
after-care period. Article 13(c) holds the operator responsible for “the
after-care phase for as long as may be required by the competent
authority, taking into account the time during which the landfill could
present hazards.”398 Moreover, Article 13(d) states, “for as long as the
competent authority considers that a landfill is likely to cause a hazard to
the environment . . ., the operator of the site shall be responsible for
monitoring and analyzing landfill gas and leachate from the site and the
groundwater regime in the vicinity of the site in accordance with Annex
III.”399 Clearly, therefore, the duration of the after-care period is a matter
for the discretion of the competent authorities in each Member State, and
clearly some time limit proportionate to the risk involved is envisaged.400
The UK landfill guidelines recommend a minimum of 50 years for aftercare.401 However, competent authorities in some other Member States do
not accept a finite period.402
The MWD is no more informative about recommended periods
for after-care. Article 3(24) refers to the “after-closure phase,” thus
implying a finite period, and the Preamble envisages that the afterclosure period for Category A facilities should be “proportionate to the
risk posed by the individual waste facility, in a way similar to that
required by Directive 1999/31/EC.”403 Yet competent authorities in some
397.
Landfill Directive, supra note 298, pmbl. ¶ 12 (emphasis added).
398.
Id. art. 13(c).
399.
Id. art. 13(d).
400.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 30 (stating that when a competent authority considers that a landfill
is unlikely to cause a hazard to the environment for longer than a certain period, the
estimated costs to be included in the price to be charged by an operator may be limited to
that period).
401.
See ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON MONITORING OF LANDFILL LEACHATE,
GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER 8 (U.K.), available at http://www.environmentagency.gov.uk/static/documents/Business/report_1_533191.pdf (“Landfill sites that contain
biodegradable or other polluting wastes may need to be monitored for periods of up to 50
years or more . . . .”).
402.
The Netherlands adopts an unlimited period for landfill waste but relieves
operators of responsibility after 30 years. Irish authorities currently consider that the
aftercare period is indefinite citing the lack of statutory guidance on the matter.
403.
Id. pmbl. ¶ 22.
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Member States require perpetual monitoring of very long aftercare
periods. For example, all Irish IPPC mining licences to date refer to
“perpetual” after-care of the site and require that a programme for this be
submitted to the EPA.404 The 2009 UK draft Guidance on Financial
Guarantees for Mining Waste Facilities envisages detailed costing of
after-care for a period of 60 years for Category A mines and hazardous
waste facilities.405
A World Bank Report on Mine Closures states that, although the
duration of post-closure monitoring should be determined on a risk basis,
site conditions typically require after-care monitoring for a period of five
years or longer.406 However, the report found no jurisdiction which
prescribed a definite period for after-care.407 Article 12.4 of the MWD
envisages the possibility that a competent authority may take over a mine
waste facility from an operator after it has finally closed without
prejudice to any national or Community legislation governing the
liability of the waste holder.408 But, insofar as can be determined, no EU
country to date makes provision for this in respect of closed mines,

404.
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ARCON MINES INTEGRATED
POLLUTION
CONTROL
LICENSE
517,
at
22–24
(2008),
available
at
http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippc-view.jsp?regno=P0517-01 (requiring that the
licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans at Galmoy mines);
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BOLIDEN MINES LIMITED INTEGRATED POLLUTION
CONTROL
LICENSE
516,
at
19–21
(2006),
available
at
http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippc-view.jsp?regno=P0516-01 (requiring that the
licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans at Tara mines);
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, VEDANTA LISHEEN MINES INTEGRATED POLLUTION
CONTROL
LICENSE
88,
at
19–21
(1997),
available
at
http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippc-view.jsp?regno=P0088-01 (requiring that the
licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans).
405.
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON FINANCIAL
GUARANTEES FOR MINING WASTE FACILITIES 5 (U.K. 2010) 5, available at
http://www.environmentagency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/Guidance_Financial_Guarantees_for_MWD_sites
_v4_FPSG__Final_170609.pdf (“We consider that is it appropriate to estimate detailed costs
for an aftercare period of 60 years, with a further contingency fund available thereafter.”).
406.
See THE WORLD BANK GROUP OIL, GAS AND MINING POLICY DIVISION, GUIDANCE
NOTES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FINANCIAL SURETY FOR MINE CLOSURE 2 [hereinafter
WORLD
BANK
GUIDANCE
NOTES],
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/financial_surety_mine-.pdf (“The
duration of post-closure monitoring should be defined on a risk basis; however, site
conditions typically require a minimum period of five years after closure or longer.”).
407.
See id.
408.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.4 (“The operator shall be responsible . . . save
where the competent authority decides to take over such tasks from the operator, after a
waste facility has been finally closed and without prejudice to any national or Community
legislation governing the liability of the waste holder.”).
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although the Netherlands does it for ordinary landfills.409 This is an issue
of great practical importance for mining companies who often want a
finite termination to their obligations; yet there is no EU guidance in the
area and each Member State has its own (sometimes incoherent) rules.
F. Financial Provision for Environmental Performance and After-Care
Referring to mine closure costs, The World Bank estimated in
2002:
Closure costs for environmental issues range from less than
US$1 million each for small mines in Romania to hundreds
of millions of dollars for large lignite mines and associated
facilities in Germany. More typically, closure costs will
range in the tens of millions of dollars. Preliminary
research indicates that medium-size open pit and
underground mines operating in the past 10 to 15 years cost
US$5–15 million to close, while closure of open pit mines
operating for over 35 years, with large waste and tailings
facilities, can cost upwards of $50 million.410
Banks adhering to the Equator Principles will not lend to operators who do
not comply with the World Bank/IFC Environmental Guidelines, which
require the provision of financial guarantees for the environmental
performance of mining projects.411
Although the MWD refers to the need for Member States to adopt a
uniform approach to implementation and notes that differing national
applications may lead to substantial disparities in the financial burden on
economic operators,412 no uniform position on financial liabilities has yet

409.
Insofar as can be determined, only the Netherlands assumes responsibility for
after-care
after
30
years.
See
Aftercare,
ROYAL
HASKONING,
http://www.royalhaskoning.com/landfills/themes/aftercare/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Dec. 13, 2011) (“The Dutch government decided to introduce a policy to cover aftercare not
for a period of 30 years, but everlasting aftercare.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
410.
See WORLD BANK GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 406, at 1.
411.
See C. GEORGE MILLER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS,
FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR MINE CLOSURE AND RECLAMATION 42 (2005), available at
http://www.icmm.com/document/282 (“Adherents to these principles have undertaken not to
finance any project anywhere in the world unless the project meets World Bank/IFC
environmental guidelines.”).
412.
See MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 34 (“[I]mproving the management of waste
from the extractive industries, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states acting
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been agreed. Commission Decision 2009/335/EC on technical guidelines
for the establishment of the financial guarantee in accordance with the
MWD has been published.413 It merely sets out how the financial guarantee
is to be calculated, clarifies that the calculation must be made by
independent qualified parties, and requires that account must be taken of the
possibility of unplanned or premature closures.414
Several directives require or give Member States discretion to
require operators of mines, waste facilities, and directly-associated facilities
to provide financial security for environmental liabilities at closure and for
after-care.415 The IPPC Directive does not require operators to provide
financial security for performance of their obligations,416 although some
Member States (including Ireland and the UK) do so under their
implementation laws or in permits granted for the mining operation.417 A
alone . . . . [D]ifferent national applications of that principle may lead to substantial
disparities in the financial burden on economic operators.”).
413.
See Comm’n Decision 2009/335, 2009 O.J. (L 101) 25 (EC) (setting out technical
guidelines for calculating the financial guarantee, taking into account the possibility of
premature closure).
414.
See id. art. 1.
415.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 14 (“Member states shall take measures to encourage
the development of financial security instruments . . . , with the aim of enabling operators to
use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under this Directive.”); see also
MWD, supra note 81, art. 14 (“The competent authority shall . . . require a financial
guarantee . . . , so that . . . all obligations under the permit issued pursuant to this Directive,
including after-closure provisions, are discharged . . . .”); Landfill Directive, supra note 298,
pmbl. ¶ 28, art. 8(a)(iv) (requiring operators of landfills “to make adequate provision by way
of financial security or other equivalent to ensure that the obligations in the permit are
performed including those relating to the closure and aftercare of the site”).
416.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3(2) (prescribing the operator’s basic
obligations). However, IPPC licences often transpose requirements in the Landfill and
MWD Directives and when doing so, they must require the provision of financial security.
417.
See, e.g., Irish Protection of the Environment Act 2003, § 15:
The Agency may . . . require the applicant for the licence, the licensee in the
case of a review . . . to (i) furnish to it such particulars in respect of such
matters affecting his ability to meet the financial commitments or liabilities
that the Agency reasonably considers will be entered into or incurred by him
in carrying on the activity to which the licence or revised licence relates or
will relate, as the case may be, in accordance with the terms of the licence or
in consequence of ceasing to carry on that activity as it may specify, and (ii)
make, and furnish evidence of having so made, such financial provision as it
may specify (which may include the entering into a bond or other form of
security) as will, in the opinion of the Agency, be adequate to discharge the
said financial commitments or liabilities.
In practice the EPA requires the financial provision provided (be it a bond or closure fund or
insurance or a combination of some or all of these) to be updated regulatory to reflect
predicted costs and liabilities calculated by independent assessors. Conditions in planning
permissions under section 34 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 may also require
developers to establish closure funds “for the satisfactory completion of the development.”
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requirement for regularly updated Environmental Liability Risk
Assessments and financial provisions to cover these risks is a common
feature of IPPC licences for activities with post-closure environmental risks
in the UK, Ireland, and Sweden.418 However, the requirement to make
financial provision for closure does not encompass the attenuation of social
and economic impacts of mine closure on local populations, although
mining companies may address this issue voluntarily.419
The ELD merely requires Member States to encourage the
development of financial security instruments and markets with the purpose
of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their
responsibilities under the ELD.420 The ELD directs the EU Commission to
submit a report on conditions of insurance and other financial security
mechanisms by April 30, 2010, a deadline it did not meet.421 The report is to
consider a gradual approach to financial security requirements, establishing
a ceiling for financial guarantees and excluding low-risk activities.422 If
appropriate in view of the report and an extended impact assessment that

These closure funds provide the funding for planned closures. The amounts are estimated to
be about 5% of capital costs. They must normally be kept separate from other company
accounts and the consent of the regulatory agencies is required for withdrawals. See Ben
Dhonau, Irish Experience of Financial Mechanisms for Remediation and Restoration, in
PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR ON FINANCIAL GUARANTEES AND SECURITIES IN THE EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRY
2007,
available
at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1
143482 (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). There is no formal system demanding hard financial
guarantees for mining operations in the UK. However, there are individual cases where hard
guarantees have been required due to the special location of the mine site in environmentally
sensitive locations. Furthermore, within the UK there is an accounting standard (FRS 12)
that requires all extraction industries to make provisions for liabilities (e.g., for closure) on
their balance sheets. The amount provided for is required to correspond to the actual
liability. See Lars-Ake Lindhal, Financial Securities—an Industry Perspective, in
PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR ON FINANCIAL GUARANTEES AND SECURITIES IN THE EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRY
2007,
available
at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1
143484 (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
418.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, pmbl. ¶ 28 (stating that operators of
landfills should make adequate provision by way of financial security or other equivalent to
ensure that the obligations in the permit are performed, including those relating to the
closure and aftercare of the site). Of course the Landfill Directive does not apply to mining
waste as defined in the MWD, but it may apply to other mining waste.
419.
The Galmoy Mine in Ireland has done so in the process of closing in 2010–11.
420.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 14, § 1 (“Member States shall take measures to
encourage the development of financial security instruments and markets . . . with the aim of
enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under this
Directive.”).
421.
See id., art. 14, § 2.
422.
Id.
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includes a cost-benefit analysis, the Commission will also submit a
proposal for a system of “harmonised mandatory financial security.”423
The first Directive to clearly mandate financial security was the
Landfill Directive. Article 7 requires that landfill permit applications424
contain certain minimum particulars, including “the financial security by
the applicant, or any other equivalent provision, as required under Article
8(a)(iv) of this Directive.”425 The said Article 8(a)(iv) requires Member
States to ensure that:
[A]dequate provisions, by way of a financial security or
any other equivalent, . . . has been or will be made by the
applicant prior to the commencement of disposal
operations to ensure that the obligations (including aftercare provisions) arising under the permit issued under the
provisions of this Directive are discharged and that the
closure procedures required by Article 13 are followed.
This security or its equivalent shall be kept as long as
required by maintenance and after-care operation of the site
in accordance with Article 13(d). Member States may
declare, at their own option, that this point does not apply
to landfills for inert waste.426
The MWD Directive also encourages (but does not oblige) Member
States to adopt financial security mechanisms to ensure that operators of
activities involving potential pollutants have the financial means to address
future environmental issues.427 The scope of this is evidenced by a draft
Spanish proposal in 2006 that would require €1 million in cash reserves,
insurance, or a bond to cover the lowest-risk activity.428 Article 14 requires
mining waste facility operators to lodge a “financial guarantee or
equivalent” ensuring that all obligations flowing from the permit will be
discharged, including those relating to the closure and after-closure of the
423.
Id.
424.
This application can be integrated into an application for an IPPC permit or a
waste permit. The competent authorities will implement the Landfill requirements when
setting the conditions for these permits.
425.
Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7(i).
426.
Id. art. 8(a)(iv).
427.
See MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 25 (stating that Member States should adopt
measures ensuring that operators have the financial means to address future environmental
issues).
428.
See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, GUIDANCE PAPER:
FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR MINE CLOSURE AND RECLAMATION (March 2006), available at
http://www.icmm.com/page/1232/guidance-paper-financial-assurance-for-mine-closure-andreclamation.
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waste facility.429 The guarantee must be sufficient to cover the cost of “any
rehabilitation work needed to be carried out on the land affected by the
waste facility, including the waste facility itself as described in the waste
management plan prepared pursuant to Article 5 and required by the Article
7 permit.”430 The guarantee must also cover the risks envisaged in the
ELD.431
Landfill and MWD guarantees must both be provided prior to the
commencement of deposition operations in any landfill and/or mining
waste facilities respectively and be periodically adjusted.432 The MWD
guarantee must be sufficient to ensure that all obligations in the permit,
including the after-care provisions, can be discharged and that there are
funds available at any given time for the rehabilitation of the land affected
by the waste facility.433 In practice, some Member States ensure the
sufficiency of financial guarantees to reflect the current level of known or
predicted environmental liabilities by conditions in permits requiring that
financial provision for liabilities be updated and appropriately adjusted in
closure and after-care plans incorporating environmental risk assessments
and risk management plans.434
Article 14.4 of the MWD envisages that an operator will be
released from the financial guarantee or equivalent, and presumably entitled
to a refund of any monies deposited or in escrow, when the competent
authority authorizes the mine closure, except for so much of it as is
necessary to finance the after-care obligations specified in Article 12.4.435
Issues have arisen over the calculation of this residual financial amount
given that some competent authorities consider after-care to be a perpetual
obligation.436
429.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.
430.
Id. art. 14(2)(b).
431.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 25 (“[A]n operator of a waste facility servicing the extractive
industries is subject to appropriate liability in respect of environmental damage cause by its
operations or the imminent threat of such damage.”).
432.
See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7(i); MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.3.
433.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.1.
434.
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY, RISK ASSESSMENT, RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT PLANS AND FINANCIAL PROVISION
37–41
(Ir.
2006),
available
at
http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/licensee/
ELRA%20Guidance%20Document.pdf (outlining the method of calculation of financial
provision for liabilities).
435.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.4.
436.
See ARCON MINES LICENSE, supra note 404, at 23 (requiring that the licensee
include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans at Arcon Mines);
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TARA MINES INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL
LICENSE 516, at 20 (2006), available at http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippcview.jsp?regno=P0516-01 (requiring that the licensee include a programme for perpetual
aftercare in its closure plans at Tara Mines); VEDANTA LISHEEN MINES LICENSE, supra note
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G. Expected Remediation Standards
No fewer than three Directives may be relevant to the issue of
remediation standards, viz., the Environmental Liability Directive,437 the
IPPC Directive,438 and the MWD.439 The ELD requires that Annex III
facility operators liable for the restoration of waters or habitats return them
to “baseline condition”440 by essentially returning them to the condition
they would have been in had the damage not occurred.441 Unfortunately, the
guidelines provided to Member States offer consistently vague descriptions
of that standard.442 Instead of expanding upon the meaning of “baseline
condition,” they tend to repeat the phrase and state that the result is subject
to the decision of the regulator.443
The EU-sponsored REMEDE Project444 has stated that this
obligation can account for natural fluctuation.445 Thus, if environmental
damage occurs during an unusually high period of conservation which
would not naturally exist at the time of restoration, the remediation of the
habitat is not expected to reach that augmented standard.446 REMEDE has
stressed that Member States have significant discretion in choosing
404, at 20 (requiring that the licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its
closure plans).
437.
See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl. (concerning environmental liability with regard to
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage).
438.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211.
439.
See MWD, supra note 81, at 15 (regarding the management of waste from
extractive industries).
440.
See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.14 (“‘[B]aseline condition’ means the condition at
the time of the damage of the natural resources and services that would have existed had the
environmental damage not occurred, estimated on the basis of the best information
available.”).
441.
See id. Annex II.1 (setting the framework for returning environmentally damaged
areas to baseline condition).
442.
See id. Annex II (listing the measures to a return to baseline condition with regard
to water and land damage).
443.
See, e.g., Georgina Crowhurst, The Environmental Liability Directive: A UK
Perspective, 15 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 266, 271 (2006).
444.
See Resource Equivalency Methods for Assessing Environmental Damage in the
EU, About REMEDE, ENVLIABILITY.EU, http://www.envliability.eu/pages/about.htm (last
visited Nov. 29, 2011) (explaining the purpose and goal of REMEDE) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
445.
See REMEDE, DELIVERABLE NO. 5: LEGAL ANALYSIS 12 (November 30, 2006)
[hereinafter
REMEDE
Deliverable
No.
5],
available
at
http://www.envliability.eu/docs/LegalAnalysis_D5_PRDF_071206_FINAL.pdf (explaining
why natural fluctuations should be taken into account when establishing the baseline
condition and determining whether or not the damage is beyond the thresholds of Article 2
of the ELD).
446.
See id. (explaining that remediation is limited to a baseline of the condition of the
site before the damage occurred and not requiring remediation beyond that point).
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restoration measures and in determining the baseline condition.447 Costs can
be expressly considered as part of Member State discretion over remedial
actions.448 If full restoration is deemed disproportionately expensive, the
regulatory authority is entitled to require only the prevention of significant
adverse effects to, inter alia, human health.449 Lucas Bergkamp has argued
that this will make the process “very inefficient and unworkable.”450 Yet
such discretion is inevitable given that establishing a baseline requires a
highly localized knowledge of the conditions prior and subsequent to the
environmental damage.451 Although the measures chosen are necessarily
somewhat discretionary, the standard to be achieved ought to be consistent.
Regrettably, however, that does not seem to be the case. At least a partial
cause of this is the paucity of case law, which REMEDE attributes to delays
in implementing the ELD and other frameworks.452 Such discretion permits
the relaxation of restoration standards in practice. This is exacerbated by the
fact that operators are under no obligation under ELD to restore damage
they did not cause or damage for which natural fluctuation is
accountable.453 The ELD requires that soil be remediated so that significant
risks capable of adversely affecting human health are removed.454
Under the IPPC Directive, when an IPPC licenced activity is ended,
the site must be returned to a “satisfactory state.”455 The IPPC Directive is
prospective in that it focuses on licensing activities to prevent future
harm.456 This forward-oriented approach is also apparent in the vagueness
447.
See id. at 16 (“The competent authority then evaluates the various options and
selects the most appropriate one on the basis of a set of criteria.”).
448.
See ELD, supra note 62, Annex II.1.3.1.
449.
See id. Annex II.1.3.3.
450.
LUCAS BERGKAMP, THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY DIRECTIVE AND ITS
EFFECTS ON INDUSTRY AND THE ECONOMY, in LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO NATURE 119 (R.
Mellenbergh ed., 2005).
451.
See G.M. Van den Broek, Environmental Liability and Nature Protection Areas:
Will the EU Environmental Liability Directive Actually Lead to the Restoration of Damaged
Natural Resources?, 5 UTRECHT L. REV. 117, 123–25 (2009).
452.
See REMEDE DELIVERABLE NO. 5, supra note 445, at 18 (“The lack of case law
can be explained by the fact that Member States are behind schedule in implementing of the
[directives].”).
453.
See id. at 12 (“[Negative variations due to natural causes . . . do not constitute a
significant damage within the meaning of the ELD.”).
454.
See ELD, supra note 62, Annex II.2 (“The necessary measures shall be taken to
ensure . . . that the relevant contaminants are removed, controlled, contained, or diminished
so that the contaminated land . . . no longer poses any significant risk of adversely affecting
human health.”).
455.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(f) (stating that member states shall
ensure necessary measures are taken to avoid pollution risk and return the site to a
satisfactory state upon cessation of activities).
456.
See id. art. 1 (stating that the directive “lays down measures designed to prevent
or, where that is not practicable, to reduce emissions in the air, water and land”).
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of the guidelines available on required restoration.457 For example, the
Northern Ireland (NI) guidelines fail to define “satisfactory state”; they
simply repeat the statutory language.458 Similarly, the Commission
guidelines on IPPC pay little attention to restoration standards.459
Nevertheless, the Directive seems to imply that “satisfactory” means at
least the standard prevailing when the licence was granted; Recital 10 in the
Preamble endorses the principle of sustainable development and the NI
guidelines require the operator to “put things right.”460
In determining what constitutes a “satisfactory state,” it is
suggested that this should mean, at a minimum, that the site and emissions
from it on cessation of the IPPC activity comply with all appropriate and
applicable environmental standards for the relevant environmental medium
when activities cease.461 Moreover, the precautionary and “polluter pays”
principles, combined with Recital 10 committing to a high level of
environmental protection, could (and does in Ireland and the UK)
encourage competent authorities to err on the side of caution and set higher
standards than the minimum necessary to ensure strict compliance with
environmental legislation.462
The MWD is similar to the IPPC Directive. Its Preamble speaks of
restoring the land “to a satisfactory state, with particular regard to soil
quality, wild life, natural habitats, freshwater systems, landscape and
appropriate beneficial uses.”463 Article 12(3) stipulates that, before a site
can be closed, the competent authority must certify its rehabilitation to a
“satisfactory state.”464 As with the IPPC Directive, however, some
457.
458.

See id. art. 3.1 (detailing the obligations of the site operator, including restoration).
See DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, INTEGRATED POLLUTION PREVENTION AND
CONTROL (NORTHERN IRELAND): A PRACTICAL GUIDE 43–47 (2003) [hereinafter INTEGRATED
POLLUTION
PREVENTION
AND
CONTROL],
available
at
http://www.doeni.gov.uk/niea/txt/ippc_practical_guide.pdf (discussing the specifics of site
assessment and restoration).
459.
See European Commission, Guidance on Interpretation and Implementation of the
IPPC
Directive,
EUROPA,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pollutants/stationary/ippc/general_guidance.htm
(last
updated June 21, 2011) (containing no information on restoration) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
460.
See INTEGRATED POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 458, at 45
(“Where an operator breaches a permit condition, causing pollution, the Chief Inspector may
issue enforcement notices to make the operator put things right while the installation is still
in operation.”).
461.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, pmbl. ¶ 10.
462.
See id.
463.
MWD, supra note 81, art. 3(20).
464.
See id. art. 12(3) (“A waste facility may be considered as finally closed only after
the competent authority has . . . certified that the land affected by a waste facility has been
rehabilitated.”).
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guidelines on restoration employ vague language or repeat the
“satisfactory” requirement without elaboration.465 General practice in
authorizations in the UK and Ireland is to require restoration to a state
suitable for permitted uses and to require compliance with all relevant
environmental standards at the time of closure.466 In many cases,
constructions which facilitated mining (e.g., mills, sheds, etc.) must be
demolished and removed unless permission is given for their use for
alternative purposes.467
All applicable Directives require “necessary” rather than
“practicable” steps to be taken.468 According to Jan Jans and Hans Vedder’s
analysis, in a different context, this tightens the discretion of authorities and
thus strengthens standards.469 Furthermore, the standard of soil remediation
required under the MWD (i.e., to a satisfactory state defined by the
competent authority) can be higher than the standard for soil restoration
under the ELD, which merely requires that significant risks of adversely
affecting humans are removed.470

465.
See, e.g., DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD, AND RURAL AFFAIRS,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING GUIDANCE: THE MINING WASTE DIRECTIVE 28 (U.K. 2010),
available
at
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/policy/permits/documents/ep2010miningwaste.pdf
(lacking any elaboration on the requirements for restoration beyond the satisfactory
standard). The Irish requirements state that the
[U]ltimate aim of the closure plan should be to leave the mine and the tailings
management facility (TMF) site in an acceptable condition which ensures
public health and safety, minimises the risk of contamination and, where
possible, allows productive use of the land or otherwise creates a stable
environment capable of integration into surrounding land uses.
Minerals and the Environment, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
(Ir.),
http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/Natural/Exploration+and+Mining+Division/Environmental+Consid
erations/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
466.
See DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
supra note 465 (describing how the land should be left after closure).
467.
This is typically required in planning permissions for mines. In one Irish case, a
well-built shed was donated to a sporting club for recreational facilities.
468.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(f).
469.
See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 8, at 343 (“Determining necessity accepts the
environmental protection objective whereas practicability involves a balance between the
environmental protection objective and the practical (economic) possibilities of the operator
and may thus result in a less ambitious environmental objective.”).
470.
See ELD, supra note 62, Annex II.2 (“The necessary measures shall be taken to
ensure . . . that the contaminated land . . . no longer poses any significant risk of adversely
affecting human health.”).
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H. Forms of Financial Guarantee
Neither the Landfill Directive nor the MWD nor any other
Directive specifies the form of guarantee required; this is a matter for
Member States.471 Article 14.1 of the MWD mentions “a financial deposit,
including industry-sponsored mutual guarantee funds or equivalent.”472
Financial guarantees take a number of forms, including upfront cash
deposits, trusts, accumulating cash deposits, bonds, letters of credit, escrow
accounts, parent company guarantees, and insurance policies.473 The latter
are sometimes favored by competent authorities, but mining companies find
it difficult or impossible to obtain them and the market for liability
insurance is weak in the UK and Ireland.474 The Irish EPA will normally
only accept cash or an escrow account for known liabilities in MWD, IPPC,
and Waste Site Closure and After-Care Plans, and insurance for a certain
sum for unknown liabilities.475 The four major mining projects in Ireland all
have substantial sums in escrow accounts to cover mine closures and aftercare.476 This was a requirement in the initial planning permissions for the
projects (most of which were commenced before the ELD, MWD, and
Landfill Directives came into force) and, with adjustments to the amounts
and liabilities covered, under conditions in the IPPC licences.477
Parent company guarantees, although common in the past, are
declining in popularity in light of stock market vagaries and growing
distrust of rating agencies.478 There is only a very limited market for
financial security instruments (such as letters of credit, surety bonds,
insurance, and trust funds) in the EU unless, reports Professor Fogleman, a
company is required to have evidence of financial security.479 Apparently
liabilities under ELD are not generally covered under standard general
471.
See, e.g., MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.1.
472.
Id. art. 14(1).
473.
See EPA, Guidance on Environmental Liability, supra note 377, 37–51 (detailing
various types of financial guarantees); C. GEORGE MILLER ET AL, Surveys of Current
Practice, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR
MINE
CLOSURE
AND
RECLAMATION
42
(2005),
available
at
http://www.icmm.com/document/282.
474.
See id. at 44 (detailing the advantages and disadvantages of insurance as a
guarantee).
475.
See id. at 8 (detailing the financial instruments acceptable for known and unknown
liabilities).
476.
See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, at 26.
477.
See id. (detailing the financial provisions necessary to cover environmental
liabilities).
478.
See Fogleman, Environmental Liability Directive, supra note 93, at 1455–56
(discussing insurance coverage of ELD liabilities).
479.
See id. at 1444.
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liability insurance, but certain general liability insurers have developed new
wordings designed to extend coverage for ELD liabilities.480 Marsh Insurers
report that it is possible to get cover for primary, complementary, and
compensatory remediation required under ELD.481 Marsh also reported that
in 2010 only four EU Member States had compulsory financial insurance
requirements for ELD liabilities.482
Under the ELD, where there is more than one operator, Member
States may impose joint and several or proportionate liability for preventing
or remedying environmental damage.483 The UK and Ireland make
operators jointly and severally liable, with the result that insurers are
reluctant to insure one operator where others involved in the mining waste
activity are not also insured.484
I. Recovery of Costs for Environmental Damage Under the ELD
As discussed above, most mining, including the management of
mining waste, is probably covered by the ELD.485 Under the ELD, a
competent authority may recover costs incurred for taking preventive or
remedial measures in respect of environmental damage within five years
from the date on which it completes the measures or identifies the liable
operator or a “third party who has caused the damage or the imminent
threat of damage,” whichever is later.486 This latter could be a third party
who has caused environmental damage despite appropriate preventive
measures taken by an operator or it could be a third party acting on behalf
of a competent authority.487 The ELD specifically directs Member States to
480.
See id. at 1456.
481.
See MARSH LTD., NEW ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES FOR EU COMPANIES 4 (2009),
available
at
http://documents.marsh.com/documents/NewEnvironmentalliabilitiesforEUcompaniesv10.p
df.
482.
See id. (stating that Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, and Sweden have compulsory
financial security requirements).
483.
See ELD, supra note 63, art. 9 (“This Directive is without prejudice to any
provisions of national regulations concerning cost allocation in cases of multiple party
causation.”). See also John Ronan & Sons Ltd. v. Clean Build and Others, [2011] IEHC 350,
available
at
http://courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/09859e7a3f34669680256ef3004a27de/ffb8dd3ef7be7ae58025
7918004ddbaa?OpenDocument, for an important Irish case on the allocation of costs
between multiple parties for decontaminating land.
484.
See Fogleman, Environmental Liability Directive, supra note 93, at 1451.
485.
See supra note 69.
486.
ELD, supra note 63, art. 10.
487.
See id. art. 11.3 (“[T]he competent authority may empower or require third parties
to carry out the necessary preventive or remedial measures.”). In the former case, under
Article 8, paragraph 3(a), the operator would not be liable for the environmental damage
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ensure that a competent authority can empower or order a third party to
carry out preventive or remedial measures, as well as to authorize a
competent authority or an operator to bring a cost-recovery action against
the third party.488
Costs can include legal, enforcement, supervisory, and other
general costs.489 Member States have discretion to provide for a flat rate
calculation of administrative, legal, enforcement, and other general costs to
be recovered.490 An operator may be liable for both its own and a competent
authority’s costs; these can include the costs of assessing actual damage or
the imminent threat of damage, assessing alternative preventive or remedial
actions, collecting data, and monitoring preventive and remedial
measures.491
X. Closed and Abandoned Extractive Waste Facilities
One of the problems with mining waste is that mining companies
may not have the resources necessary to fulfill their closure and after-care
obligations or they may have entered into liquidation or have simply
disappeared. There are many closed and abandoned mines in the EU. This
is an issue addressed in Article 20 of the MWD which requires Member
States to:
[E]nsure that an inventory of closed waste facilities,
including abandoned waste facilities, located on their
territory which cause serious negative environmental
impacts or have the potential of becoming in the medium or
short term a serious threat to human health or the
environment is drawn up and periodically updated. Such an
inventory, to be made available to the public, shall be
carried out by May 1, 2012, taking into account the
methodologies as referred to in Article 21, if available.492
The waste referred to is waste as defined in Article 2.1 of the
MWD, i.e., “extractive waste,” meaning “waste resulting from the
prospecting, extraction, treatment and storage of mineral resources and the
caused by the third party. See id. art. 8.3(a) (“An operator shall not be required to bear the
cost . . . when he can prove that the environmental damage . . . was caused by a third party
and occurred despite the fact that appropriate safety measures were in place.”).
488.
See id. arts. 10, 11.3.
489.
See id. art. 2.16.
490.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 19.
491.
See id. art. 2.16.
492.
Id. art. 20.
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working of quarries.”493 It includes radioactive waste from the extractive
industries except “such aspects as are specific to radioactivity, which are a
matter dealt with under the Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom).”494 This means that closed and abandoned
waste facilities must only be inventoried if they contain waste directly
resulting from prospecting, extraction, treatment, and storage at land-based
mines. The waste facilities to be inventoried are those defined in Article
3.15.495 The MWD does not define what is meant by “closed” or
“abandoned facilities” but an EU expert group considers “closed” waste
facilities to be “facilities with an identified former owner or licensee and
closed according to former licences or regulations” and “abandoned” waste
facilities to be “facilities without an identified former owner/licensee and/or
not having been closed in a regulated manner.”496
The Article 21 “methodologies” referred to in Article 20 above
which must be taken into account relate to the compilation of inventories
and the rehabilitation of closed and abandoned facilities in order to satisfy
the requirements of Article 4.497 Article 21.1 states that these methodologies
493.
Id. art. 2.1.
494.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 10 (“[T]his Directive should not cover such aspects as are specific
to radioactivity, which are a matter dealt with under the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community.”).
495.
Article 3, paragraph 15 of the MWD defines “waste facility” as
[A]ny area designated for the accumulation or deposit of extractive waste,
whether in a solid or liquid state or in solution or suspension, for the following
time-periods: no time-period for Category A waste facilities and facilities for
waste characterized as hazardous in the waste management plan; a period of
more than six months for facilities for hazardous waste generated
unexpectedly; a period of more than one year for facilities for non-hazardous
non-inert waste; or a period of more than three years for facilities for
unpolluted soil, non-hazardous prospecting waste, waste resulting from the
extraction, treatment and storage of peat and inert waste.
Such facilities are deemed to include any dam or other structure serving to
contain, retain, confine or otherwise support such a facility, and also to
include, but not be limited to, heaps and ponds, but excluding excavation
voids into which waste is replaced, after extraction of the mineral, for
rehabilitation and construction purposes.
Id. art. 3.15.
496.
INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
FOR A RISK-BASED PRE-SELECTION PROTOCOL FOR THE INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE
FACILITIES AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 20 OF DIRECTIVE 2006/21/EC, at 7 (2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/mining/pdf/Pre_selection_GUIDANCE_FINAL.pdf.
497.
See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4 (providing, inter alia, Member States shall take
the necessary measures to ensure that extractive waste is managed without endangering
human health and without using processes or methods which could harm the environment,
and in particular without risk to water, air, soil and fauna and flora, without causing a
nuisance through noise or odours and without adversely affecting the landscape or places of
special interest.”). In addition, the MWD requires that “Member States shall also take the
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are to be developed by the Commission, assisted by the Committee,
referred to in Article 23, comprising representatives from each Member
State.498 According to Article 21.1(b), methodologies shall allow for the
establishment of the “most appropriate” risk assessment procedures and
remedial actions “having regard to the variation of geological,
hydrogeological and climatological characteristics across Europe.”499 The
application of risk assessment methods is therefore required in compiling
the inventory for closed waste facilities that have either known
environmental impacts or potential environmental or human health
impacts.500 It does not require the development and application of a
harmonized risk assessment methodology.501
In order to implement the Directive, the EU Commission and
Member States established the Inventory of Closed Waste Facilities Ad-hoc
Group (AHG), a Sub-Committee of the Technical Adaptation Committee
for Directive 2006/21/EC. This group published a Guidance Document502 in
February 2011 on the use of a pre-selection methodology established during
its consultations for the development of the inventory required by Article
necessary measures to prohibit the abandonment, dumping or uncontrolled depositing of
extractive waste.”
498.
See id. art. 23 (stating that this is the Committee established under Directive
75/442/EEC on waste, as amended, Article 18). Article 18 provides that the Commission
submit drafts of its proposed measures to the Committee, which must respond within a given
time.
[T]he Committee can decide] by the majority laid down in Article 205(2) of
the [EEC] Treaty in the case of decisions which the Council is required to
adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the representatives of
the Member States within the Committee shall be weighted in the manner set
out in that Article. The chairman shall not vote. The Commission shall . . .
adopt the measures envisaged if they are in accordance with the opinion of the
committee. If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion
of the committee, or if no opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without
delay, submit to the Council a proposal relating to the measures to be
taken . . . . The Council [shall] . . . act by a qualified majority. If, on the expiry
of that period [three months] the Council has neither adopted the proposed
implementing act nor indicated its opposition to the proposal for
implementing measures, the proposed implementing act shall be adopted by
the Commission.
Council Decision 1999/468, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23, 25 (EC). Note: Directive
75/442/EEC on waste has been replaced by Directive 2008/98/EC on waste.
499.
MWD, supra note 81, art. 21.1(b).
500.
See id. (“Such methodologies shall allow for the establishment of the most
appropriate risk assessment procedures and remedial actions having regard to the variation
of geological, hydrogeological and climatological characteristics across Europe.”).
501.
See id. art. 21 (discussing the need for risk assessment procedures and cooperation
between Member States in finding best techniques, but not requiring a uniform set of
procedures).
502.
See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496.
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20 of the MWD.503 The guidance is not intended to be definitive or
prescriptive; Member States were told that it should not replace work
already undertaken by them and to use their own standards if desired.504
The objective is to provide a methodology so that Member States can omit
from the inventory of closed waste facilities those which do not cause a
serious threat to human health or do not have the potential to cause a
serious threat to human health and the environment.505 A precautionary
approach is suggested so that if any level of the hazardous506 and
dangerous507 substances referred to in Annex III of the MWD is
encountered, it is recommended that the facility be listed in the inventory
for further investigation.508
Thresholds for these hazardous and dangerous substances were
fixed by Commission Decision 2009/337/EC.509 Facilities exceeding them
must be listed.510 It may be that elevated levels of some hazardous or
dangerous substances present at or near mines are not attributable to mining
activities.511 In such cases, the Guidance Document recommends as
follows:

503.
See id. at 3 (“The objective of the present document is to provide guidance to
Member States on the use of the Pre-selection Methodology established during consultations
of the AHG for the development of the inventory required by Article 20 of the MWD.”).
504.
See id. at 3, 13–15 (“The risk-based pre-selection protocol presented in this
document should not replace the work already undertaken by Member States.”).
505.
See id. at 4 (“This screening should result in the elimination of those facilities
which do not cause a serious threat to human health or have the potential to cause a serious
threat to human health and the environment from the inventory of closed waste facilities.”).
506.
See MWD, supra note 81, Annex III (referring to “waste classified as hazardous
under Directive 91/689/EEC above a certain threshold” when considering the classification
of waste facilities under Category A).
507.
See id. (referring to “substances or preparations classified as dangerous under
Directives 67/548/EEC or 1999/45/EC above a certain threshold” when considering the
classification of waste facilities under Category A).
508.
See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at
4 (describing a precautionary principle for selecting waste facilities to investigate further).
This is because the pre-selection protocol is relatively superficial and is not meant to involve
field sampling or laboratory analysis. Id. The actual levels of these substances will often be
unknown for closed mine waste facilities. Id. Further investigation may lead to the
elimination of the facility from the inventory if the levels of prescribed substances detected
are below the thresholds in Commission Decision 2009/337/EC. Id.
509.
See Comm’n Decision 2009/337, art. 7, 2009 O.J. (L 102) 7, 9 (EC) (defining
threshold ratios for wastes).
510.
See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at
4 (discussing how facilities with substances above the threshold must be listed as a
precautionary measure).
511.
See id. at 5 (“It is important to understand that elevated levels or certain metals at a
now closed mine site may be due to entirely natural processes and not due to the processes
of mining.”).
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In most mining situations prior to the middle of the 20th
Century the pre-mining situation is both unknown and
unknowable. It is important to understand that elevated
levels or certain metals at a now closed mine site may be
due to entirely natural processes and not due to the
processes of mining. However, differentiating between
geogenic and anthropogenic elevated levels is almost
impossible at our current level of scientific understanding.
Therefore, on the basis that it is likely that some of the
elevated levels of metals are due to entirely natural
processes it is inappropriate to attempt to remediate a site
to some form of either global mean or some safe value,
howsoever determined.512
Commission Decision 2009/337/EC also defines what is meant by
the expression “serious threat” to human health or the environment because
only facilities posing a “serious” threat must be inventoried.513 Article 4.2
states that “[i]njuries leading to disability or prolonged states of ill-health
shall count as serious dangers to human health” but that “[t]he potential for
loss of life or danger to human health shall be considered to be negligible or
not serious if people other than workers operating the facility that might be
affected are not expected to be present permanently or for prolonged
periods in the potentially affected area.”514 Serious harm to the environment
is not defined, but Article 4.3 states that a threat will not be serious if “(a)
the intensity of the potential contaminant source strength is decreasing
significantly within a short time; (b) the failure does not lead to any
permanent or long-lasting environmental damage; [and] (c) the affected
environment can be restored through minor clean-up and restoration
efforts.”515
The AHG defines short term as six to twelve months, medium term
as one to ten years, and long term as longer than ten years.516 The AHG
Guidance provides detailed recommendations on the methodology for
compiling the inventory.517 A question which arises is, what happens after
512.
Id. at 5.
513.
See Comm’n Decision 2009/337, supra note 509, art. 7 (discussing how to
determine whether a facility is a serious threat or not).
514.
Id. art. 4.2.
515.
Id. art. 4.3.
516.
See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at
8.
517.
See id. at 3 (stating that the objective of the guidance is to “provide guidance to
Member States on the use of the Pre-selection Methodology established during consultations
of the AHG for the development of the inventory required by Article 20 of the MWD”).
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compilation of the inventory of problematic mine waste facilities by
Member States? It is clear that if an operator of such a facility can be
located, Article 4.2 of the MWD obliges Member States to “ensure that the
operator takes all measures necessary to prevent or reduce as far as possible
any adverse effects on the environment and human health brought about as
a result of the management of extractive waste.”518 This includes
management of the facility after closure, the prevention of major accidents
involving the facility, and the limitation of their consequences for human
health and the environment.519
Curiously, neither the Directive nor the Decision imposes any
specific or clear obligation on Member States themselves to act where an
abandoned mine waste facility (or a facility which the operator cannot
rehabilitate) is causing serious negative environmental impacts or has the
potential to become a serious threat to human health or the environment in
the medium or short term. The purpose of the methodology for
rehabilitation, required under Article 21.1(b), is stated to be “in order to
satisfy the requirements of Article 4.”520 Article 4 requires Member States
“to take the necessary measures” to ensure that extractive waste is managed
so as not to harm the environment or endanger human health.521 The
question which then arises is whether Article 4 requires a Member State
itself to rehabilitate a closed mine listed in the Article 20 inventory. Given
the ECJ’s propensity for expansive interpretation of Member State
obligations under the Waste Directives,522 and the fact that a facility will
only be listed in the Article 20 inventory if the Member State itself has
determined that it is causing serious negative environmental impacts or has
the potential to cause serious human health or environmental damage
within 10 years,523 it is highly likely that the ECJ would interpret a Member
State’s obligations under Article 4 to include the rehabilitation of closed or
abandoned extractive waste facilities if no operators can be found or can be
compelled to do so. This would certainly be the case if infringements of EU
guaranteed human rights were involved.

518.
MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.2.
519.
Id.
520.
Id. art. 21.1(b).
521.
Id. art. 4.1; see also supra note 494.
522.
See, e.g., Case C-188/08, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2009 E.C.R. I-172, ¶ 86; Case C286/08, Comm’n v. Greece, 2009 E.C.R. I-142; Case C-494/01 Comm’n v. Ireland , 2005
E.C.R. I-3331, I-3381.
523.
This is the period classified as short- to medium-term by the AHG. See INVENTORY
OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at 8.
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XI. Conclusions
Overall, it can be said that mining and mining waste are extensively
regulated by EU legislation. There is no comprehensive study on the
effectiveness of this legislation, and it is too early yet to judge this, but, if
codified and properly implemented, the EU model could be emulated in
other jurisdictions. The political structure of the EU has ensured that good,
if not perfect, legislation was enacted to regulate mining and that there is
support at EU level to enforce this legislation when Member States are
patently failing to meet their obligations under EU law. The ECJ has
consistently interpreted environmental laws so as to ensure a high level of
protection for the environment in the EU and its purposive interpretative
techniques fill the voids in Directives which of their nature are sometimes
somewhat nebulous as to what is required in particular situations. The
growing reliance on EU human rights law also augments the capacity of
individuals and NGOs to compel individual Member States to comply with
their obligations with respect to human rights which in practice often
requires the enactment of laws providing for appropriate mining regulatory
regimes and the proper enforcement of EU environmental laws applicable
to mining in national courts. The jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, and, recently, the rulings of the Committee on Social Rights
have provided remedies to those affected by severe pollution from mining
at supranational levels. However, there are still concerns about the proper
implementation and enforcement of EU environmental laws in some
Member States (especially in the newer Member States) and uncertainty
about the nature, extent, and forms of financial provisions which competent
authorities may require operators of mines to provide in respect of
environmental damage from mining activities. A supranational inspectorate
for mines of international significance or having the potential to cause
significant transfrontier environmental damage with powers to question the
performance of national enforcement authorities and the establishment of a
fund to meet liabilities modeled somewhat on the fund established under
the International Conventions on Liability and Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage 1969524 would go a long way to meet these concerns.
Like democracy, the EU system is not perfect and it is still a work in
progress but it is submitted that it does provide an embryonic model for the
regulation of mining globally.

524.
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Oct. 13, 1971,
26 U.S.T. 765.
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